Venezuela oil deal
Editorial
Whenever the dust has settled and the issue is crystal clear, there are three concerns that Guyana will retain on the Caracas Energy Accord. The first is that access to the facility should not be used as an economic and political weapon by Venezuela as Caracas' foreign minister Jose Vicente Rangel had originally telegraphed. Secondly, Georgetown would be concerned that the oil largesse is not offered or received in such a way that it weakens even by a smidgeon CARICOM's longstanding backing for Guyana in its territorial controversy with Caracas or sows the seed of division in the movement. A third concern is that if and when it is clarified officially that Guyana can join, if she decides to do so Venezuela should not apply conditions that would have the effect of giving it an advantage in the simmering border controversy between the two countries. No one would begrudge any CARICOM or Latin American country the opportunity of benefiting from the oil available from Caracas on concessionary terms. Roiled by the Middle East crisis and with the spectre of greater output discipline among key OPEC players, it is a reasonable bet that oil prices will continue to sting and get hotter. Guyana also sources its oil from its western neighbour precisely because it is getting a reasonable deal. But it does have legitimate concerns over this addendum to the San Jose Accord and it behoves CARICOM in particular to address these. While Rangel has intimated to CARICOM that no one in the region will be excluded from accessing the accord, his original remarks in a Venezuelan newspaper that oil has always been used as a political weapon and that Guyana will not be included because of a "different conversation" between the two countries prejudiced early discussion on the accord. These remarks have still not been adequately explained and they transmitted that Venezuela was seeking political and other capital out of the energy accord. Further, the method of invitation to this Venezuelan oil bonanza left much to be desired and exposed ulterior motives. Access to the Caracas Accord is automatic for beneficiaries of the San Jose Accord but not for other CARICOM countries and Guyana. Yet, several CARICOM countries were apparently given clear signals that this accord was definitely open to them and they simply had to give the word. This has not been the case with Guyana and in his most recent communication with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rangel did not extend an invitation to Guyana. It seems that Guyana will have to make the first approach to Venezuela. What are the conditions that Caracas will apply for accession to the deal? Have CARICOM countries been told? Will it be broadly uniform for all these countries including Guyana? Does Guyana have to be concerned that in any bilateral engagement with Venezuela on the accord that Caracas will seek to turn the screws as it has shown a willingness to do in the past? Shouldn't CARICOM be concerned about this? If Venezuela's intentions were straightforward should it not have offered the oil facility to CARICOM as a whole as opposed to sending conflicting signals to its various members and shouldn't CARICOM have made this suggestion to it? The CARICOM Bureau meeting in Barbados that welcomed the accord could not have had answers to all of these questions if Guyana is still in the dark. It is difficult to understand, therefore, how no reservations were attached to its welcome and how there was no mention at all of Guyana's concerns. Was it simply the case of oil dollars doing the talking? Jamaica's announcement before the Bureau meeting that it was accepting the offer made it impossible for an objective assessment of the pros and cons and for a unified stand to be taken. Guyana should have insisted on its presence at the Bureau meeting and should have been there. There are three final considerations. If Venezuela applied artifice to this offer of oil to gauge where CARICOM would stand with respect to Guyana's concerns then it has learnt a lot about the inner workings of the movement from this gambit. It would not be an unreasonable conclusion to draw from the medley of events, starting with Rangel's remarks, that Caracas was indeed testing the resolve of CARICOM. The concatenation of events also begs the question as to whether Guyana should have resorted to quieter diplomacy within CARICOM and with its neighbour to the west to prise out the crucial information it needed and table its anxieties. The shrill tone of Guyana's objections in the open could have annoyed its fellow CARICOM members who simply saw the offer as a welcome respite from the recent higher oil prices. Perhaps Guyana also has to choose more carefully which issues it seeks a CARICOM stand on so as not to wear out the goodwill that we would have built up with our fellow members. The movement is already fully engaged in the political turmoil here and with Guyana's territorial concerns to the east (with a fellow CARICOM member Suriname) and to the west with Venezuela. Finally, Venezuela's offer has nudged Trinidad into contemplating its own facility. For CARICOM and Guyana having such an option would be an improvement on the present situation.
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