Venezuelan golpismo
Editorial
Stabroek News
May 16, 2002
Since the flight of Venezuela's last military dictator General Marcos Perez Jimenez on 23 January 1958, fear of a potential golpe de estado (coup d'etat) has been the constant concern of civilian heads of state. When Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez Frias, along with his comrades-in-arms in the Movimiento Revolucionario Bolivariano 2000 attempted a golpe on 4 February 1992 and, even after that failed another group of like-minded officers attempted a second golpe a few months later on 27 November, fears that those attempts would jeopardise democracy by threatening to return the country to military autocracy were resurrected.
Hugo Chavez was imprisoned for two years and cashiered from the army. But, having been elected President in December 1998 with overwhelming popular support and by democratic means, he infuriated many senior commanders in the National Armed Forces (FAN). Chavez's biggest military mistake may have been his appointment of Jose Vicente Rangel as Venezuela's first civilian Defence Minister in nearly fifty years, and the removal of General Eliecer Hurtado from that post. Rangel was widely despised by the FAN and was regarded as a Marxist and long-standing adversary of the USA.
The Commander-in-Chief made other mistakes. Continuing to wear military uniform and celebrating the anniversary of his failed golpe with military parades, Chavez, a cashiered officer, was resented by professional officers; they also disliked his international relations-fostering friendships with China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia which they saw as their traditional adversaries.
As a golpista himself, Chavez had been only too careful to guard against the danger of dissident officers' overthrowing his administration. But, although he took the trouble to appoint many loyal officers to command key units and bases, he nevertheless approved a plan last March to relocate some military units away from Caracas and disarm others by deploying them to build roads and schools. He had earlier given FAN a role in civil affairs by incorporating it into his anti-poverty project, 'Plan Bolivar', and selecting some officers for key positions in the Government.
As recently as last November, Chavez boasted of his intention to retire from office at the age of 67 years in 2021 and warned his political opponents that he had "rifles and tanks" to defend his "Bolivarian Revolution".
Although the President did have supporters in the FAN, especially the red-bereted parachute brigade, the cracks which appeared last year with Rangel's appointment opened wider. This year, senior officers Air Force Colonel Pedro Luis Soto Fuentes, Navy Rear Admiral Carlos Molina and Air Force General Roman Gomez Ruiz - started calling publicly on their Commander-in-Chief to resign.
These actions gave encouragement to civilian groups which Chavez had alienated: the Roman Catholic Church, especially its powerful Opus Dei society; the media; organised labour in the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV); the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production (Fedecamaras) and the professionals who ran the all-important Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).
But the key role in the dramatic events which expelled Chavez from office, was played by the FAN high command although, at first, it had no plan for a golpe. Gen Manuel Rosendo, chief of FAN's joint command, refused to obey Chavez's order to confront peaceful protesters with "rifles and tanks". Similarly, when he was convinced that pro-Chavez "Bolivarian Circle" gunmen had fired into the crowd killing several persons, Army commander General Efrain Vasquez Velasco revolted saying, "The Armed Forces are not for attacking the people".
The generals' involvement, therefore, was based on professional resistance to the misuse of the FAN by the President in a matter of civil unrest. It was the generals, not the crowds, who forced their President out of office. But, alarmed at the faux pas of the ultra-conservative civilian candidate Pedro Carmona Estanga - abolishing the National Assembly and dismissing the Judiciary - and realizing that a significant part of the FAN would not join the revolt, the generals restored the deposed Chavez.
The April events had the effect of shifting the fulcrum of power in Venezuela away from Miraflores and towards FAN. Chavez was obliged to remove Rangel and appoint Gen. Lucas Rincon Romero, FAN's highest-ranking officer, as Defence Minister. A military Consultative Council, comprising six generals and including General Raul Baduell, Commander of the 42nd Parachute Brigade who had refused to revolt against Chavez, has also been created.
For the time being, at least, although many dissident officers will be dismissed, and despite the restoration of democratic civilian rule, the golpe was partially successful as the generals probably have more power over the President than the President has over them!