A costly error
Editorial
Stabroek News
June 6, 2002
The tale of the sinking of the Mandela Avenue bridge is a costly and perfect lesson for the government on what can go horribly wrong in the massive public works and infrastructure programme.
In a nutshell, the government awarded a contract for $9.6M for a new deck for the East La Penitence structure in 1999. Subsequent to this, Cabinet authorised a $5.4M variation taking the contract sum to $15M. By the time the works were completed, the centre section of the bridge had begun to sink. Remedial work to the tune of $10.8M subsequently had to be done to save the structure.
So, from a contract originally intended to be $9.6M, the final bill was $25.8M. This was a whopping cost overrun of 169% and a significant charge to taxpayers' money.
What is even more revealing is what happened within the Ministry of Public Works that led to this gross expenditure above estimate. Auditor General Anand Goolsarran in his report for the year 2000 revealed that the Technical Adviser to the minister had examined the contract drawings and after making the requisite calculations had determined that the proposed new decking was too heavy to be supported by the existing support structure. On this basis, he recommended that the bridge be re-designed and the project put back out to tender.
The Chief Works Officer and Chief Roads Officer in the ministry did not concur with the view of the Technical Adviser and as a result the construction of the bridge proceeded on its ill-fated journey with the consequential overrun. It was simply a judgement call on which advice was the best and in this case it seemed that the Technical Adviser's position was spot on but it was discarded. The Ministry of Public Works presides over an impressive array of infrastructural projects and it would defy the laws of probability if it managed to get all of these decisions right. Nevertheless, maybe another opinion should have been sought given the very different views coming from professionals right within the ministry.
There was one disturbing facet which was brought to light by the Auditor General's report and which cast a shadow over the decision making process in the ministry. It was discovered that the engineer for the project had accepted a fee of $220,000 from the contractor for the design of the deck that had been proposed in the original $9.6M project. This was highly irregular as he was employed with the ministry on a full-time basis and his ordinary duties included the design of bridge structures. There were other problems. Goolsarran found that the Chief Roads Officer had only recommended a variation of $2.1M and no documentary evidence was produced to substantiate the actual $5.4M variation approved by Cabinet. When an assessment of the actual works and the bills of quantities was done it was concluded that only $2.8M should have been paid as a variation. Other concerns were also raised.
When he was asked about this case, Public Works Minister Xavier said that the engineer repaid the $220,000 he received from the contractor and was fired. Xavier further said that he should have heeded the advice proferred by his technical adviser and that as a result of this lapse the Work Services Group of his ministry had been fortified with more engineers to enable better supervision and implementation of projects. Frequently these bits of information filter down to the public through the Auditor General's report. It is the ministry's obligation to ensure that taxpayers are kept in the loop especially when their money - particularly the unnecessary waste of it - is involved. The explanation about the conflicting advice and the dismissal of the engineer only came to light after the release of the Auditor General's report and when questions were put to the minister.
There are two other points that should be made. The Auditor General's Office continues to do a superlative job even if it is hamstrung by a lack of manpower and resources. It is grossly undervalued at the moment. The annual report produced by the office in tandem with the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament can be powerful tools in exposing gross abuses of public finances and helping to prevent fiascos like the Mandela Avenue Bridge sinking.
The involvement of the Office of the Auditor General in pre tender audits could also help to throw a spotlight on discrepancies and irregularities in proceedings even before they go out to tender. The state audit office now has the resources to fulfil this mandate but lacks the legal authority to do it. Giving it the legislative fiat to do pre-tender audits should be seriously considered by the government.