Be prepared
Editorial
"Venezuela will not get into conflict with Guyana," blazoned the Guyana Chronicle headline on Wednesday, April 12. The lead story, based on the BBC radio programme Caribbean Report, said that during a state visit to Venezuela by Brazil's President Cardoso, President Chavez had called Guyanese "our brethren," and had sent them his "best wishes." According to the newspaper, he expressed confidence that the United Nations' role in the controversy would lead to a satisfactory and peaceful solution. He was further quoted as saying that this solution had to be one between brothers, "as it should be in this America of ours." All of this might be very reassuring. Possibly. But it has to be set against a report reflecting a different tone published in last week's edition of this newspaper. According to the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, President Chavez said during a speech at Lomas de Urdaneta in Sucre province, that he was going to rescue from obscurity Venezuela's historical claim to Essequibo. It had been a forgotten matter, he was reported as telling his audience, but one had to speak about it again, "so that the little ones may know where Bird Island is, the Guayana Essequibo, the Arauca River... " According to the report, he attributed the obscurity of the issue to what he called the moral degradation of the political class. "That is territory [Essequibo] which we need," he was quoted as saying, although he added that Venezuela was going to arrive at a "peaceful agreement" with Guyana. The only statement which the two pieces have in common is that President Chavez went on record as stating that he wanted a peaceful solution to his country's controversy with this nation over the border. No doubt he does. But supposing for the sake of argument, that the 'peaceful solution' is longer in coming than he had anticipated. Where does he go then? In any case, if he were in principle prepared to apply pressure to this country in a less than brotherly fashion, he surely is not going to advertise his intentions in advance, particularly in the presence of the President of Brazil on the occasion of a state visit. It is true that the Venezuelan Head-of-State was targeting different audiences in the two addresses which were reported - the first international, and the second local. To which, therefore, did he speak his mind - the first, the second, neither or both? In fact, it really doesn't matter which exactly it is; all that has to be considered is the potential consequences of what he stated. Where this is concerned, the problem lies with what was said in Sucre, not what he said in the presence of President Cardoso. Any resuscitation of a consciousness of the claim among the Venezuelan public will cause Guyana difficulties sooner or later. We have been down that road before, when Essequibo was first put on Venezuelan stamps, maps and children's exercise books. No matter how good President Chavez' intentions, and no matter that (for the sake of argument) his remarks in Lomas de Urdaneta were not meant to be taken too seriously, he could still become a prisoner of his own rhetoric. Once public feeling on the issue has been ignited, he will find his ambit of choice restricted, and he will be under pressure to deliver a success where the border is concerned. The Government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which advises it, have given the impression that they are all too willing to believe the soothing platitudes issuing from west of the border and to ignore those which might be a source of unease. In addition, there is a tendency to listen to words and ignore actions as indicators of possible intent. There is no problem appearing to believe the expressions of brotherly love in public; privately, however, the duty of the Ministry is not to base policy on subjective assessments of motives, but on an analysis of objective facts. And what are a few of those facts? 1. Venezuela has a claim against Guyana's territory, not the other way around, which leaves no room for compromise. 2. Venezuela's 'solution' to a controversy generated by her has always been land at Guyana's expense, and that hasn't changed. No matter what the Venezuelan President's statements about 'brotherhood' have been, therefore, (and no doubt these are genuinely intended) he still wants land. 3. While Guyana's ideal solution would be to have Venezuela abandon the claim, no Venezuelan government could possibly afford to do that under normal circumstances, particularly not President Chavez' administration. Given his rhetoric, even freezing the issue is not an option for the current Venezuelan regime. All relations with Venezuela - political, economic, cultural or whatever - have to be seen in the context of a claim which no magic wand can make disappear. All of which doesn't mean to say that we shouldn't be avidly pursuing friendly relations in a multiplicity of areas so we keep cooperating thereby relieving tensions, but it does mean that we have to confront the fact that no matter how many high level bilateral commissions are set up, these will have no impact on the reality of the claim. That being so, the other thing which the Ministry should take into consideration is that the problem could flare up at any time, and not necessarily with very much warning. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should adopt the motto of the Boy Scouts as his own: be prepared.
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