Power sharing is sometimes seen as political risk sharing. At other times, power sharing addresses conflict management if it is functional at all, but not conflict resolution. Perhaps, it would be more feasible to talk about structures of inclusiveness rather than power sharing!!
What is power sharing?
According to Sisk (1996), power sharing refers to practices and institutions that produce broad-based governing coalitions inclusive of all major ethnic groups. The two theories are the consociational theory and the integrative theory. The integrative theory depends on the use of incentives to achieve cooperation among all groups. Some inducements could be favorable pre-election agreements among candidates and economic interface crosscutting ethnic lines. Incentives are intended to minimize inequalities among groups through an equitable and fair distribution of resources. Some critics believe that the incentive method is applied to motivate the majoritarian group, encouraging it to relate caringly to minorities. In this scenario, minorities really are not part of any serious power sharing.
Consociational theory (cross-ethnic power sharing), introduced by Arend Lijphart, "means government by elite cartel to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (1969). Lijphart believes that consociational theory is required where there is social segmentation leading to serious political conflicts. The consociational theory indicates that elite cooperation will be able to accommodate political conflicts through compromise or some form of harmonious agreement. Lijphart presented four elements of consociational democracy, and these are: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. He felt that all four elements are necessary for consociational democracy. Later, he introduced consensus democracy characterized by 10 elements, as a softer choice for those political systems that fail to meet the four criteria for consociational democracy. However, advocacy for consociationalism continues unabated with consensus democracy losing ground.
Criticisms of power sharing
Some criticisms of consociational democracy now will be presented. Lijphart's consociational theory was sourced from the Dutch society where he may have exaggerated the level of that society's fragmentation. Social class as a variable was not applied in Lijphart's analysis of Dutch society. A comprehensive study of Dutch society characterized as a plural society would have shown that religious and class divisions intersected each other, producing little political instability. Barry (1975) argues that Switzerland was never a divided society, and that its Federal Council is not a Grand Coalition, to which Lipjhart alluded; it is not a Grand Coalition because its members do not primarily represent any subcultures, and decisions are effected through a referendum. Halpern (1986) believes that Lipjhart tried to invent case histories of countries to validate the consociational theory. The theory focuses on elite behavior and elite cooperation as necessary and sufficient to produce political stability, thereby excluding the role of the masses in decision making. In this way, consociational theory excludes participation of the lower levels of civil society.
The power-sharing models - consociational theory and integrative theory - were developed during the cold war period when the United Sates had the capacity to impose its will on many developing countries (Kloby, 1997). That capacity was reinforced through the dependent nature of these states. Where developing countries were dependent, the U.S. wielded greater control. Noam Chomsky (1993) remarked that "The cold war framework was scarcely more than a pretext to conceal the standard refusal to tolerate third world independence."
Power-sharing arrangements have not achieved the level of political stability necessary for human development, but have, indeed, created a sustained form of dependence to the U.S. and to other super powers at different points in history. Israel with some power-sharing arrangement receives considerable foreign aid from the U.S., which, in turn, inputs and manipulates the Israeli political process as and when needed. Consider the large number of countries around the world divided through territorial autonomy, which is promoted by the consociationalism approach. Power-sharing forms of governance have been utilized and leveraged by 'super' powers throughout history to sustain dependency from poor societies.
Advocates for power sharing have produced scathing attacks on the Westminster model as a political system. But we must be careful that we do not throw out the baby with the bath water. Former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Dr. Eric Williams (Ryan, 2002) felt that the Westminster model helped his country "to avoid producing our own barbarities and monsters...The prime requirement of the new developing states is not for more freedoms but for discipline. In any country with tribal, racial, or religious hostilities, the essential need is strong and unified management." Williams did not support coalition politics. Power sharing discussions have taken center stage in Guyana, being promoted as a way of halting ethnic excesses. Power sharing crusaders believe that a power sharing system of governance will produce national unity, and eliminate once and for all ethnic mistrust and ethnic insecurity. Let's not delude ourselves as to whether or not it has the capacity for conflict resolution.
Power sharing through the ballot box
Numerous parliamentary and general political changes in multiethnic societies have not produced the desirable changes in race relations. The United States Congressional system is a case in point. Notwithstanding the many democratic mechanisms enshrined in the U.S. Congress and the Constitution, and reinforced by Congressional concerns for justice, fundamental fairness, and equity, racism still stalks the land. Parliamentary systems are mere conduits for protecting vested power interests. Indeed, it's possible that political systems could ameliorate some aspects of race relations problems, but only if the masses are the architects of such systems. Selwyn Ryan (ibid) in the Trinidad Express (ibid.) commented on whether or not we should have power sharing. He said that "My own formula for cutting the Gordian Knot is to have the issues thoroughly canvassed during the run-up to the next general election since it is too serious an issue to be left only to self-interested politicians." The people must decide on power sharing mechanisms through the ballot box.
Power-sharing experiences
Malaysia & Singapore<br>
Both Malaysia and Singapore have incessantly been touted as exemplars of power sharing. This is not the case. In Malaysia, a constitutional monarchy, the Chief of State is a hereditary appointment. The Cabinet is appointed from among the members of Parliament by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Chief of State. The Prime Minister comes from the party that has the majority of electoral votes. This party is the National Front (coalition of 13 parties), frequently capturing more than 60% of the electoral votes. But these 13 parties largely comprise the Malay ethnicity. The House of Representatives with 192 seats consisting of mainly the Malays dominate the Parliament and the political parties. There is no conceptual ethnic power sharing here. There possibly is power sharing at the political party level, but not at the governmental or parliamentary level. The Singapore situation is no different. Singapore has 21 registered parties. The ruling People's Action Party has 77 members in an 81-seat Parliament. However, to allow for minority representation in Parliament, the constitution grants up to six Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NCMPs), selected from unsuccessful electoral candidates, in order to guarantee the representation in Parliament of political parties not forming the government. The ratio of 77 to 6 parliamentary members hardly makes the case for any significant form of power sharing.
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, former President Rakhmon Nabiev established a Government of National Reconstruction (GNR), in order to ease political tensions (Sattorzeod, 2001). This power sharing formula disintegrated quickly due to pressure from regional elites, internal conflicts, limited cooperation, and stubbornness of the majority group to sustain its old methods of governance.
Israel
In Israel, not long ago, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were deadlocked on the appointment of an Ambassador to the U.S. (Morrison, 2002). These two senior politicians, under the Israeli power sharing arrangement, have to reach some consensus on major Ambassadorships. Peres accepted Sallai Meridor, a member of Sharon's Likud Party, as a candidate because Peres could have a member of his Labor Party to lead the agency that deals with Jewish immigration to Israel. Under the Israeli power sharing arrangement, political gridlock is quite frequent on numerous other issues, and indeed, not excluding the course of the perennial Israeli/Palestinian peace process over the years. This type of political bargaining is driven more by frequent efforts to promote specific group and subcultural interests and not by worthy principles and fairness. This kind of unhealthy transaction could become the norm for making major appointments in a power-sharing governance structure.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the complexity of its power sharing structures retarded progress in many sections of the Dayton Peace Accord (ECMI). This difficulty has reduced the public's understanding of issues and hinders participation in issue-based politics. In fact, the European Center for Minority Issues argued that the absence of issue-based politics has sustained ethnic politics. The Center reported, too, that parties, reluctant to compromise, delay and obstruct decision making in the power-sharing institutions. Further, some parties instead of settling differences within the power-sharing structures, have unilaterally withdrawn, or have threatened to get out of the power-sharing arrangement.
Suriname
Consociationalism was introduced in Suriname after World War II to transcend ethnic politics, according to Dew (1993). The result of this experiment increased ethnic power sharing in the military, and subsequently, it experienced an abrupt termination. Suriname currently has no grand coalition in the spirit of consociationalism, as the Venetiaan Government has a coalition of four parties out of a total of 21 parties in the country.
Sisk (op. cit.) argues that power-sharing arrangements would need moderates for sustainability purposes. If moderates are not involved, then extremists would take over, as was the case with the Arusha Agreement in 1993 in Rwanda, according to Sisk (ibid.). Political advocates in Guyana calling for power sharing can hardly be described as moderates. And this poses a serious problem with any power-sharing arrangements in this country.
Conclusion
The basis for a change in any political system has to do with addressing existing issues that negatively impact the betterment of people's lives. Some issues could be lack of political inclusiveness, ethnic marginalization, and racial-ethnic discrimination. We have attempted to demonstrate in this series the comparable socioeconomic status shared by both East Indians and Africans at each class level, considering their population proportions. This equivalency in socioeconomic status for both major ethnic groups suggests minimal marginalization and discrimination. Further, the recent Constitutional Amendments, the Constructive Engagement, Parliamentary Committees, and the Opposition's role, can evolve into stronger structures of political inclusiveness within the existing political system.
Whatever political arrangements are put in place or whatever is sustained must be effected in the people's interests. Advocates of power sharing or some other political arrangement must demonstrate that the proposed system will serve the people's interests better than the existing political arrangement.