Caribbean must unite

By DAVID JESSOP
Trinidad Express
July 3, 1999


"IS ANYONE in Europe or North America really interested in what happens to the Caribbean?"

This was the question put to guests from the region, the US and Europe over dinner in a smart Washington suburb last week.

The host, a leading US trade lawyer and lobbyist, was surprised by the degree of unanimity on the part of those present.

Everyone agreed that during the cold war the Caribbean had mattered to Europe and the US. Tripartite co-ordination between the US, Canada and UK had been an important element in maintaining a high level of international interest in the region. Although the relationship between these three nations had not always been harmonious, it had ensured that action was taken when necessary to secure Caribbean economic or political stability in consultation with friends in the region. However, the removal of the Soviet threat had not only brought regular co-operation to an end but had made it hard to identify any other issue that might create a positive policy towards the Caribbean.

Despite this, some around the table put reasons forward why the US and Europe should continue to care: narcotics production, transhipment, money laundering and associated crime; the fear of a flood of economic refugees created by economic collapse in one or more Caribbean nations; Cuba; commercial interest; and votes in the UN. But all were quickly discounted as not providing Washington or Brussels with incentive enough to develop a long-term consistent policy towards the region.

It was pointed out that narcotics-related activity created genuine concern, but not enough to drive overall policy. The consequences of the switch from bananas to ganja in certain Eastern Caribbean islands may alarm those whose job it was to interdict crime, but it had done nothing to help resolve the banana war. It did not drive policy. Instead, US agencies were left to deal piecemeal with the negative effect of US trade negotiators' insistence on compliance with World Trade Organisation rules. Until an island's government was controlled by narco-terrorists or became a centre for international crime in a way that materially affected the national interests of either the US or EU, it was felt that super power reaction would be sporadic and measured.

Economic refugees, some suggested, posed a more potent threat. But Europe was too remote to have its policy driven by an uncontrollable exodus of Caribbean citizens fleeing economic or political breakdown. Even the US may not be that concerned. In the case of Cuba, the US had established systems through government-to-government agreements that allowed for the return of economic refugees. Moreover, the absence of land borders with the US made the danger of the arrival of large numbers of Caribbean citizens remote.

Then the Caribbean should play the Cuba card, it was suggested. The region should seek to intensify its relationship with Havana in order to create concern in Washington. The guests' reaction was negative. While Cuba itself continued to exercise US policy makers and provided spice in the life of European Ministers involved with the region, it was no longer the issue it was. Cuba was seeking a positive trade and economic relationship with its neighbours, in part to find a way to maintain its political system while integrating its economy with others in the region. It posed no security threat in its relations with the Caribbean. Cuba was seen in Washington as an issue to be resolved in isolation from the region.

Moreover, the dinner guests felt the moment that any change took place in the Cuba/US relationship, Cuba would become yesterday's news and the rest of the region would become of even less interest.

Everyone agreed that US and EU policy towards the Caribbean was inconsistent, short-term and designed to secure trade advantage or deal quickly with any security threat. It was also a part of a long term exit strategy from the region that related to globalisation. As far as the US and EU were concerned economic integration would be completed by 2020 for the Caribbean, in the context of the FTAA and whatever relationship is established with Europe in the 15 years after 2004.

The dinner guests concluded that the answer therefore had to lie in the Caribbean itself. No one would take the region seriously or work with it in future unless it was unified, had coherent policies and was engaged in a co-ordinated way in putting forward clear ideas that would ensure economic tradition within a sensible time scale.

As this column is being written, Caribbean Heads of Government are preparing for the 20th Caricom Heads of Government meeting. Each year its agenda becomes longer and the number of external parties seeking access ever more extraordinary. In many senses the idea of the annual summit is a questionable concept when it comes to delivery. Ideas and consensus mean nothing in isolation from action. While there has been gradual change in the thinking of Caribbean Heads there has so far been no renaissance in the Caribbean's structures. The region still relies on old models such as a non-executive Caricom and on an unreconstructed Caribbean Development Bank to try to deliver newer solutions in a totally changed global environment.


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Guyana: Land of Six Peoples