The four Prime Ministers were not stealing a march on the other Heads of Government with whom they had so recently been conferring; in fact it had been agreed in Montego Bay, as recorded in its Rose Hall declaration, that there was “The recognition that within this framework, (ie the proposals for regional governance which the Summit has been discussing) it is both legitimate and feasible for a group or groups of Caricom Member States to forge such closer links among themselves as they collectively consider appropriate”.

While there could be a down side to the impact of such smaller groups on the movement as a whole, this development could on the other hand accelerate the overall development of Caricom. There is a regional precedent to support such thinking. It should be recalled that it was the signing at Dickenson Bay, Antigua of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) Agreement by Prime Ministers Burnham, Barrow of Barbados and Vere Bird of Antigua and Barbuda that was the catalyst for wider integration. Within a short time thereafter, the other states had signed up, eleven in all, to the Carifta Agreement and the regional movement was well on its way.

It should also be recalled that there has existed within Caricom since June 1981 a grouping of states which is committed within the framework of Caricom to a deeper level of integration namely the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The OECS had itself built on the foundations of two earlier sub-groupings namely the West Indies (Associated States) Council of Ministers (1966) and the East Caribbean Common Market (l968). Although its levels of achievement vary from sector to sector, the OECS has in fact achieved a remarkable number of joint institutions - namely a common central bank and currency, a common market to be deepened soon into an economic union, a common judiciary, a common civil aviation administration, a common telecommunications authority and a common tourism promotion organisation.

There is thus a long tradition of sub-groupings which have more or less served as the building blocks for wider and deeper integration.

The geographical aspect, propinquity, clearly provides some of the rationale for the sub-group of the four Caricom states now committed to attempting some form of closer union. They are all located in a compact space criss-crossed by numerous airlines and sea routes. Within them are several major integration institutions - two of the three campuses of UWI namely St Augustine in Trinidad and Cave Hill in Barbados. The Secretariat of the Association of Caribbean States (the ACS) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) sub-regional secretariat are in Port-of-Spain; and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), perhaps the most powerful and effective of regional institutions, is in Barbados. The stability of its institutions is a major contribution of Barbados to the sub-group. Moreover the sub-group will be supported by the buoyant economy of Trinidad and Tobago which could play a similar role to that the Federal Republic of Germany played in the early stages of the European Community. As a kind of sub-secretariat for the Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME) which is already located in Barbados, it is likely that the proposed Caricom Commission will be headquartered in Barbados, especially as its first responsibility will be the implementation of the CSME. The group of Four will thus have considerable weight in the region.

From such limited information as has been disclosed it seems that the sub-group of four will have as its initial objectives inter alia the accelerated implementation of the CSME among themselves, deepening and widening areas of functional cooperation and integration of regional transport. A blueprint for operations is to be presented at a meeting of the four Prime Ministers in September and later at a Special Summit in November.

So far, the proposal of the Four for deeper integration has been silent on what may be called its external stance or foreign policy. Is it the aim that the Four will serve as a catalyst for a wider Caribbean Union, along the lines of the European Union which aims to strengthen joint external action? A Caribbean Union would not constrain independent action within international organisations (as shown by the divisions among European Union Member states, UK, France and Germany in the Security Council over Iraq) but would enhance the political potential and diplomatic weight of Caricom, especially in its dealings with major states.

Increasingly a dominant theme in the diplomacy of Caricom Member States is the emphasis on their vulnerability. This is the basis for making the case for Special and Differential Treatment in the current trade negotiations. This emphasis on vulnerability is essential as it is probably the only basis, at a time when traditional links of history, language and culture from the colonial past are wearing thin, on which one can insist on the special transitional market arrangements without which the traditional commodities sectors of Caricom economies may be destroyed by the demands for liberalisation. But is there not a danger that Caricom states will sell themselves short if they only project weakness and vulnerability? Caricom states have played important roles in shaping international relations and can do so again.

The statement issued by the Montego Bay Summit on the demand of the US administration that Member States accede to bilateral agreements which would give immunity to US nationals from prosecution in the International Criminal Court concludes with the following remarkable paragraph: “Heads resolved to explore the possibility of establishing mutual legal arrangements on military matters among their member states and in addition to seek partnerships in the international community to protect and embrace the security of the Caribbean Community.”

As this decision of the Heads comes in the context of pressures from the US , one might well ask which are the states with which partnerships will be sought? It will surely not be with other small and vulnerable states. The security resource will only be available from major states or groupings. Within the region there are the major states of Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico. There is also France which has territorial interests in the region. It should also be noted that threats to regional interests, as for example in sugar, are coming from major states, Australia, Brazil and Thailand.

A major state is more likely to be responsive to a security partnership if it is with an entity such as a Caribbean Union which will be seen to have weight in the UN and the OAS and other international organisations and may be perceived as more like an equal partner in a bilateral relationship.

In time the value of this initiative by four states may be seen to be in its role in “precipitating” region-wide action as was done by the agreement on Carifta signed by the three Bs at Dickenson Bay. But the initiative could alas also run the risk of negative consequences. Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK had early in his term envisaged a two stage, two speed European Union and had held a Downing Street dinner with chosen Heads of Government to test his ideas. His proposals got nowhere as it was felt that such arrangements would subject the European movement to unbearable strain as the smaller, less developed states would be left behind. Something similar could happen in Caricom. There is the real risk that if all Member states are not keeping more or less in step, albeit a slow march, some will be “frozen” into the current levels of integration and some states in particular Jamaica might increasingly go their own way.

So far the geographical separation of Caricom states -Belize in Central America, Jamaica close to North America, Guyana in South America - has been bridged by an awareness of a common identity and kinship. Might not this web of identity and kinship, already under strain, be ruptured in a two stage, two speed Caricom.

However, it seems that the clear intention of the Four is to remain open and responsive to other states which wish to be associated with their initiative. Prime Minister Gonsalves has said that he has been inundated with requests to hold discussions with other Heads of Government and President Jagdeo has confirmed that PM Gonsalves has been in touch with him.

President Jagdeo is reported (SN, Friday, July 18) as stating that he is willing to participate in the discussions but that he first wishes to have clarity on the concept of political union. That indeed is the heart of the matter. Regional thinking should not be limited to prevailing concepts such as a unified State or Federation - both of which are likely to be non-staters. There is the example of the European Union which is neither a super-state or a federation but essentially a political framework which facilitates and strengthens joint actions and has only those powers specifically conferred on it.

Guyana up to now has been in the vanguard of integration. The leadership which Burnham had provided was recognised in the location of the Caricom Secretariat in Georgetown. Even though in regional terms Guyana was almost the end of the road, the regional centre of gravity in an important sense lay in Georgetown. It may now be slipping away. It is vital to Guyana’s security and development interests to ensure that it remains pivotal to regional integration.