Public Forum

By sheer coincidence, last week’s edition of Sunday Stabroek carried an advertisement of a Public Forum to be hosted by the Office of the President on the Public Sector Modernisation Design Plan. This Forum is planned for the period May 23 to June 30 and is to be organised as a series of public events to which stakeholders are invited to “obtain information, share views, and support the public sector modernisation efforts.” Because of the timing, I have brought forward some of my observations on this subject to today’s issue of Sunday Stabroek.

Readers may not be aware of the fact that in a process which started last April (2002) a Canadian firm of consultants was recruited to undertake a Public Sector Modernisation Design Project for Guyana. This contract is scheduled to be completed at the end of this month with the submission to the Government of a Public Sector Modernisation Design Plan. Remarkably this plan has been completed with no systematic input from either 1) the relevant public sector unions 2) the opposition parties in the National Assembly 3) non-governmental organisations representing key stakeholder interests and advocating issues, for example the consumer groups and professional associations (Bar Association) 4) the academic community, or 5) the general public. It is not surprising, therefore, to hear accusations made since word has got out about the near completion of the plan that there are on-going secretive and clandestine attempts to reform the public sector. Since the reform of any public sector is by definition a public event, one finds it unbelievable that those funding this project, the professionals who were recruited to undertake the exercise, the Government of Guyana and, for that matter, those privileged to be “participants” in the preparation of this plan could have been involved in such an ill-conceived misadventure.

Root of the problem

The root of the problem lies in the simple fact that in Guyana among the many concerns about the functioning of the public sector, four stand out. These are 1) the perceived level of political interference in the operations of the public sector 2) persistent conflicts between the Government and the public service unions 3) the low level of efficiency displayed by the public sector in meeting the needs of the public, and 4) the prevalence of corrupt practices in the public sector system. Such problems are not primarily ‘technical,’ but have a lot to do with three weaknesses in public sector oversight. One of these is the incomplete state of constitutional reform given the constitutional basis from which public sector activities must flow. Another is the poor quality and limited effectiveness of stakeholder involvement in public sector management. And the third is the unwillingness of the political administration to accept transparency, openness, and the sharing of information as entitlements of citizens and not discretionary matters over which they have sole control. As a consequence of this situation, the starting point of any serious reform process, therefore, has to be real as opposed to mere token ‘ownership’ of the design and implementation of the Design Plan. The World Bank itself has identified as a major weakness of public sector reform in developing countries the failure to build consensus within the public sector and the broader society for “the conception and design of the reform process.” This has not happened in this instance, which is not altogether surprising given the President’s views cited in the last SN Business about the dire consequences of “policy information falling into the wrong hands.”

Two choices

When such fundamental errors are committed in the methodology of a programme design as has occurred in this instance, two choices are open to those who committed the error. One is to frankly admit the design error and re-start the process, hopefully next time with a shorter schedule having already covered some ground, at least in terms of information gathering. The other would be to attempt to retroactively manufacture a consensus. In the present circumstance that means forging a consensus after publication of the plan, thereby retroactively endorsing it. This latter action, however, merely postpones the original problem indefinitely because such patent manipulation would not comfort the excluded stakeholders. If this occurs they are likely to be unwilling to cooperate in the implementation and monitoring of a programme where they have been excluded from the original design. The former action costs time and expense, but it is more honest and more likely to succeed. The truth nevertheless remains, two wrongs do not make a right and opportunities foregone are lost.

Complicity of the donor community

Here again we see how complicit the international community has been in the persistence and spread of poor governance in Guyana. Despite their self-proclaimed commitment to transparency, consensus building, and stakeholder involvement yet they manage to finance the preparation of a plan of such far-reaching significance to the Guyanese people while having them and their non-governmental organisations excluded from the design stages. The plan shows the weaknesses of this omission. Consider a striking example. At the moment, Guyana and CARICOM have foremost on their agenda the creation of a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). The proposed CSME will clearly have far-reaching implications for the unification of regional public services and consequently the modernisation of Guyana’s public sector. However, this is not addressed in the new plan, even though we can anticipate that this will make more open the market in which Guyanese professionals in the public service offer their services. The implications of this for pay, conditions of service and professional support will be considerable. Already, without this agreement the impact of CARICOM on the mobility of teachers, nurses, doctors and scientists are acutely felt.