Guyana-Suriname relations
Editorial
Stabroek News
December 21, 2002
The October debacle in Paramaribo followed precisely the pattern of Guyana-Suriname relations over the past three decades or so. The optimism of newly-appointed Chairman of Guyana's National Border Commission, Legal Affairs Minister Doodnauth Singh, who led Guyana's negotiating team to the 25-26 October meeting with the Surinamese side, may have cooled after nearly two months without a final communique.
Guyana's hope was that the two sides would agree on modalities for the joint exploration and/or exploitation of petroleum resources in the disputed Guyana-Suriname maritime zone of the Atlantic. This is the zone from which the Suriname Navy had expelled the Guyana-licensed, Canadian-owned, CGX petroleum exploration platform in June 2000. Guyana's licensing of the platform was based on a Memorandum of Understanding between Guyana and Suriname signed in February 1991 but which was repudiated subsequently by Suriname.
Much has changed in both countries since 1991. Not only have Presidents Desmond Hoyte and Ramsewak Shankar been replaced by Bharrat Jagdeo and Ronald Venetiaan, respectively, but also a weak Suriname which had then been reeling from the effects of a brutal bush war has now refurbished its navy and army. Meanwhile, Guyana, which had then started its turnaround under the economic recovery programme, is now mired in a 5-year political, economic and crime crisis.
Having been admitted to full membership of the Caribbean Community with Guyana's assistance, Suriname has refocused its strategy towards Guyana. The exploitation of its mineral resources has always been at the core of Suriname's geopolitics and its quest for territory- whether in the New River Zone, the Corentyne River, or the Atlantic Ocean - has been aimed at the control and ownership of those mineral resources, and the hydroelectric capacity to exploit them.
Prior to the start of the latest failed round of negotiations, President Ronald Venetiaan explained to the National Assembly, in great detail, his country's present and future plans for the mineral exploitation of western Suriname, the area that adjoins the three disputed zones in eastern Guyana.
Bauxite, the mainstay of Suriname's export economy, is continuously being exploited and the Government is engaged in talks with ALCOA and BHP-Billiton on developing new deposits and making new concessions available. The ultimate aim is to develop a fully integrated industry - bauxite-alumina-aluminium - supported by hydroelectric power.
Petroleum production, also increasing, is aimed at reaching a level of 14,000 barrels per day and scores of new wells are to be constructed. Investment of US$30 M is being actively pursued.
Gold production is set to increase with the construction of a new mine by CAMBIOR which will represent an investment of US$95 M. The production target will be 6,700 kg per annum.
It should be clear to the Guyanese side, therefore, that the border issue with Suriname is not about ferry services, fishing licences and functional co-operation, issues with which some Guyanese Ministers seem preoccupied but do not hold much interest for the Suriname Government. Suriname is concerned about mineral resources so vital that they warranted the deployment of armed naval power against an unarmed civilian commercial operation over two years ago.
Indications of the impending stalemate in the October talks were visible in a series of small incidents throughout the year. After the collapse of the 2000 round of talks in which President Bharrat Jagdeo attempted to negotiate personally with then President Jules Wijdenbosch for the return of the expelled Canadian CGX petroleum platform to the disputed maritime zone, the President used the occasion of his official visit to Paramaribo on 28-29 January to raise the issue again.
But there were bad omens. There was a partial boycott of President Jagdeo's appearance before the National Assembly by Opposition members to protest Guyana's frontiers policy and, at Suriname's request, scheduled meetings of the ad hoc sub-committee tasked with making recommendations to the National Border Commissions were twice postponed. The failure of the October talks, therefore, should have been expected. Suriname is not about to sign away what it perceives as its possession of potential sources of mineral resources simply because its unloved neighbour has asked for a share.
This explains why successive Surinamese administrations have been taking their Guyanese counterparts up a long, winding road of meetings and talks that never lead anywhere, and never will.
