Some aspects of the Guyana/Suriname Sea Boundary
By Harold Sahadeo CCH
Introduction The significant aspects of the boundary controversy between Guyana and Suriname are linked with the general history of the European powers, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to secure a presence in the New World. The early settlements did not fall under the direct authority of the British or Dutch sovereigns, but was administered by commercial establishments. The Dutch arrived first with Abraham Van Peere settling a colony in 1627 in Berbice. In 1651 Lord Willoughby of Parnham and Lawrence Hyde settled in Suriname under a grant from Charles II. In the beginning, therefore, Suriname was an English colony and Berbice a Dutch possession. Subsequently, as a result of imperial rivalries the colonies frequently changed hands; on some occasions, either of the two powers took possession of both colonies. These changes had consequences on developments on the boundary question between the two colonies and later the two independent states. Up to about 1930, there were in fact no boundary disputes between the two colonies. For instance, a significant agreement made in 1799 by two Dutch Governors who were administering the affairs of the then two British colonies was more concerned with which colony should have control over particular lands. Also in 1831 when the three colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice were united in one colony British Guiana, the eastern boundary of the united colony remained undefined. A further example was the British decision to commission a survey of the boundaries of the new colony of British Guiana. Sir Robert Schomburgk was engaged for this task by the British Government and Suriname was invited to participate in the survey. The Government of Suriname declined the invitation explaining that it had no instructions to do so, and further there was no difference of opinion on the boundary. It was not until the 1930s that some ambivalence surfaced on the Dutch attitude to the boundary question as the prospect for the discovery of oil dawned in the estuary of the Corentyne river. Nevertheless, the Dutch government in 1935 recognised the Kutari River as the continuation of the Corentyne River and both rivers as the border rivers. The frontier line was also acknowledged to run along the thalweg of the Corentyne and Kutari rivers. Further, the Dutch Government became a party in a tripartite Mixed Boundary Commission to fix the trijunction of the boundary points of Brazil, British Guiana and Suriname. In effect, therefore, no link was established between the border on the Corentyne/Kutari Rivers and the boundary on the sea, as happened later. Draft treaties on the sea boundary In 1927 the Dutch proposed the holding of discussions for signing a treaty on the boundary question. The discussions began in 1931, but following the custom of the time the first draft of the treaty was forwarded by the United Kingdom to the Netherlands in 1935. The Dutch in their original draft of 1931 proposed a 28 degree line, but this line was changed to a 10 degree by the Mixed Commission in 1936. Subsequent drafts were submitted by the two sides up to 1939, when work on the final draft of the treaty was interrupted by the outbreak of the War in Europe. After the war the question of concluding a treaty was renewed. The British prepared a revised draft in 1949, but no agreement was reached by the two sides. The Netherlands then proposed in 1958 that a line following the equidistance principle be drawn to divide the continental shelf adjacent to Suriname and British Guiana. The British in 1961 following the latest Dutch suggestion revised the 1949 Draft and proposed that the sea boundary should follow the ten degree line up to a distance of six miles and thereafter in a direction of 34 degrees east of true north but plotting according to the equidistance principle. The Dutch changed course in 1962 and produced a counter draft conceding to British Guiana a boundary on the thalweg of the river in consideration of the New River Triangle area being recognised as Suriname's territory. They also suggested that the sea boundary should commence at the point where the thalweg met the mouth of the river and thereafter follow a straight line 10 degree east of true north. These proposals were difficult to implement and were rejected. Part of the difficulties rests with the fact that there are two channels at the mouth of the river, with the eastern channel the deeper of the two and more navigable. In 1965, the British Government after consultation with the British Guiana Government proposed a new draft restating the 1961 British Draft and suggesting a sea boundary following the median line from the left bank along the line where the two markers intersect the low waterline and then drawn according to the equidistance principle. This proposal elicited no response from the Dutch. After independence, the Republic of Guyana delivered a modified draft treaty in 1971 following the lines of the 1965 British Draft. There was again no discussion on the latest British Draft and it was considered rejected by Suriname. Suriname has made no proposal for a settlement of the issue since that date or especially since that country became independent in 1975. There is therefore no treaty recognising the precise frontier line on the Corentyne and Kutari rivers and on the sea boundary between Guyana and Suriname. The fixing of the trijunction point between the two countries and Brazil remained the only positive achievement on the boundary question. Conditions for determining sea boundary It will be noted as mentioned above that the 1961 and 1965 British Draft Treaties employed the principle of equidistance. This principle was enshrined in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the Continental Shelf which were open for signature in 1958 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in December, 1982. These conventions underlined the need for neighbouring states first to determine their sea boundary by agreement. Where there is no agreement or where there has been failure to reach agreement the equidistance principle becomes automatically applicable unless one side can prove there is historic title or other special circumstance. Note should be taken that in the case of the continental shelf there is no proviso for historic title, for the simple reason that the concept of continental shelf is relatively new as it developed after World War II. Suriname, in its attempt to claim a 10 degree line in the territorial sea and continental shelf, will be hard put to show any special circumstance as provided in the convention. Certainly, it will be difficult to prove that she has historic title to a 10 degree line. For these reasons Guyana may decide to declare a unilateral delimitation of an equidistance boundary on both the territorial sea and continental shelf or exclusive economic zone. The precipitate action by the Suriname Government in forcing the CGX oil rig from its original position (in what is clearly Guyanese territory) is contrary to international law and practice and will be counter-productive to its own interests in the immediate future. This decision may be dictated more by the local political situation and is consonant with the style of Suriname's negotiating behaviour as discerned once in the recent past. Some highlights of Guyana/Suriname relations 1967 - Shortly after the attainment of independence, one of the first visits of a foreign head of government to Guyana was that of the Suriname Minister-President to Guyana. Suriname was still a dependent state of the Netherlands. 1969 - High tensions developed in the relations between the two countries arising from the military action taken by Guyana to evict Suriname military personnel operating in the New River Triangle area. Guyana opened its Consulate General in Paramaribo 1970 - Meetings between Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and Prime Minister Jules Sedney in Port-of-Spain, Georgetown and Paramaribo. Discussions related to follow-up action after the New Triangle area incident. Agreement also reached on the establishment of the Guyana-Suriname commission, which was made responsible for improving co-operation in economic, social and cultural areas. 1973 - Guyana complained to the Suriname government on the detention and harassment of Guyanese citizens in Suriname. 1975 - Guyana and Suriname established diplomatic relations on Suriname's accession to independence. 1978 - Tensions rose in the two countries' capitals over Guyana's action to implement the provisions of the Guyana Maritime Act on fishing in its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. One Suriname-owned trawler Sugam 20 was impounded; six other foreign trawlers based in Suriname were also impounded. Suriname responded by refusing to grant licences to Guyanese fishermen, loggers and floating-shops operating in Suriname. Guyana's foreign minister held discussions with his Suriname counterpart to resolve these problems in a mutually beneficial manner. Suriname detained 10 balata bleeders who were surveying balata trees along the Corentyne River. While they were later released, their equipment was not returned. 1979 - Three Heads of Government meetings held between Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and Prime Minister Henck Aaron in Barbados, Georgetown and Paramaribo. Agreements were reached in the fields of economic and technical cooperation. Also ministers of both countries would meet to deal with specific aspects of bilateral cooperation. An agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation was signed. The Heads of Government examined proposals for the operation of a jointly owned car-ferry service in the Corentyne River. Agreements were ratified in 1986. A Guyana-Suriname Fishery Agreement was signed Guyana's Police Commissioner visited Suriname to discuss procedures in dealing with the illegal trade in goods, drugs and currency violations and the treatment of Guyanese nationals. 1981 - Guyana's Foreign Minister visited Paramaribo and held discussions with the Suriname Foreign Minister. 1986 - The two foreign ministers met again in Georgetown. 1989 - The President of Suriname, Mr Ramsaywak Shankar paid a state visit to Guyana. The presidents of the two countries agreed to establish the Guyana-Suriname Council, which will be charged to improve cooperation in various sectors. They also discussed measures to activate a trade agreement signed between the two countries. Visit of President H.D. Hoyte to Suriname. The Presidents of Guyana and Suriname agreed on a trade mission from Suriname to visit Guyana. The Surinamese President informed that his government had decided to proceed with the Kababebro Hydro-power project. On the maritime boundary with Guyana both presidents agreed that pending settlement of the border question, the authorities responsible for petroleum development in both countries should agree ... the area of the north eastern and north western seaward boundaries can be jointly utilised by the two countries. 1994 - Visit of President Cheddi Jagan to Suriname. 1995 - Guyana supported Suriname's application for membership in CARICOM. Political developments - Independence, military rule and democratic challenge Suriname, which achieved independence on 25th November, 1975 has had a history of social unrest stemming from its racial/ethnic rivalries. The leadership of the major political party, VHP, the Hindustani United Progressive Party led by J. Lachmon was opposed to Suriname's acceptance of independence status. In 1971, though his party won a majority of parliamentary seats, Lachmon supported Frank Essed as Minister-President. In the 1977 election Henck Aaron's Suriname National Party with the support of minority parties formed the government. Racial tensions resulted in the emigration of 150,000 Surinamese by 1979 and in early 1980, the rate increased to about one thousand a month, mainly to the Netherlands. Suriname was the beneficiary of a US$ 2 billion grant on Independence, but the government spent large sums on grandiose schemes, which did nothing to alleviate poverty in the country. The government became widely unpopular, thus giving impetus to the military coup in February 1980 led by Desi Bouterse. The military-dominated government adopted a policy of appointing civilian cabinet ministers but this strategy did not reduce the pressures for a return to civilian rule. Elections for a constitutional government were held in 1987, but under pressure from the Maroon insurgency the military again intervened in the government. In May, 1991, the military faced with mounting international pressure, permitted new elections to be held. The New Front Coalition, comprised of former rival parties, VHP and NPS, and two smaller parties formed the government. The New Front government secured moderate improvements but lost support and failed to regain control of the government in the 1996 elections. Bouterse's National Democratic Party was able to form a coalition government with support from other small parties. This coalition government suffered several setbacks. Divisions among the parties and reshuffling of cabinet posts undermined the government. The economy deteriorated and civilian unrest forced the government to hold national elections on May 25, 2000, one year before schedule. In these elections, the National Front recovered ground in winning 33 out of 51 parliamentary seats, but still one short of the two-thirds majority required to name the President and the Vice-President. Bouterse's Millennium Combination was the only other party to win a large block of seats, but lost 12 seats held in the last parliament. The party of current President Wijdenbosch, the Democratic National Platform 2000, now led by Natural Resources Minister Errol Alibux, won two seats. Three small parties will send representatives for the first time. One the BVD, a party split from the Hindustani VHP failed to win a seat; it held five seats in the 1996 parliament. For the election of the new President and the Vice-President the following procedures must be observed. - Meeting of the National Assembly within 30 days after the election results are declared; - the National Assembly shall elect the President and the Vice-President within 30 days after the commencement of the session of the National Assembly; - Each party in combination with at least seven members of parliament can nominate a candidate for president and vice-president; - Each candidate must secure two-thirds of the votes in the National Assembly after two rounds of voting; - In case none of the candidates obtains two-thirds of the votes in the National Assembly, the election is referred to the Peoples Assembly. - The Peoples Assembly consists of 869 representatives of the National Assembly, District Councils and Local Councils. Decision in this Assembly is taken by an ordinary majority of the votes cast, if more than half of the functioning members of the bodies are present. Suriname's negotiating behaviour Suriname's approach to negotiations, which we have already seen recently in the bilateral discussions and at the CARICOM Heads meeting in St Vincent and the Grenadines, must be viewed from its political culture, its domestic institutions and its external environment. Its political ideology regards crisis as a norm as the society moves from one difficulty to another. Its political officials do not regard agreements and understandings reached with foreign actors as sacrosanct. The agreements are neither honoured nor ratified. Any kind of excuse is made to reject agreements signed by outgoing governments, reference will be made to administrative and personnel problems. Any compromises made are transitory. Political considerations are dominant over technical or pragmatic solutions. Suriname's historical experience has left an indelible mark on its perception of the world. Its colonial record is more brutal than that of any other of its neighbours. During the slave trade period about 325,000 Africans were brought to work on the plantations. A mere 33,600 were left when slavery was abolished in 1863. Thousands died from overwork, mistreatment and disease. Suriname's foreign relations are governed by its relationship with the metropolitan power; the country stayed within the orbit of the Netherlands, thanks to the financial agreements brokered with The Hague and the large Surinamese population which migrated to Holland. Suriname also finds itself isolated among neighbours who speak languages other than Dutch. This separation is further reinforced by an array of self-created ethnic groups, which makes it difficult to break out of the Dutch sphere of influence. The military interventions in government have had a deleterious effect on social and political life in Suriname. The people still feel threatened by new military action or by violence from insurgency groups. With the constant rise and fall of governments, the steady reshufflings and resignations of ministers, political leaders are hesitant to make decisions which they fear may cause loss of support or civilian protest action. They also believe that any signs of weakness or appeasement might appear as if they are giving up too much and would cause them loss of political support. There is therefore a tendency to adopt a wait-and-see attitude in negotiations, for which they have perfected their own peculiar techniques. Conclusion It is a matter of deep regret that in a problem involving two CARICOM states, which by the definition of an integration movement cannot settle a boundary claim by peaceful negotiations. This writer understands that a similar issue arose between two neighbouring countries about 20 years ago when Trinidad & Tobago was exploring for oil/natural gas on the projection of the boundary line from the Columbus Channel eastward. Venezuela noted the development but advised its neighbour that if and when oil is found then they were expected to hold discussions on a joint regime. No gunboats or destroyers were sent to the area of operation. Suriname, since its independence, has been a member of the Organisation of American States, the Amazon Pact, the International Bauxite Association, the African, Caribbean, Pacific Group of Countries and CARICOM along with other international institutions. It has not taken an active role in the work of these organisations adopting instead an indifferent profile. At the moment focus on the CGX oil rig operation will be centred on the efforts of CARICOM. If no success is achieved at the regional level where apparently Suriname is reluctant to present its case, then Guyana will have no recourse but to resort to the mechanisms contained in the United Nations Charter - Chapter VI - Pacific Settlement of Disputes - Articles 33 to 38. It is assumed that Guyana has notified the Security Council of the Suriname Government's action which is a threat to international peace and security. There is no need for Guyana to respond to the military aggression with equal or countervailing power. The Government of Guyana in its own deliberate judgement has opted to budget its scarce resources on economic development and welfare projects rather than on military or naval hardware. Harold Sahadeo is a former Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, the European Union and Cuba and a Director of International Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Follow the goings-on in Guyana
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