The People's National Congress Reform (PNC/R) last week submitted to the Social Partners a proposal on shared governance. The party had formed a committee before its congress in August to flesh out the concept and the proposals of that committee were discussed at several sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the party. The idea of shared governance had been formally approved by party leader Desmond Hoyte at the August congress and the party has indicated that it intends to publicise the details of the proposal to obtain a feedback. It has accepted that the proposals in the document are not cast in stone.
The essence of the proposal is as follows: the Prime Minister, who will be the head of government and who will sit in parliament, will come from the party that gets the highest votes at the elections. Ministerial portfolios will be allocated proportionally to those parties who get at least five per cent of the vote so if one party gets fifty-one per cent of the votes, another 43% and the rest less than five per cent each the first two will divide the ministerial portfolios between them. This will be done by agreement if possible but if discussion fails to produce agreement the selection process will be achieved by alternate picks, the party with the largest vote having the first pick.
There will be a non-executive president as head of state. He will be appointed by a multi-party vote in parliament for a term of seven years which, to use the language of the document, "straddles the holding of national elections and reduces the pressure on the office-holder to pander to the parties in hopes of reappointment."
The parties involved in the government will sign a Coalition Agreement that will include a policy platform based on the national development programme and ideas from party manifestoes, portfolio allocation and party responsibilities and the decision-making structure and procedures in the executive. That agreement will be publicised so the public can monitor the process and assess the compliance of coalition partners with the spirit and provisions of the agreement. The primary object of the decision-making process will be to facilitate consensus and avoid surprises, such as significant unannounced unilateral action, by setting up rigid mechanisms for communication, consultation and dispute resolution within the executive itself. Decision-making in the governing executive will be a mixture of collective responsibility (where consensus has been reached) and single-party responsibility, where no consensus has been reached or where unilateral actions are allowed.
The Council of Ministers will be the highest executive decision-making body and will include all the ministers, parliamentary secretaries and perhaps advisers. It will consider all the issues normally discussed by a cabinet. It will be chaired by the Prime Minister and will meet at stipulated times. A quorum will be two thirds of the members of each of the major parties. Decisions will be by consensus failing which the issue will be sent for resolution to the Standing Coalition Management Committee. That will comprise the leaders of the parties and perhaps also senior party members. That committee will be responsible for overall management of the coalition and will be the highest forum for dispute resolution.
There will be subcommittees of the Council of Ministers which will be the main areas for consultation, coordination and negotiations among the parties. Those subcommittees will include ministers, other members of parliament, civil service heads and advisers. Those subcommittees will function as informal decision-making forums to process issues to be formally dealt with by the Council of Ministers. Proposed new legislation and other initiatives will be sent first to these subcommittees.
There are procedures for dealing with what the document calls "unresolved issues" which are different according to whether that issue is identified by one party as "inimical to race relations" in the country or is identified as an issue of "party distinction". The former can only be passed in parliament by a majority of each party in the council. If all attempts at internal dispute resolution fail, the matter is sent to the President for a judgment. However, he or she must seek advice from the Ethnic Relations Commission which must hold a public hearing. If the President in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Commission holds that the measure is harmful to race relations it must be amended and re-submitted to the ministerial working group. If not, it can be implemented and will be considered a collective decision of the council.
If it is a matter of party distinction, the appropriate parliamentary sectoral committee must discuss it at a public session before submitting recommendations to the parliament where it can be passed and "dissenting parties are no longer under any obligation of collective responsibility for that particular issue". Presumably it will still be a valid law and this proposal needs some further thought and clarification.
The proposal recognises that with shared governance parliament will function somewhat differently. It seems from the proposal that the small parties which win one or more seats in the parliament but have less than five per cent of the vote will not be part of the government. They can therefore function as an opposition. To cater for the lack of a powerful opposition the document proposes that government bills, after their first reading, must be sent to the appropriate select committee for public hearings, with some exceptions. There are also provisions for public petitions. In practice, it is clear that a strong responsibility for monitoring government actions and laws will fall on the media and other non-governmental organisations. There are other provisions designed to increase public accountability such as the publication of cabinet minutes (with exceptions) and the setting up of commissions by the President to enquire into government activities.
In preparing this document, the committee consulted the practices of coalition governments in countries like Belgium and Ireland. It has come up with a proposal that will require close consultation with the other political parties to make it workable. Other opinions will be sought. This is surely, however, a significant step forward. Obviously, there is a lot of bad blood between the two main parties. But, as the document notes, they were able to work meaningfully together in the process of constitutional reform. What will be needed to make discussion of this proposal useful and viable is a considerable reorientation in attitudes and a lessening of the now standard hostile rhetoric in public political life. What may also be essential is that a structured process for discussion of the many detailed issues be set up with perhaps one or two experienced facilitators and secretarial help to prepare agendas, take minutes, record decisions and arrange timely follow ups.
Changing modes of governance is a big undertaking. To have a real chance of succeeding all sides will have to make a real commitment of time and energy. Why don't the parties now in parliament decide to turn parliament into a constituent assembly for the purpose of discussing this proposal on shared governance? This will have the advantage of making parliament functional again and will ensure that these discussions which will clearly involve some constitutional amendments are given maximum prominence in the highest forum in the land.