As an Attorney-at-Law, I recognised with pride that great moment of my country's history when she acceded to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1993, May 10. Accession meant that my countrymen who felt aggrieved about violations of their human rights had recourse ultimately to an international tribunal. As a matter of fact, I made it a point to tell the citizens of Guyana in the last elections campaign that a major distinguishing feature between the PNC and PPP/C was the emphasis the latter placed on ensuring the non-contravention of human rights of Guyanese citizens. Moreover, I, and very many senior comrades, told our political audiences that we did not only' talk the talk', but had 'walked the walk' when our administration, unlike the former, had seen it fit to become a signatory. And there was always great applause at these words.
Our country's accession was proof of how seriously human-rights oriented and democratic our Government is; how the Government will allow scrutiny by dispassionate referees of international standing without any local biases in accordance with and upon application of universal standards. We had imprinted our commitment, by this accession, to be part of a community of just States by sanctioning certain moral standards which claim universal validity beyond our own legal community. This was indeed glorious and noble.
Then came Yassin and Thomas (the former recently died in prison) who both have tested the genuineness and sincerity of our commitment to international human-rights standards. These men won their cases at this august body, which found, apart from long delays in their many trials and motions, that:
(a) they were abused in pre-trial custody and their detention was in poor and humiliating circumstances;
(b) there was a failure on the part of the police at the last trial to produce documents which were produced at the first trial which may have contained evidence in favor of them;
(c) there was an absence of legal representation for one of the accused during the first four days of their final trial.
This august body then held that these men go free and even be compensated for their incarceration. This was indeed somewhat surprising and extreme. But this ruling was mistakenly and outrageously seen, especially by the powers that be, as a device by the United Nations Human Rights Committee to halt hangings in Guyana, and was so propagandised. This illogical quantum leap necessarily means that whenever our Court of Appeal sets aside a conviction for murder, it is halting hanging. It is a misapprehension to imbue this "anti-death penalty" attribute to the Human Rights Committee because these same judges in the Committee had ruled inadmissible the complaints of Dole Chadee and his murderous band from Trinidad, thereby dismissing their cases.
But all of the above apart, when Guyana became a signatory to the Optional Protocol, it submitted to the jurisdiction of this Committee. And this means that it is bound by its rulings on a matter originating out of Guyana as is this Yassin and Thomas matter. How could it have been otherwise? Now that we have re-acceded with the relevant exception on the right to life, am I to be told that upon a finding by the Committee, for example, that my right to freedom of expression, or right not to be deprived of my property has been violated, that such a finding will not be adhered to by the Government? If views of the Committee are not going to be conformed with, why have we re-acceded? It could not be just for cosmetic effect.
I believe, too, that our citizens like Thomas and Yassin reasonably expected an adherence to and conformity with the Committee's ruling. This adherence has always been the custom and practice of rulings from this Committee in death-penalty cases. No country I know of, which signed the Protocol and obtained an unfavourable ruling, has ever proceeded to hang those who were successful in their appeals to this Committee. Even if such a country exists, we must not make it our exemplar. We are civilized; we adhere to the rule of law.
Finally, the false sovereignty argument, which avers a convenient non - binding attitude whenever it suits us on the spurious ground that we are a sovereign country, must not be used to suffer us to depart from our agreements with the larger world, especially when the consequence will be to disengage ourselves from the obligations we have to third parties, like Yassin and Thomas, who were intended beneficiaries of these agreements. Rather, our sovereignty should operate to bind our consciences, as far as they can be bound, to a true and literal performance of our agreements.
So if we can't 'walk the entire walk', let's commute.