Because events have moved so quickly, it is now possible to see the Afghanistan situation in terms of an ending. The swift advance of the Northern Alliance forces and the rout of the Taliban in the north of the country, leading to the capture of the capital city Kabul have led to the belief that the rest of the country will soon fall. On the other hand, the Taliban have very recently defiantly asserted that they will fight to the last man to defend the territory they still hold and have recently demonstrated that they are prepared to do this. President Bush is probably right in asserting that the end is not yet in sight, if only because the Americans have themselves never been clear about their objectives. First, it was the capture of bin Laden at which stage it was explicitly stated that there was no desire to remove the Taliban, but to destroy the al Qaeda. Later the objective was to destroy the Taliban, destroy the whole al Qaeda network and kill bin Laden. In the case of the killing of bin Laden, the US Defence Secretary who somewhat intemperately gave this out as his personal objective will doubtless invoke DNA tests to prove that he has got his man!

The lack of precise US objectives apart, international attention and hopes are now focused on the conference of representatives of Afghan factions in Germany. The UN is uneasily in charge of these arrangements, having eventually been persuaded to undertake the task by President Bush's sudden assurance that the US will pay its long standing arrears. A major factor which could thwart success in Germany is the Northern Alliance's sweeping success. Conquerors do not negotiate away control and representation over the territory which they hold. On the other hand, the Pashtuns who are hostile to the Northern Alliance are 40% of the population and will not settle for a situation which does not reflect their numbers. President Musharraf had clearly perceived the dangers which too early success of the Northern Alliance would pose but his view was sidelined, perhaps a fateful error. It is also certain that each ethnic group or sub-group with its own warlord can be expected to fight for their own representation on any governing council.

But those are only part of the positions which will have to be reconciled. All the neighbouring states and in particular Pakistan and Iran, both host countries to millions of Afghan refugees and with opposing views as to who should be represented on the governing council, will wish to ensure that that body will not be hostile or inconvenient for them. Russia, which fought a ten year war and lost to the Afghans, largely because the Mujahadin had been trained and armed by the Americans has been playing a low profile but powerful role. Russia has equipped the Northern Alliance even to the extent of uniforms. Russia now has a large delegation in Kabul and can be expected to ensure that its centuries' long concerns are reflected in any ruling group which may emerge from the conference in Bonn.

The auspices are not good.

It is being too easily said that September ll marks fundamental changes in the international system. Change there will be but it will not derive only from terrorism or the outcome of the events in Afghanistan. Terrorism is only one of the factors (and not the most dominant, as recent propaganda asserts) making for change. The structured change now emerging derives from internal factors in some of the main players, in particular the USA, the European Union and Russia.

The profound shock of September ll on the US psyche is that it makes nonsense of the prevailing US military doctrine, the so called Colen Powell doctrine. In keeping with such doctrine billions are spent on bombers to rain down vast quantities of bombs on to an offending state, pulverising its people into submission. Despite pinpoint targeting there is collateral damage, the phrase used by those who do not wish to speak of the senseless killing of civilians. But what if the enemy is not a state but an ideology or/and a network of individuals ready to die for their cause. What if the situation is one of asymmetric conflict, as the strategists call it. How can one justify the vast expenditure when your opponents use penknives and box cutters. All the US national instincts will be to withdraw from the world under the "turtle's" shell of which the symbol is Bush's anti-missile defence system.

The European Union for their part have been slowly withdrawing from their imperial commitments. The colonial conscience no longer exists as witnessed most recently by the fact that the main difficulties encountered by developing countries on the WTO negotiations came from the EU. In their own stomping ground, NATO, the EU states invoked the most powerful clause in the treaty, namely that the attack on the USA was an attack on all of them. And almost no one paid attention. It was soon clear that only the British were prepared to send troops into Afghanistan.

But more than anything else it is Putin's skilled diplomacy which will loom large in the retrospect of history. Russia needs US support in coping with threatened Islamic insurgencies in former Soviet states such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and other central Asian states. Putin also needs urgently the removal of the harsh Western critiques of his handling of Chechnya.

The US for its part needs Russia's acquiescence, if not support, for any continuing military campaign in South West Asia and for the maintenance of power and influence in the Gulf.

Russia has for all practical purposes withdrawn from its global role into a European identity. The war on terrorism provided the occasion for all the trends outlined above to come together leading to the cementing of massive structural change, namely the establishment of the close relationship of co-operation between the USA and Russia. With Russia virtually in NATO, suddenly a range of other urgent issues like the expansion of NATO or coping with the shouldering discontents in sub Saharan Africa or indeed even the Middle East have been shoved to the back burners or off the stove altogether.

A photo editor in the next century may well choose the picture of the baby boomers Bush and Putin driving around in the Texas ranch as the one which defined the 2lst century.

In view of their new awareness of vulnerability, in view of the increasing challenges to globalization and liberalisation not only from the developing world, but from within the developed states themselves, it is likely that the Western states including Russia will now increasingly turn inwards. Russia indeed could be reverting to its historic role of guarding the gates of Europe from the invading Eastern hordes.

The model of the future may be that the West, mainly rich, mainly white, all powerfully armed states, will form an inner defensive circle whose principal interest in the states outside will be in fire brigade action to prevent fires which start there from spreading into the inner circle.

Some day, this further turning away from the problems of the developing world may be seen to be an error, to be in fact the ultimate impediment to any successful campaign against terrorism. It may well be like killing mosquitoes while not draining the swamp.

Michael Ignatieff has recently written with characteristic wisdom about this situation:

"September ll shrank the distance between the world that benefits from globalization and the world that has been left behind. Our values tell us to share the bounty of a globalised world with those who have less than we do. Our interests now tell us that if we do not we will face an unending struggle in which victory will be forever beyond our grasp".

But it is most unlikely that such wisdom will prevail. All the signs are that the struggle against terrorism will be seen in the immediate future as a powerful foreign policy and defence instrument for controlling the turbulence which derives from under development and hunger and despair.

The human community has taken several steps backward.