Internal security doctrine
Editorial
Stabroek News
March 13, 2003
President Bharrat Jagdeo last month ordered a major overhaul of the Guyana Defence Force's internal security (IS) tactics in light of its apparent failure to halt the crime wave, especially in the Buxton-Friendship village community on the East Coast of Demerara. The GDF has maintained a permanent garrison in the village for about eight months and has mounted numerous operations - Plaster of Paris; Tourniquet; Saline Solution - but murderous crime has continued, not infrequently within earshot, if not in the eyesight, of armed soldiers.
The Administration has been criticised severely, especially by the Indian communities of Annandale, Strathspey and Vigilance which have been hit the hardest by marauding criminal gangs, for the continuing rash of crime. The business community, also, last year conducted a symbolic shutdown of Georgetown's central business district on 9-10 October to vent its dissatisfaction at the Administration's inaction on curbing crime.
The President seems to feel that the security forces are to blame. He complained that, despite providing all available resources and all the necessary moral, financial and legislative support to the security forces, they seemed to be achieving little success in arresting the situation.
The President said that the GDF had been sent to the East Coast by the Guyana Defence Board in accordance with the laws of the country with the intention of supporting the police in the anti-crime fight. "Clear instructions," he said, had been given to the GDF as to its purpose in the operations and these were fully endorsed by Brigadier Michael Atherly, the GDF Chief of Staff. Any soldier who did not respond to a crime was not complying with orders and should not be part of the armed forces, the President said.
As Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Guyana Defence Board, the President must be aware that the GDF's tactics are derived from its internal security doctrine which has existed from the formation of the Force 37 years ago and is imparted to all cadets and recruits when they enter the GDF. That doctrine embodies the Force's philosophy, beliefs and principles and guides the training given to soldiers. It is hard to change tactics without first changing doctrine and, as the Jamaica Defence Force recently pointed out, it is impossible to change doctrine without changing the law.
Military action in internal security is guided, above all, by the principle of co-operating at every level, in every sphere, and at every step, with the civil authorities, particularly the police and the central government. Military and civil forces must work together as a single team and the military must always be in support of the civil authority. For this to happen, not only must the Defence Force have a military operational plan such as 'Operation Tourniquet' etc, but the Central Government must also have a civil restoration plan for the community.
Further, the GDF is compelled to use only minimum force and must act offensively and not become part of the landscape by being immobilized on static tasks. Because there is no state of open warfare, soldiers are subject to the civil law like other citizens and they are constrained by strict rules governing the use of force in aid of the civil power in internal security operations. According to the GDF's doctrine, the overarching rule is the use of minimum force which holds that no more force than is absolutely necessary must be used, although a military commander must be firm and unafraid in using force to achieve his aim. The GDF does not have a 'shoot-to-kill' policy in internal security and it is the military commander on the ground, and no one else, who is responsible for deciding the extent and nature of the force to be used. There must be local justification for each separate and individual act of force and such an act should not be continued longer than is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Force must be used only to suppress actual disturbances and must not be used as a deterrent, reprisal or punishment.
Members of the GDF must comply with the law and act impartially and calmly in doing so. The commander on the ground, regardless of his rank, has the responsibility to record or secure accurate evidence of any incident involving the GDF.
The Force must also maintain public confidence, making every effort to foster public support and taking every precaution not to endanger the lives and interests of the people.
This doctrine has stood the test of time and on several occasions from the time of the 1992 post-elections disorder, this Administration has praised the GDF's objectivity and steadiness under provocation. It would be dangerous to try to change decades of training without a closer examination of the situation on the East Coast today and without an evaluation of the efforts of the central government to tackle the problems of the community.
If, for example, the GDF must co-operate with the Police Force, it should be explained what operations that Force is actually conducting inside Buxton-Friendship to enforce the law and arrest those who break the law. In addition, if the GDF must also co-operate with the central Government, the Administration must publish its own plan to return that troubled community to normalcy and explain when Government ministers and officials will go there to hear what the people themselves have to say about the present situation.
In any internal security situation, it is very unlikely that military operations, without a plan of action for good governance by the central government, could bring unrest to an end.
East Coast Demerara is no different.
