Despite its preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction, the international community has been aware for some time now about the contribution of these “small arms and light weapons” to global insecurity. Thus the United Nations has estimated that these weapons have accounted for as much as 90 percent of all war causalities since World War II and that in all but three of the 49 conflicts during the 1990s these weapons were relied upon as the “only” instruments of war! These are indeed staggering statistics not sufficiently widely known.

While the quantity of these arms available is not known, certain characteristics make them a lethal weapon of choice. For one, being quite often Cold War gifts, their cost is low, they are not only widely available, but are also easily concealed and transported and very durable. Secondly, these arms have a tendency to “persist and remain at large”. Thus at the end of organised conflicts they often become “available” for criminal endeavours and are recycled. Thirdly, although classified as conventional weapons, these arms are often not included by countries when they report on their conventional arms sales. A large fraction of the trade is also conducted as private commercial transactions, which help to facilitate illegal/illicit transfers.

Recently the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated the small arms trade at 13 percent of all arms transfers and that its value accounts for about US$10 billion annually, which is about 25 percent of the total value of all arms transfers. Over the past decade the number of small arms and light weapons manufactures has grown substantially (by about 25 percent) and Stohl and Smith (1999) report that there were in 1999 about 300 manufacturers in 50 countries.

Child Soldiers and the Failed States

The use of small arms has been linked to the sinister development of “child soldiers”. Reasons for this include the fact that these weapons are easily used by children as young as 8 years old and in some countries where there is conflict the population is very young. A classic example of a young population is Sierra Leone where the average lifespan is estimated at 37 years! In the literature this emergence of “child soldiers” is treated as “unnatural” and when it does occur a “failed state” is said to either exist or is in the making. Thus Stohl and Smith observe that: “the use of child soldiers is an indication of a failed or failing state”. The UN estimates that there are about half-a-million child soldiers involved in global conflicts.

Given the wide availability of these arms, a prime task for the international community is obviously to seek to gain control over the existing stocks, while simultaneously trying to bring the present flow of production and distribution under close regulation. As an incentive it has been suggested that the international community to facilitate the destruction of stocks, and the cessation and/or monitoring of further production should provide funding. Some writers use the US Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme with Russia as a possible model. Under this programme US funds help Russia to account for/control/monitor/ destroy some of its nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear technology.

The Case for Intervention

The other approach to this problem is far more serious and is the real focus of our concerns. Some writers articulate the dilemma presented above as making a case for external intervention in failed states. Indeed the argument is now being stretched further as the claim is made that the international community should intervene even before these states fail. The reasoning is that the threat “failed states” pose to global security are far worse than the consequences of external intervention. In other words we might say “prevention (external intervention) is better than the cure afterwards”.

The picture portrayed in the literature therefore of a failed state is one of unrelenting wretchedness, despair, and death. As it has been said: “the appeal to violence in the name of ‘duty’ and hatred of the enemy” leads to war and a cycle of killing. The first to be killed becomes the sacrifice, which spurs their compatriots on to kill in return. At some stage no price in terms of death, destitution, and disintegration seems “too high to pay”. The three options that are then left to bring this killing machine to an end is: “the lack of new victims, exhaustion, or overwhelming force from outside”. From this standpoint the case for external intervention into “failed states” therefore, seems unassailable.

Summing Up

My concern is not to critique the “failed states” thesis, but merely to establish two points, which will be pertinent to the summation of my hypothesis on the criminalised state. The first of these is that although some issues raised have connections with the situation I am addressing, such as the role of boundary disputes, the Cold War, and the impact of deadly “small arms and light weapons” on the state in Guyana, most of the essential particulars of the “failed states” hypothesis do not apply. Indeed the Guyana state is still very distant from such a prospect and only very loose analysis can categorise it in this way.

The second point is that the methodology used by proponents of the “failed states” thesis does not take into account adequately three vital considerations in the formation of all states namely, 1) the unique impact of the particular external environment in which the country finds itself and the state therefore has to operate 2) the socio-economic and cultural factors, which shape the society, the pattern of their historical evolution, and the rhythm or logic that drives them and, 3) the historical evolution of the state and its political culture. In my summation of the hypothesis of the criminalized state all three considerations are essential pre-requisites.