The territorial and maritime claims which Suriname and Venezuela tenaciously pursue remain Guyana's most serious defence problems thirty-six years after Independence. In dealing with these two issues, therefore, President Bharrat Jagdeo's address to the GDF Annual Officers' Conference on 9 May should be taken as his Administration's guide to current defence policy.
The President called on the GDF to safeguard the country's maritime resources, defend its integrity and enforce its maritime agreements with the USA. He criticized the Coast Guard for not doing enough since the acquisition of some maritime craft from the UK and USA in 2001 and in the wake of attacks by pirates on fishermen in the Berbice River on 14 April. Since buying the boats, it seems, the GDF has not embarked on any significant operational activity except for the Essequibo's Caribbean cruise to ferry troops to and from the USA's Exercise Tradewinds and the seizure of a small Brazilian boat.
The piracy incident was followed by a rather ingenuous remark by a Coast Guard officer to the effect that information about the attacks was received only 24 hours afterwards and, when clearance was received from headquarters, an operation was launched 48 hours later.
If it is that the Coast Guard failed to carry out the Defence Board's directives to patrol our rivers and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) it would be a serious matter indeed and, beyond the President's public scolding, both the Defence Board and Defence Force should be concerned.
It is to be remembered that the vessels were bought with great haste in the wake of Suriname's forcible expulsion of the Canadian CGX petroleum exploration platform from the disputed maritime zone in June 2000, and Venezuela's fierce threats about granting the US Exxon, Century and Beal Aerospace Technologies Corporations concessions in the Essequibo territory which it claimed.
After the ceremonial commissioning of the boats, hopes were raised that the Defence Force would have been able to protect offshore explorations which were vulnerable to being driven away by our stronger neighbours. But the hasty purchase of a few boats, however expensive, is not the end of policy-making.
Defence doctrine must be carefully defined prior to purchase to ensure that the equipment to be acquired is suited to the intended mission. And once the vessels are bought, manpower must be obtained, trained and retained and continuous maintenance and finance must be provided. But given Guyana's 432 km-long coastline, 138,000 sq km EEZ and six large rivers which run into the ocean, it would be quite impossible for the Coast Guard on its own to detect, much less arrest, the assorted pirates, smugglers, narco-traffickers and other dodgy types who pass through our waters daily.
Successful defence operations can be based only on the best intelligence. But there is no overarching agency in Guyana to collect information and coordinate the activities of the two dozen or so Government ministries, administrative departments, technical institutions, law enforcement forces and regulatory authorities which are concerned with Guyana's rivers and seaspace.
In normal countries, decisions on such matters would be made by the Defence Board, monitored by the Defence Ministry and executed by the Defence Force. But this has not happened and there is no system to provide timely maritime intelligence the Coast Guard. Even the GDF's solitary, airworthy Chinese aircraft which could conduct limited maritime surveillance has been directed by the President to engage in commercial flights to the hinterland, thereby reducing the time available to the maritime sector. That is why it is so difficult to eradicate piracy and other maritime lawlessness.
To achieve the results he desires, the President should assure himself that he bought the right vessels for the job in hand. He is the best person to know that none of the vessels has ever been described as 'patrol' craft: the Essequibo is a minesweeper and the Barracuda, Hymara, Pirai and Tirapuku are known as 'motor life boats' (MLB), a clue that they were not designed for patrol purposes!
The President should also be sure that the Government has provided the Coast Guard with sufficient material and manpower resources to fulfil its mission; that appropriate maritime information and intelligence systems and institutions have been established; and that he and the Defence Board have issued realistic directives for the Coast Guard's employment.
National defence is an expensive business for which $2.7 billion have been allocated this year. Not a small sum. Defence is the President's inescapable ministerial responsibility since, like his predecessors, he has chosen deliberately not to allocate this portfolio to any other minister. It may be helpful for him to examine not only how defence decisions are executed but how they were made!