Cheddi Jagan
Although most of the proposals that attempted to foster some form of political unity among the territories in the British West Indies emanated from the metropolis, a noteworthy departure from the usual practice occurred in 1926, with what was said to be the first well-thought out local proposal for political unity in the West Indies. This proposal was crafted by the regional labour movement initially led by Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow and the British Guiana Labour Union and expressed persuasive arguments for federation and regional political and economic unity.

Regional labour leaders crafted this proposal at a labour conference held in British Guiana in January 1926. A number of resolutions related to labour and political reform were passed. One of the most important resolutions appealed for a federation of the West Indies with self-government and dominion status. These labour leaders, including Arthur Cipriani from Trinidad, W.J. Lesperan of Suriname, H.N. Critchlow and A.K. Dinally from British Guiana were not preoccupied exclusively with the immediate material development in the lives of the working class, but also thought that at the end of the day, improving of the lives of the working class called for appropriate legislation and self government and they therefore advocated for a federal government in addition to a federal labour union organisation.

Although the regional organisation created at this 1926 conference, the Guianese and West Indian Federation of Trade Unions and Labour Parties (GWIFTULP) was not successful in achieving its aims, the ideas expressed by this organisation endured until the 1940s when the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) was founded. The main purpose of the CLC was to produce a strong regional labour movement by networking existing trade unions and labour parties in order to generate widespread support for a strong federal government. This strategy was believed to be one that would allow West Indians to develop their living and working conditions not only through labour and welfare reforms but also by promoting economic development.

Initially, the CLC had a very significant impact in the region and convincingly expressed the need for a united regional labour movement as a precursor to independence and democracy within the context of a socialist Caribbean federation. At the CLC conference, the delegates agreed, “that the West Indies must unite with the mainland territories of British Honduras and British Guiana, under one flag, for one Caribbean commonwealth”. It was also agreed that each colony be given a similar constitution that included universal adult suffrage and internal self-government. Further, that a federation be established - this would have a prime minister and cabinet accountable to the federal Parliament and would have authority over “regional planning and economic development.”

Even while the CLC’s council and affiliates were considering the federal proposal in 1947, yet another federal proposal was being considered at a conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica that was organised by the British Colonial Office. Representatives of trade unions and political parties from the various territories attended the Montego Bay Conference to primarily consider the political and constitutional development of the West Indies. Some key CLC delegates used the opportunity to present their resolutions to the Colonial Office.

However, the proposals from the CLC were not given much attention because according to the Secretary of State for the colonies Arthur Creech Jones, the topic of a self-governing federation was “rather outside the immediate terms of reference of this conference”. In essence, the Colonial Office’s model for federation “meant merely a loose confederal association”, while the CLC perceived it as “a strong federal state...a vehicle for democratic social growth”. Not surprisingly therefore, the Colonial Office rejected the CLC proposal for federation as “precipitate and unfeasible”

That the two proposals differed is not surprising in view of the different aims/agendas of their proponents. The policies of the Colonial Office were essentially determined by Britain’s economic crisis and it therefore tried to devise measures to promote the productivity of the colonies to satisfy the UK’s urgent needs. On the other hand, the CLC wanted to develop the colonial economies so that they could become self-sufficient and meet the needs of the West Indian people.

All the participating territories in the Montego Bay Conference with the exception of British Guiana, accepted the principle of federation. The Guianese Legislative Council rejected the report of the Standing Closer Association Committee even though there were some members who supported federation. In the council debates, some members contended that British Guiana had a continental rather than a Caribbean destiny. The argument was that Guiana was located on the South American continent and was therefore separated from the West Indies from a geographical perspective. Other members regarded the matter through ethnic lens and pointed to the possible political gains/disadvantages that federation would pose to an ethnic group. Others, especially those who represented the business interests in the colony viewed the loose federal idea proposed by the colonial office as potentially beneficial while they viewed with suspicion the socialist oriented federalist idea proposed by the CLC. Guyana nonetheless participated in the Standing Closer Association Committee and the Regional Economic Committee and sent observers to specific federal meetings.

Meanwhile the Bahamas rejected an invitation to participate in the conference organized by the colonial office in 1947. It was argued that the intention of the white Bahamian leadership, commonly referred to as the “bay street boys” was to maintain their governing political and economic position. The white Bahamian community had enjoyed political domination despite the widening franchise. The white Bahamian leaders were proud of the economic success of the islands when compared to the rest of the region and argued that the attempt to introduce reactionary political movements (i.e. socialist-oriented economic and political strategy) via Federation would retard this progress.

The federal concept held by the CLC in the end did not secure widespread support. Several reasons were responsible for this including:

* A poorly run public relations campaign. Many persons in the individual colonies were either unaware of the proposal or suspicious of its potential impact on their individual territory.

* The middle class CLC leaders’ concentration on constitutional reform in the West Indies. This preoccupation resulted in the organisation neglecting its labour mandate and constituency. The working class increasingly felt alienated from the CLC’s agenda and tempered its support.

* Division among some CLC leaders. Divisions surfaced among the CLC leaders partially because of divide and rule tactics employed by Britain. Some leaders were promised constitutional reforms in their own colonies and they were therefore reluctant to offend the colonial office by encouraging public protest for more extensive reforms. Some political leaders in the CLC including Adams of Barbados and Manley of Jamaica agreed to a gradual, reductive method whereby each colony was responsible for obtaining whatever constitutional advance it could. This acceptance of the Colonial Office recommendation was harshly condemned by a number of their fellow CLC colleagues and other regional and international labour leaders and organisations. CLC Secretary Hart accused Adams and Manley of betraying the West Indian people for personal gain.

The labour/working class leaders in British Guiana supported the strong federalist idea, which was increasingly being championed by Hart. They supported a strong federal body, dominion status and each territory having internal self-government. These leaders, including Cheddi and Janet Jagan, Jocelyn Hubbard, Ashton Chase and Nathaniel Critchlow collaborated with Hart and worked to sensitise the Guianese people and to press for self-government. Cheddi Jagan argued that the Colonial Office Federal proposal was “nothing more than a glorified Crown Colony, the amalgamation of several units which will carry us no further to self government”. He further declared that since the desire of the Guianese people was self-government, it was incumbent upon their elected representatives to unreservedly reject the Colonial Office proposal.

Meanwhile, the rejection of the West Indian identity prior to and during the years of the West Indian federation by the white Bahamian leadership continued and as infighting and insularity over issues such as the capital site and the potential losses to a particular state were raised, both the PPP and the UBP congratulated themselves for not pursuing that avenue for development.

In the second article in this series, four areas will be scrutinised that were deemed largely responsible for the non-participation of both British Guiana and the Bahamas in the Federation. Those areas are: political ideology, identity, ethnicity and economic destiny.

This article is the second of a three-part series that focuses on two of the three British Caribbean territories that opted not to be part of the ill-fated West Indian Federation - Guyana and the Bahamas. The first article examined the background to the federal proposal that was ultimately adopted and implemented by the colonial authorities and assessed the initial responses of political leaders in both territories to several federal proposals. In this second article four areas will be scrutinised that were regarded as largely responsible for the non-participation of both British Guiana and the Bahamas in the Federation, namely political ideology, identity, ethnicity and economic destiny. Particular emphasis would be placed on the attitudes of some specific pre-independence leaders and their political parties in both states, namely Cheddi Jagan (PPP), Roland Symonette (UBP) and Lynden Pindling (PLP) to the West Indian Federation.

Political ideology
There were real ideological differences that developed between the regional leaders over the role of capitalism and the United States in the future development of the region. In the immediate post World War 2 period, the leadership in the region articulated strong nationalist positions that were premised upon economic self-determination and the desire to wean the region away from its dependence on the West. This position however, was challenged and ultimately undermined after these nationalist sentiments became viewed through cold war lenses. The majority of regional leaders shifted their position and expressed explicit support for the United States in this global ideological battle. Jagan and the PPP believed that these regional leaders had lost their militancy and, in adopting a rightist/pro-West stance, were repudiating national sovereignty in favour of the rights of capital.

The commitment of the regional leadership to western capitalist tenets was revealed in no uncertain terms after the suspension of the British Guiana constitution in 1953. Echoing the sentiments of Bustamante and Manley, Grantley Adams stated “How-ever much we regret the suspension of the constitution, we should deplore far more the continuance of a government that put communist ideology before the good of the people”.

This event in 1953 however, was not the only signal that the ideological direction of the leadership in the region was no longer common. There were earlier indicators of this growing discord such as

* the disbandment of the socialist oriented CLC
* the split in the regional labour movement reflecting the split in the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
* the gradual isolation of leftist leaders from the decision making process in some territories e.g. leftist leaders were expelled from PNP in Barbados, and, several communist regional political and labour leaders were banned from travelling to certain islands.

Meanwhile, the white Bahamian leaders were unapologetically capitalist in their economic orientation and despite the support increasingly given to the United States by the regional leaders during the Cold War era, the bay street boys ironically continued to view and label the Federation and regional leaders as being the unreserved followers of communism. Moreover, it was an argument that was effectively used in the effort to persuade black Bahamians to accept the unequal status quo. The white leadership argued that it was their “sound guidance” and commitment to capitalist principles that were responsible for the prosperity enjoyed “in every corner of this little island” and that any deviation from the UBP party and the principles of capitalism would result in a drastic decrease in the tourist trade and hence decreased standard of living for the populace.

Similarly, black Baha-mians’ leadership, cognisant of the connection between prosperity and the tourist trade, and anxious to pacify investors and tourists, stated their unwavering commitment to capitalist principles. Pindling assured that once his party assumed power, it would follow the rules of capitalism including no income tax or death duties, encouraging foreign investment and maintaining a climate of free enterprise because of its attractiveness to foreign capital. The preceding does not suggest that the PLP as a party did not express nationalist principles. Their brand of nationalism however, was clearly capitalist.

Question of Identity
The discussion surrounding the identity of British Guiana was an interesting one. There was the suggestion that British Guiana had a continental rather than a Caribbean destiny since the country was located on the South American continent and was geographically separated from the West Indies. With ten times the size of the whole federation and a rich though undeveloped interior, it was argued that Guyana was anxious not to become a dumping ground for the overflow populations of the islands. The discussion over identity however invariably focused more on ethnic and political issues rather than geographical ones.

Dr Cheddi Jagan position on the issue of Guyana’s identity seemed somewhat ambivalent - some argue deliberately so. At one point, Jagan argued that there is no great difference or variation between Guyana and the other West Indian islands. At another point, he argued that while Guyana is arguably culturally tied to the West Indian islands, Guyana is equally tied to the people in Latin American countries since “some of the people in Brazil and Venezuela are of African and Amerindian origin. The only difference is that British Guiana is not a self-governing country and consequently, we are not as free as a sovereign body to go to Venezuela or Brazil or ...Surinam and say ‘let us federate in our own interests’”. The latter seemed to suggest that Jagan did not accept that there is necessarily any special connection between Guyana and the rest of the British West Indies and some argue that this was one reason for his lack of support for the West Indian Federation.

In certain respects, the Bahamian quest for self-identity was more complicated. The Bahamians have traditionally questioned their connection with the rest of the British West Indies and have identified some distinctions in their cultural and national ethos. A number of reasons have been posited for these peculiarities including: the absence of sugar; the very brief experience of a plantation economy and the relatively small scale of its operation; the fairly substantial white population; the reliance on the sea for their livelihood; their experience of over a century of alternating boom and bust, which left a get rich quick philosophy of life that was intensified by the post-war boom; and close association with American values through proximity to Florida and by the conspicuous consumption of tourists.

The Bahamians considered themselves to be much better off than their West Indian counterparts. The whites in power played on such sentiments. They statistically highlighted the Bahamian economic advantages over the West Indies and carried the message that the political advantages of the West Indies were less important, or might even be secured at the cost of economic advancement. This strategy, of dividing the black populations both within and among the Caribbean seems to have been a deliberate strategy. As one prominent UBP strategist stated, “...Negroes are ... the easiest people in the world to divide. We are going to have work on these divisions and play them for all they are worth”.

Even the black-led and dominated PLP and the black Bahamians seemed to share a common distrust of West Indians so the PLP moved very cautiously in opening up new connections with West Indian governments and refrained from declaring a common identity or interest.

Ethnicity
The issue of ethnicity was closely linked to the question of identity in both Guyana and the Bahamas. The discussion of Guiana’s identification with the rest of the Caribbean was closely related to ethnicity, focusing on the issue of potential political gains/disadvantages that federation would pose to an ethnic group.

Jagan acknowledged that since the majority of persons in the British West Indies were African, there were those in the East Indian community who were afraid of joining the Federation since they believed that their community would be shut out of political and economic opportunities and power. He denied however, that his party subscribed to the latter position. His stated main grouse with the Federal idea which he had made since the late 1940s remained the same - that is the federal structure was too loose and did not give any real powers to the federal government.

Jagan’s opponents were not convinced that his advocacy for a strong federal structure was genuine, arguing that on the contrary, Jagan was opposed to any type of Federation with the rest of the West Indian islands. One analyst pointed out that elections in Guyana were won by Jagan in 1957 and 1961 largely on the strength of ethnic mass voting. Since these elections coincided with the period of the West Indian Federation (1958-62), it is believed that Jagan’s Indian constituency persuaded him that Guyana’s inclusion in the Federation was inimical to their interests and numerical advantage.

In the Bahamas, the white Bahamian unquestionably believed that black Bahamians did not have the capacity or the experience to lead the society and their criticism of other black West Indians suggests that they were also unsure of their ability to govern. Moreover, the white dominated government under Roland Symonette, displayed their ethnic biases with their “open-door immigration policy” with respect to whites from Europe, England, Rhodesia and South Africa, while maintaining a strictly selective policy for West Indian nationals and those that were resident in the Bahamas were faced with discrimination.

Some black Bahamians were uncomfortable with this policy since they could more readily identify with black West Indians and were fearful of displacement by these expatriates. This identification however was not strong. The black group with whom the black Bahamians most readily identified came from the United States. Much of the message of racial pride came by way of the United States. The black heroes who were used by the PLP and their supporting agencies to give respectability and authority to their campaign were all American. Political observers believed that the American ideological concept of “black power” produced powerful repercussions in the Bahamas and the PLP was quick to stress that since blacks were in the majority in the Bahamas, they should be able to decide their own destiny.

Economic Destiny
The stated policy of the federal government to encourage foreign investment and the decision by the various territories to adopt the Lewis development model and compete with each other for such foreign investment were strongly criticised by Jagan. He argued that the unreservedly capitalist direction in which the territories were going would result in a recolonisation of the region.

Jagan argued that the weak federal structure implemented would merely support the vested interests and the capitalists and assist them in increasing their profits through the organized unification of services such as “better shipping facilities, better cooperation among primary producers, better cooperation in trading facilities, a common customs tariff, unification of Public services, a common currency”. He therefore advocated for a strong federal structure based on socialist economic principles.

Ultimately, while the Jagan government did not seem fully supportive of the idea of a political union, it was keenly interested in a West Indian customs union, particularly as a means of marketing rice and there was the feeling among some observers that only if British Guiana could not secure the benefits of customs union without federation, would she be persuaded to accept it.

In the Bahamas meanwhile, both black and white leadership from the inception dismissed the possibility that federation with the West Indian territories would result in economic gain for the Bahamas. They noted the traditional reliance of the West Indian territories on agriculture for their economic survival and contrasted this with the Bahamian reliance on commerce and services. The bay street boys constantly noted the evidences of prosperity and progress throughout the islands highlighting the fact that the gross national product had moved from approximately $300 000 in 1918 to $150 million in 1966. Despite these stated improvements however, there was still gross inequity between blacks and whites with the latter possessing disproportionately more power, privileges and wealth, and West Indian Federation was perceived as another attempt to change the status quo and was therefore fiercely resisted.