The Berbice Uprising, 1763
History
By Jerome de Freitas (former lecturer and head of the Physics Department at the University of Guyana)
Stabroek News
April 26, 2007
This book on one of the most famous incidents in our history, the Slave Uprising in 1763, by our Sunday Editor, Mrs Anna Benjamin under her maiden name A.J. McR Cameron has just been published and should soon be available for sale in local bookshops. Wit
Preface
This work on the 1763 rising in Berbice was commissioned some twenty years ago by the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) as a school text for students studying the Resistance and Revolt theme on the CXC History Examination syllabus. In the event, it was never published by the Council owing to a lack of funding.
Tailored as the material has been for classroom purposes, full citations of sources have not been included except in the case of the documentary extracts, as well as in those instances where modern secondary sources have been relied upon - namely, Ineke Velzing and Monica Schuler. Since the nomenclature, the plantation vocabulary and the administrative structures in Berbice would have been unfamiliar to students outside Guyana, it was decided to include a relatively long preliminary section, introducing them to the world of a Dutch mainland colony, as well as to append a glossary.
The original specifications for the work required the inclusion of visual material and archival extracts. Brief excerpts from documentary and other sources have been interspersed throughout the text, but there is a dearth of visual material pertaining to eighteenth-century Berbice, and as a consequence in some instances recourse has been made to illustrations in J.G. Stedman's Narrative of a five years' expedition against the revolted negroes of Suriname … (1796).
Prologue
On the 4th July 1762, the Dutch slave-ship de Eenigheyt slipped over the bar at the entrance to the Berbice River, and taking the deeper eastern channel past Crab Island, dropped anchor in front of Post St. Andries. Among the two hundred and eighty-six slaves packed in her reeking hold was a young man named Atta, who was destined to become one of the great leaders of the 1763 Uprising. Chained near to him was his ship-brother Quabi, who was to follow him loyally to the end of his life. At this point, Atta had less than two years to live, but before he met his death, he and others would rock the Dutch plantation system in the Guianas to its very foundations. Before the Dutch would be able to reassert control over their colony, they would have been forced to mount the most massive military expedition against their former slaves ever seen in that part of the hemisphere. Never again until 1791 would any European nation come so close to losing an entire colony to its slaves.
Part II
The Background
to the Uprising
Dutch regulations against revolt
Like the other West Indian colonies, the Dutch passed regulations to try and reduce the likelihood of revolt. The Company had a rule about black:white ratios, for example, which was never really enforced. According to the regulation, a plantation had to have one White for every 15 Blacks. The biggest transgressor of this rule, however, was the Company itself, whose average plantation ratio of 1:26 was well above that of the average private ratio of 1:12, although many private plantations broke the rule too. As it happened, those plantations which led the Uprising in 1763 did not have unusual ratios, while some of the plantations with very high black:white ratios took no part in it.
The Dutch had introduced Pass Laws into Berbice in order to restrict slave movement and make it difficult for slaves on different plantations to conspire together. As in other colonies, a slave was not allowed beyond the boundaries of his plantation without a written pass from his master. Two ordinances on the subject from 1735 and 1738 were completely ignored by everyone, and in 1739, the administration tried a different approach by ordering the chaining-up of corials at weekends. As with the earlier ones, it would appear that this ordinance too was totally disregarded by all and sundry.
In order to ensure that the seeds of revolt were not imported from outside, an ordinance was passed in 1762, prohibiting planters from bringing in slaves from another colony if those slaves had ever been before the courts there.
Ordinance of 1739
On closer reflection regarding the disorders which are caused daily by the frequent roaming of negro slaves on the river, especially on Saturday and Sunday nights, His Excellency the Governor and Councilors have thought fit … to order … both Colony planters and free inhabitants … to ensure that all the boats, namely the small canoes or corials which are on the plantations under their management, and which belong to the plantation or to the slaves are chained up early at the aforementioned period, to wit Saturday and Sunday evening in order thus to prevent the roaming around at night of the aforementioned slaves; and those who might not have a chain are earnestly instructed to obtain one within the period of one year on pain of a fine of 25 guilders …
Van Hoogenheim, 1764
Besides letting them [i.e] the slaves roam around at night is one of the greatest mistakes in the handling of slaves. It has always happened here and I complained about it frequently. Probably it is one of the chief causes of then entire revolution.
Conditions in Berbice unfavourable to revolt
Despite the laxity of the Dutch authorities and planters, the great Uprising of 1763 is, at first impression, a surprising event in terms of West Indian history. Some of the conditions normally associated with revolt simply did not exist in Berbice. The slave population was very mixed, and there was no large concentration of any one linguistic group who could have organized a rebellion. In fact, there was simply no large concentration of population anywhere in Berbice. A handful of plantations in the same parish could easily supply a body of 1,000 men in Jamaica, but in Berbice the manpower of nearly an entire division had to be mustered in order to achieve that total.
From the point of view of revolt, geographical conditions were not really in the slaves' favour either, owing to the ribbon-like lay-out of plantations. Organization and secrecy would have presented major problems in such circumstances. There was also the difficulty of the Amerindians. It would not have been easy to plot a large-scale uprising without the plantation Amerindians, at least, knowing about it. Some plantation Amerindians may well have been sympathetic to the slaves, but this was certainly not something that conspiring slaves could have relied upon. If a small revolt actually got underway, its chances of success were severely limited by the presence of the bush tribes, who normally assisted the Dutch in stamping out maroon communities.
From Head Division upwards, where the river is much narrower, it was also easy for plantations on the opposite side to come to the aid of a beleaguered planter. The river acted as a sounding board, amplifying noises on the other bank, so that unless rebels were very discreet, they attracted attention to themselves long before they had time to spread the revolt to other estates, or make good their escape into the bush.
Earlier revolts
Not surprisingly, therefore, revolts were not all that common in Berbice. Of the few that occurred before 1763, all were very small-scale. The first recorded revolt was in Canje in 1733 or 4, and involved a dozen Company slaves. These had been hired out to employees of the Vernesobre family who were laying out their new plantation of Monbijoux. The slaves were so brutally treated that they finally decided to kill their tormentors and run away. The Indians killed some of them, and brought in the rest from the bush.
In 1749 and 1752, there were two small revolts in Upper Division. These also involved small groups, both of which attempted to set up maroon camps in the bush. Owing to the noise they made, they soon attracted attention to themselves, and their efforts were easily frustrated.
In 1762, another similar incident occurred. On this occasion, however, the Dutch proved very incompetent in dealing with the situation, and the episode had some very far-reaching consequences. The slaves from two plantations in Upper Divison belonging to the same planter ran away and set up a maroon encampment beyond "Savonette. For one reason or another, it took the Dutch nearly two months to wipe out the settlement of only twenty-six people. For one thing, the Amerindians proved very unwilling for once to co-operate with the Dutch in attacking the camp. Van Hoogenheim was extremely angry and complained that "the cowardice of our Indians is indescribable, as they had the ability to overpower such a small number of vagabonds". The accusation of cowardice might have been more aptly applied to the Governor's own burgher-militia, as the Amerindians were very quick to point out. They said that they thought that the Whites had behaved in a cowardly fashion, and had not appeared to want to put themselves out, so they hardly saw why they (the Indians) should do so. They also complained that arrows and bows were of little use against rebels armed with muskets. This last point, at least, was taken to heart by the Dutch, who issued their Amerindian supporters with firearms in the Great Uprising of 1763.
For the very first time, the slaves saw the inability of the Whites to cope with a very minor revolt, and much more amazing still, they also witnessed the total lack of co-operation on the part of the Indians.
The Head Division slaves, at least, appreciated the enormous significance of this new development.
When the Dutch finally wiped out the 1762 settlement, very few of the maroons survived for the Dutch to put on trial. Ironically, the man who was executed for his part in the revolt was named Coffy, and just before going out to his execution, he spoke some prophetic words, which were recorded by Commissary Wijland.
Before he was brought out of the Fort he was still asking for a glass of kilthum. I had this given to him in accordance with the orders of the Governor and asked him whether he did not wish that he had not done it; but he said that now it did not matter, but that where they failed, others would succeed.
Situation prior to 1763
Since Berbice did not have a history of revolt, and conditions generally did not make it easy for slaves who were inclined to revolution, what was it in 1763, that made such a massive Uprising possible? Perhaps the most important single factor was the breakdown of Dutch authority, and the loss of administrative confidence which accompanied it. From 1762, the planters were nervous and panicky, seeing the shadow of revolt in every slave movement and whispered conversation. They were firmly convinced their slaves were on the brink of revolt and, in the end, their expectations were not disappointed. Their almost fatalistic attitude is illustrated by Burgher-Captain Kunckler, who fled immediately on receipt of the news of the 1763 Uprising, saying to his neighbour:
… my dear neighbour, it is over for us and the Colony.
The "Raging Sickness"
The most important single reason for this breakdown of authority was an epidemic which struck the colony at the end of the 1750s. The illness has never been properly identified, but it may have been yellow fever. Initially, all races were affected by it, but the Blacks seem to have had a greater resistance to it than others. It took its heaviest toll on the Whites, as the Amerindians started to move out of the colony to healthier regions in order to escape it. Not only were white ranks seriously depleted, therefore, but the normal Amerindian population was also drastically reduced. The Amerindians that remained proved far less co-operative than was usual. Once the Amerindian screen was down, revolt became a much easier proposition for the slaves.
If this were not sufficient cause to make the planters nervous, they were rendered doubly alarmed by the knowledge that the disease had struck the colony's military garrison with particular force. Van Hoogenheim simply did not have the available military manpower to deal with even the smallest crisis. Even if the military had none too good a reputation under normal circumstances, at least their psychological presence served a very important function. The burgher-militia was in no better position; it could not muster because the planter population was so seriously affected by the sickness. It was partly because they could not raise sufficient manpower that the Dutch took two months to deal with the rebels of 1762.
In these circumstances, every minor incident sent waves of panic surging through the white population. After the 1762 revolt, for example, the planters imagined that they saw rebellion everywhere. In one case, the director of Savonette complained to the Governor that his slaves would not work for him. In another instance, rumours circulated around the colony that the fort slaves were on the verge of rising up; when these were investigated, however, they were found to be groundless. Stories of this kind fed the obsessional fears of the planters who most likely responded with an excessive use of both the ordinary whip and the spaanse-bok, in an attempt to bolster their authority.
This disease raged on for several years until 1765. It seemed to go in waves, appearing with particular virulence every time newcomers arrived in the colony. Van Hoogenheim lost his own wife to the disease shortly after his arrival in 1760. He himself also contracted it, but apparently was of a sufficiently robust constitution to survive it. One of the most virulent phases of the disease coincided with the beginning of the Uprising, whereafter it was sustained by all the foreign troops which came into the country.
The Slaves
1. Food
Not only were there special external conditions which made successful revolt a viable proposition for the first time in many years, but it would appear that the slaves were more disposed than usual for revolt. The first cause for dissatisfaction was a reduction in the normal rations. It would appear that by 1762-3, Berbice slaves could no longer lay claim to being the best-fed slaves in the Caribbean. Some of the private slaves were even complaining to the Amerindians that they were not getting anything to eat. Coffy himself gave as one of the causes of the Uprising the fact that "there have been many gentlemen who have not given the slaves their due".
One of the reasons for the shortage of imported foodstuffs seems to have been the Seven Years' War in Europe (1756-1763). Those boats which came into Berbice at the beginning of the 1760s often brought supplies that were either spoiled, or of very inferior quality. In addition, the winter of 1762 was an exceptionally hard one in the United Provinces; many boats simply could not leave the harbour. Supply ships for Berbice were no exception; those due to arrive at the end of 1762 did not even leave port until the beginning of 1763.
The problem of supplies affected Company slaves as much as private ones, and Van Hoogenheim was extremely alarmed by this. The Governor's answer to the problem was local fish from the Canje River, although this proved only partially successful. Most of the private planters almost certainly did not bother to seek sources of protein for their slaves, and again probably resorted to an even greater arbitrary use of the whip to keep them in line than was customary.
Letter from Van Hoogenheim to the Directors of the Company, 1762
The misery that our plantations have suffered for a considerable time past, has been so great, that unless I had a mind to help them your Honours could not have believed what an evil impression this would have caused on the minds of the slaves and in our straitened circumstances, to what worse results they might have often given rise, - wherefore I beg and supplicate that your Honours be pleased to provide a further supply of victuals for the fort as well as for the plantations.
2.Planter cruelty
The second reason the slaves gave for the Uprising was the cruelty of particular planters whom they named. These included Anthonij Barkeij and his overseer of Lelienburg; Widow Janssen of Nieuw Caraques, Van Staden of Elisabeth & Alexandria, Gysbert De Graef of Hoogstraaten, Burgher-CaptainVan Lentzing of Margaretha Christina and Johan Dell of Juliana. There were also some Company servant on the list, although none of these was a plantation director or 'negro officer'. Two of the Company servants, Vendue-master Wijs and Lieutenant Pronk were related to Anthonij Barkeij, and were presumably frequent visitors to Lelienburg.
It is very difficult to know how Berbice planter cruelty in general compared with that in other colonies. In one way it might be thought that since Berbice planters had very great difficulty replacing slaves, they would have been a good deal more cautious about inflicting life-endangering punishments than the planters in Suriname or Jamaica. Nevertheless, there were clearly a number of planters who were guilty of extreme brutality to their slaves. Perhaps one of the unusual features about Berbice was that the nature and frequency of punishment could very considerably from one plantation to the next. The first obvious variation was between Company and private estates, but there were also differences between the private plantations as well. The slaves were extremely conscious of these differences and distinguished 'good' and 'bad' planters. Since the slaves roamed the river quite freely, they had ample opportunity to make comparisons in their own area. Coffy, for example, must have seen for himself the differences in the punishment meted out to the slaves of his plantation, compared to the various Company plantations in his district. In the larger colonies, the planters were always very conscious of the importance of having certain accepted standards in the treatment of slaves. These standards were still brutal, but not to have any at all, where each individual planter did what he felt like, was thought to invite trouble.
It is more than likely that the incidence of brutal punishments had actually increased on some plantations prior to 1763. The planters were extremely nervous, and the slaves very uncooperative owing to the shortage of rations. In that case, the slaves would have experienced a very real deterioration in all aspects of their daily life before the Uprising.
Van Hoogenheim,
March 5th 1763
The two leaders of the rebels had ordered Ramring to bring me a message in which they informed me of the cause of the revolt, namely the cruel mistreatment [of slaves] by a party of inhabitants, whose full names were given, etc.
Van Hoogenheim,
March 8th, 1763
This morning master planter Schreuder's wife arrived from upriver … She said that the runaways were very embittered against a group of our inhabitants who had always cruelly mistreated them.
Letter from Coffy to Van Hoogenheim, 1763
Mr. Van Lentzing is hard and so are many others. If all Christians were as kind as the Governor, Gillessen and Schirmeister then the Negroes would not have acted as they have.
3. Freedom
It goes without saying that all slaves wanted their freedom. However, they were practical. Revolt was an extremely dangerous enterprise, with a very low success rate. The consequences of failure too, were grievous. Organizing a widespread rising, and keeping it secret were also very difficult, as can be seen in the case of Berbice. So even though slaves longed to be free, and individuals or small groups might make private decisions to seek freedom by running away, it was not very often that large numbers of people chose the option of revolt. Generally, before they would do so, there had to be the opportunity, giving at least the possibility of success; there had to be leaders; and perhaps, in some cases, there had to be a deterioration in what were already inhuman living conditions, which affected a large number of people.
In the year 1763 in Berbice, all these things were obtained.
