Learning the lessons
Editorial
In terms of President Jagdeo's visit to Suriname national expectations were firmly focussed on the reaching of an agreement between the two Presidents which would permit the early return of the oil rig. It was widely believed, perhaps not without foundation, that the area identified for off shore exploration contained an immense oil basin.
Stabroek News
February 6, 2002
President Jagdeo at his press conference on his return from North America had himself tried to temper expectations. He said that the best which might be hoped for was a decision on a mechanism for resolving the situation.
The situation in Paramaribo as it turned out was worse than expected. The oil rig question was not even on the agenda for discussion. The Joint Declaration issued at the end of the visit stated that it was President Jagdeo who had requested in Paramaribo that the matter be discussed. The paragraph which appears towards the end of the Declaration should be quoted in full. It reads: "At the request of President Jagdeo the issue of joint exploration for hydrocarbon resources was discussed and the Presidents took the decision to request the Border Commission to look at best practices and modalities that could assist the governments in the taking of a decision regarding an eventual joint exploration. It was agreed that a sub-committee of the Joint Suriname and Guyana Border Commission should be established to address this issue and to report to this Commission before its meeting in May."
This is all for practical purposes a formula for delay, for postponement of decision. The mechanism decided upon could have been specific and separate. Making it part of the Border Commission will almost certainly make it subject to those wider considerations with which that Commission is charged. Beyond the sub-committee there is no time-table or commitment. Moreover President Venetiaan, apparently responding to groups hostile to agreement on joint exploration, has been at pains to point out that in terms of the Suriname Constitution all agreements are subject to parliamentary approval. It is difficult not to think that oil rig question has been kicked sideways.
How had it come about that Guyana's Head of State was involved in this negative situation. The visit had been dogged by other irritations and indignities. The circulation of a map showing part of Guyana's territory as belonging to Suriname during the President's visit to a specific site could only be seen as a direct insult. Then there was the deliberate omission from the Agenda of the oil rig question. Likewise the failure to provide translation facilities (even a whisperer) at the Press Conference was clearly disconcerting. These were all matters which President Jagdeo's advisers and diplomatic staff could with a little vigilance have eliminated.
Nevertheless, it should be recorded that the visit was apparently otherwise a success, marked by the projection of national goodwill and Presidential authority.
However, it might be wrong to see the difficulties which arose as only due to Suriname's intransigence, whatever its causes. It may be that there were stumbles in our own diplomacy. It will be recalled that after the ejection of the oil rig there was a flurry of meetings here and in Paramaribo, in Port-of-Spain and in St. Vincent and eventually at the Caricom Summit in Jamaica where Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson mediated without success. One surprising feature was the speed with which the matter became one for Presidential negotiation. Had some political functionary facing failure cleverly passed the buck upwards? Whatever may have happened, the Presidential level made for high visibility and political significance. The matter had become one of national prestige and confrontation and hence less tractable to negotiation especially as the Suriname Government and President Wijdenbosch, on the eve of an election, was bound to take a hard line.
Wijdenbosch duly lost the election. His successor President Venetiaan was immediately more forthcoming and spoke the rhetoric of cross border co-operation. Expectations of a settlement rose on the Guyana side. But in retrospect this was a mistake. Major foreign policy decisions are seldom the result of personality. Such decisions even when a government changes usually respond to deep factors externally and in the society, what the text books call the determinants of foreign policy. Such factors were very much on display in Paramaribo during the visit.
First there is history. Guyanese regarded the expulsion of the oil rig as an outrage but it is clear that the Surinamese for their part have not forgotten that twice, in December l967 and again in August l969, the Guyana police and the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) respectively had ejected Surinamese engaged in various activities from the area described as the New River Triangle which is part of Guyana but which Suriname claims. In this connection it is evident that the acquisition of arms by the GDF is being closely monitored.
Second there are as in any society powerful groups in Suriname such as a major trade union, the University students, and smaller parties which include the leadership of 'strong man' Bouterse which are all opposed to any measures on the oil rig matter which might appear to be a concession of territory to Guyana.
Third, there were the special limiting dynamics to which coalition governments are subject - coalitions apparently being the norm rather than the exception in Suriname.
Fourth, there are the restrictive provisions of the Suriname constitution itself on the matter of external agreements and to which President Venitiaan drew attention.
Fifth, here are the effects on the relationship with Guyana of the growing migrant community of Guyanese in Suriname, especially in Nickerie.
Those are the factors which in all probability shaped the ambiguities in Paramaribo despite their Presidential friendliness.
It should be very clear that despite the geographical propinquity, the similarities in population, the common problems which derive from the colonial past and the other community ties to which President Jagdeo so often referred Suriname marches to a different drummer. Negotiations cannot be pursued on the same basis as with other Caricom states.
What of the future? Whatever may be public opinion in Suriname as far as Guyanese are concerned, oil exploration is seen as vital to the achievement of acceptable standards of living, a high priority. Guyana must therefore persist for the time being with the mechanism agreed upon. Our Mission in Suriname should at the same time take a major initiative in persuading some of Suriname's decision makers of the wisdom and realism of President Jagdeo's contention that turning aside from conflicts which cannot be settled in the short run, there should be joint exploitation of resources to the benefit of both peoples.
At the same time other foreign policy initiatives must as a matter of urgency be set in train. Thus there might be a potential for settlement in invoking a wider diplomatic effort. With question marks over the security of Middle East oil supplies, may there not be special interest in the North American powers in the early development of another nearby source of supply?
Because of the vital interest involved an understandable concern with Caricom links should not impede diplomatic efforts to seek the resolution of the conflict within other fora, importantly the OAS.
A last word. There is apparently heavy dependence on the Border Commission for the settlement of the border disputes. However, these are matters of the utmost complexity as shown in the scholarly work of Duke Pollard and the more popular approach of the article by Rudy Collins. What is involved is no less than the profound study of Archives and history and geographical science and international law. It would seem probable that there would have to be resort to an international tribunal as was the case with the boundaries with Venezuela and Brazil.
This was indeed envisaged as at the President's Conference there was a mention of possible resort to a third party.
There is in the Guyana Foreign Ministry a Frontiers Division staffed with three or four bright but young and inexperienced diplomats. It is reported that there is also a Presidential Advisory Boundary Commission which has met once. It is also encouraging that steps have been taken towards the rehabilitation of the relevant archives. Those may be useful initial steps but Guyana should not be caught napping. Preparation should be put in train at once towards the possible referral of the boundary question to an international tribunal. The identification should begin of experts and sources including sources of funding possibly from within the Commonwealth for the probably long and difficult exercise ahead.
Indeed it is a matter for consideration whether it would not be in Guyana's best interest to move to a Tribunal, especially in view of the likely political (as distinct from legal) effects which bilateral negotiations may have on Guyana's position on already settled borders.
Confronted with the difficulties in Paramaribo one is left with the uneasy feeling that some thirty-six years after independence, Guyana has not yet been able to mobilise the required degree of political and diplomatic competence to effectively manage its external affairs. All the more reason for bipartisan consultation and approaches and for the early establishment of the Foreign Affairs/National Security Committee of Parliament which as Mr Raphael Trotman M.P. noted in a letter to this newspaper last week the Minister of Foreign Affairs had promised early last year.