Labour problems in immediate post-Emancipation period

The labour problems faced by the British West Indian sugar economy in general, but new colonies like British Guiana in particular, did not begin with abolition and Emancipation, but in many respects escalated as a result. The planters had always felt that the Blacks, if they could, would desert the sugar plantations in large numbers at the end of Apprenticeship. Their often confrontational rather than conciliatory stance during Apprenticeship and in the immediate post-Emancipation period, almost made it a self-fulfilling prophecy. In British Guiana, some ex-apprentices did move away from the plantations to seek independent livelihoods on the estates they had acquired by purchase or by squatting on Crown lands, but they did not abandon plantation labour entirely. The smallness of the plots in the Proprietary Villages and cash-strapped Communal villages made that impossible. However, they attempted to use their new bargaining power to negotiate for higher wages and to withhold their labour if the terms of service were not satisfactory. The planters could not come to terms with the fact that they no longer had absolute command over the movements of the labour force, as had been the case during slavery. In 1842, they attempted to impose rules and regulations and reduce wages. The Blacks responded by a prolonged strike and the planters were forced to withdraw their demands. This bitter confrontation with the planters resulted in even more of the black labouring population abandoning the estates, further exacerbating the labour problem.

A guaranteed, protected market in Britain for West Indian sugar was lost with the passing of the Sugar Duties Act of 1846. It ended the West Indian preferential system by equalising duties on all sugar entering Britain from whatever the source. Although the act did not actually come into effect until 1854 prices of sugar immediately dropped.

Consequently, in 1847-48 many merchant houses in London which had engaged in West Indian Trade & Finance collapsed and it precipitated a severe economic crisis in the West Indies. The planters of British Guiana reacted by again attempting to reduce wages, and the black labouring population again went on strike. But on this occasion they were unsuccessful due largely to the relatively larger numbers of East Indian and Portuguese immigrants present on the sugar estates. This more than ever convinced the planters and later helped to persuade the Colonial Secretary that large-scale immigration would be the solution to their dilemma.

There had been initial but largely unsuccessful experiments with East Indian and Portuguese immigration between 1838-1845. Now, even more elaborate schemes for the introduction of immigrants into the colony were tabled in the planter-dominated political institutions of the colony. They used that dominance to pass new immigration ordinances. Additionally, their supporters, the West India lobby in London, also helped to persuade the British Parliament not only to support but also to partly finance their immigration proposals despite the lingering reservations of that body over schemes which could bring back slavery in a disguised form.

The Campaign for Chinese Immigration

A Guiana planter who had been visiting British possessions in the East was so impressed by the Chinese immigrants he saw working on the Isle of Penang that he wrote to the West India Committee in London stating that "during the heat of the day I have seen them cutting canes, digging canals, carrying canes etc... going through all the work as well as the best picked men (Creoles) would do". He continued: "I have seen all classes of coolies, and the different tribes of Asia, but nowhere have I seen a people who would suit our purposes better." Those comments must have been music to the ears of the West India Committee and British Guianese planters who were still smarting from the success of the 1842 strike earlier mentioned. However, any scheme to introduce Chinese immigrants into British Guiana had to overcome the hurdle of the Order-in-Council of September 1838 which declared invalid any contracts for labour entered into outside the Colonies.

There were clear indications that it would be necessary to enter into a contract with the Chinese labourers for definite terms of service before they would emigrate with foreigners. The Colonial Secretary was therefore asked to exempt any contracts made with Chinese labourers from the provisions of the Order-in-Council. Eventually, after considering the arguments of the West India Committee, Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had reservations about emigrants unaccompanied by women and the possibility that the immigrant on arrival in the colony might change his mind about the terms of the contract he had entered into, proposed a compromise which would permit the Chinese labourer to rescind his contract on his arrival in the colony if he so desired. His proposal allowed for compensation for the person at whose expense the labourer was being introduced.

On October 27, 1843 in similar dispatches to the Governors of British Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica, Lord Stanley authorised them to propose legislation in which "any existing provision against contracts made out of the Colony should be waived as to Chinese Labourers, provided that such contracts were not for a longer term than 5 years service in the Colony". He was willing to do this since he felt that because many of the immigrants had made the long journey to Singapore and adjacent settlement on their own, it would be "a guarantee at once of their knowing the nature of the proposals made to them, a question so much disputed in the case of the East Indians." This compromise was significant in that it represented a breach in the rigid contract policy adopted in 1838 due to pressure from the Anti- Slavery lobby and still fresh memories of the horrors of the Middle Passage. After this, with constant pressure from the West Indian planters, changing public opinion in Britain and its own changing attitudes towards indentured labour, the Colonial Office gave ground. Eventually, permission was granted for the long-term contracts which underpinned the iniquitous indenture system. Based on Lord Stanley's dispatches, the Court of Policy on the 31st January 1844 passed an ordinance number 2 of 1844 to introduce Chinese labourers into British Guiana. At the same time with the dispatch, earlier mentioned, Lord Stanley issued two licences to private individuals to introduce a total of 2,150 Chinese immigrants into British Guiana.

Constraints to Implementation

However, it took almost a decade after the consent of the Colonial Office was secured before any Chinese immigrants actually landed in British Guiana. The factors responsible were the result of the social, economic, political situation in the colony and the socio-political situation in China itself. In case of the Colony, the same time that the planters were actually campaigning for the introduction of Chinese labourers, they were also agitating for the reopening of immigration from India. Ordinance No. 12 of 1844 allowed Asiatic Immigration. Ordinance 13 of 1844 provided a credit of 75,000 pounds, the cost of introducing 5,000 Indian immigrants. Consequently, in 1845 state-funded immigration of Indian labourers began. It continued until 1917, stopping only briefly between 1845-1851 because of the financial difficulties facing the colony. Additionally both Portuguese and Indian immigrants could be procured much easier and at a cheaper price than Chinese labourers. The Portuguese, in particular, became easily available after a famine in 1846. Immigration from all sources came to an abrupt halt as a result of the Civil List dispute between the governor and the elective section of the Combined Court in 1849-50. They attempted to coerce the governor into letting them have their own way over constitutional reform by threatening not to pass the Civil List. Part of the solution proved to be the passing by Parliament of an act guaranteeing a loan not exceeding 750,000 pounds, which the British West Indian Colonies could use for certain purposes. The pre-eminent position of British Guiana as Britain's most profitable sugar-growing colony was underlined by the fact that half of that sum was allocated to British Guiana. 50,000 pounds of that loan was spent on the construction of a railway. The balance was used for reviving Asian immigration.

The arrival of Asian immigration led to the renewed interest in Chinese immigration. In fact, so keen was the interest of the local planters to have immigrants specifically from China that on July 8, 1850 the Court of Policy read for a first and second time "a Bill for the encouragement of the introduction into the colony of Chinese labourers." However, that Bill was withdrawn and an ordinance for the introduction of labourers into the colony in general was introduced. That ordinance fixed a bounty for the introduction of immigrants. In the case of Chinese immigration specific provisions were put in place to take cognizance of the issues of contract.

In the next article, the focus will be on the factors within China, which both constrained and facilitated immigration, the experiment in action and the impact of the experiment.

(Part 2)

Introduction
Over the last few weeks, a series of activities have been organized to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the arrival in British Guiana of the first Chinese immigrants. Their descendants have zealously catalogued from where and why they came. They have also shared with the rest of us the impressive contribution they and their ancestors have made to the development of our country. Even more interestingly, however, they have embarked on a project to record all Guyanese of Chinese ancestry, many of whom, superficially, belong to other ethnic groups. The focus of the last article was on the circumstances in the immediate post-Emancipation period, which caused the local planters to aggressively attempt to recruit Chinese labourers and some of the factors in the colony which hampered and facilitated the process. The focus of this article will continue to be on the factors in the colony, in Britain and in China, which affected the Chinese experiment, the experiment in action and its immediate impact.

Factors affecting implementation
Between 1853, when the first group of Chinese immigrants arrived, and 1869 when Chinese immigration all but came to an end, the self-serving attitude of the local planters, changing economic conditions in the country, Colonial Office ambivalence, the imperatives of British foreign policy and conditions in China itself all affected the pace and quantum of Chinese immigration to British Guiana. Just prior to the arrival of the first groups of immigrants, the Court of Policy passed Ordinance 3 of 1853 which made three-year contracts basic for all but African immigrants. Several months later they passed a resolution requesting 1,500 Chinese immigrants and 200-300 young females. However, the planters in the colony wanted as many immigrants as cheaply as possible. There was a clear indication that immigrants from China would cost about 10 pounds more than immigrants from India and the implementation of the male/female ratio was going to be rigid.
Reports from planters who had received Chinese immigrants were very favourable. The manager of “La Jalousie” reported that his Chinese labourers were “a very useful class of people, exceedingly apt and intelligent, and were very willing, quite equal to many coolies we are now receiving”. He felt that eventually the Chinese would be “a better class of labourer for any and every description of work than those of the East Indies”. The manager of “Windsor Forest” reported that the Chinese are “some of my best labourers for strength and in endurance are equal to the Africans.” Nonetheless, despite their suitability, the colony could not afford the expense and Chinese immigration was halted. The short-sighted planters chose quantity over quality, even when they acknowledged the ultimate long-term benefits to the society and the economy. Even after Chinese immigration resumed in 1859, the planters continued to balance the advantages of intelligent, hard-working but expensive Chinese immigrants, for whom they had no obligation in respect to return passages but specific requirements in respect of male/female ratios, against more easily accessible, less expensive (even with return passages), and less aggressive Indian immigrants. The latter group inevitably won.
The above factors were influenced by Colonial Office ambivalence and the imperatives of wider British foreign policy. From a situation of constant conflict between the Colonial Office and the British West Indian colonies in the 1840’s when ordinances were passed by the planters and subsequently disallowed by the Colonial Secretaries, by the 1850’s sentiment shifted to a point where the Colonial Office came to accept the notion of compulsory terms and indenture for immigrants imported from public funds. Even though this shift was primarily in respect of the evolution of long-term contracts for Indian and African immigrants, the Chinese contracts of indenture were also affected by Colonial Office ambivalence. What finally emerged was a contract which differed in several important respects from Indian indentured contracts. Nonetheless, there were enough loopholes to permit almost equal exploitation of Chinese labourers.
The concern over the provisions of Chinese indenture contracts had more to do with Britain’s desire to maintain amicable relations with the Chinese authorities in order not to jeopardize other aspects of Chinese/British foreign policy and trade and economic relations, of which the acquisition of immigrants for her West Indian colonies was a very small part. Consequently, although the British government sympathized with the position of the planters, they were not prepared to compromise the potentially lucrative trade with China. They did not hesitate to intervene whenever it became necessary. The desire of the Guianese planters and the imperatives of British foreign policy notwithstanding, it was ultimately conditions in China which determined the quantum and regularity of immigrants from China. The conflict with Britain and the other Western countries that were eager to force China to open her doors to trade simply exacerbated the socio-economic conditions which were causing Chinese people to flee their country in search of a better life. Overpopulation in China and periodic famines had always acted as an incentive for emigration. However, by the middle of the 19th century, the financial and political problems facing the ailing and corrupt Ching dynasty were exacerbated by its defeat by Britain in two wars during the 1840’s and 1850’s.
The continuing economic hardships led to constant peasant revolts. The worst of these was the Taiping Massacre of 1859-61. The bulk of the immigrants who came to British Guiana under the Chinese experiment came during this period of deep social, economic and political crisis in China. In 1861, 3,365 Chinese immigrants arrived. It was the highest annual figure for the entire period of Chinese immigration. In fact, between 1859 and 1866 there was a continuous annual arrival of Chinese in the colony for eight years. It constituted 11,984 persons, 88.5 per cent of all the Chinese immigrants who came to British Guiana. According to records passed on to their descendants, as early as 1859 several Chinese came to the colony as non-indentured immigrants. They were sometimes professionals with their families. In addition to the normal indentured immigrants, there were refugees - members of the aristocracy fleeing the Taiping rebellion and rebels overthrown by the imperial army.

The experiment in action
As earlier mentioned, the overwhelmingly satisfactory performance of the initial group of Chinese immigrants whetted the appetites of the planters for more. They were hard-working, doing more work than the average Indian immigrant and as much as the Creoles. The story is told of one group who turned out on Sunday demanding the opportunity to earn more money. The Chinese labourers were said to be willing to turn their hands to anything. Though recruited to serve primarily as agricultural labourers, by 1864 it was stated that the early success of the vacuum pan method of refining sugar was generally attributed to their “neat skill”. However, the very qualities which made the Chinese desirable as examples for the Indian immigrants and Creole labouring population, proved to be disadvantageous in other respects. The planters preferred a hardworking but submissive labour force. Hard-working the Chinese immigrants were, but they proved to be far from submissive. They were quicker to react to perceived injustices by overseers. Their intelligence, which had made them initially so attractive to the planters, proved now to be a thorn in their sides. The Chinese immigrants, more than any of the other categories of immigrants, understood the terms of their contracts. The exploited any loopholes to the fullest. Moreover, at about this same time a regular supply of Indian immigrants became available so that the planters were not dependent for their prosperity on Chinese immigrants. They were therefore in a position to propose the discontinuation of Chinese immigration when new rules which seemed to them “unjust and burdensome” were drawn up by the British, French and Chinese governments.
The planters were, however, still able to exploit the Chinese labourers, mainly in respect of the quantum of wages they received and the amount of food they were allotted. The latter, in particular, eventually led to problems in the wider society. To supplement the slender rations they received, the Chinese labourers resorted to stealing plantains from the villagers. This led to several bloody confrontations between the two groups. Far from dealing with the underlying issue by granting provision grounds to the Chinese labourers, Governor Hincks, who was at this time quite preoccupied with his confrontation with Chief Justice Beaumont, simply allowed harsh laws to be passed. This reduced but did not eliminate the problem. The Chinese immigrants themselves became extremely frustrated with their conditions of service and several reacted by saving enough money to buy themselves out of indenture. Ironically, the Chinese had been described as a spendthrift lot. Some of the planters felt that more Chinese should be recruited because their habit of spending their earnings locally would set an example to the Indians whom they felt were saving their money to return to India.
However, this particular characteristic which was attributed to the Chinese immigrants proved to be a temporary one in the face of the adversity, it was clear that the Chinese immigrants learned to bury their differences and cooperate with each other. The short-lived Hope-town experiment under the Chinese missionary, O-Tye-Kym, contributed to this. It is believed that during its brief period of prosperity, a number of residents, with no place to spend their money, were able to accumulate substantial sums which they used to set up businesses which challenged the monopoly of the Portuguese shopkeepers and laid the foundations for a prosperous Chinese business community.