According to the findings of the Disciplined Forces Commission, the power to command and superintend the force is an internal one which cannot be shared with someone extrinsic to the GPF, like the minister.

"The minister's power to give general orders and directions to the commissioner does not extend to ordering or directing him how the GPF is to be commanded or superintended," the commission's interim report says.

The commission's findings were in view of the submissions of the

PNCR and other groups, who said there are instances of political interference in the functional operations of the GPF. Such interference was blamed for the loss of public confidence in the force and the undermining of its independence.

But former commissioner Maggie Beirne believes the commission hardly broached the subject of how to ensure "that the police [force] is, and is seen to be, politically nonpartisan.

"There was no fundamental engagement with the concept of political independence and effective accountability," she wrote in her appendix to the report, which she helped draft before resigning due to her other commitments.

According to Section Seven of the Police Act, the police commissioner, "shall, subject to the general orders and directions of the minister, have the command and superintendence of the force, and he shall be responsible to the minister for the peace and good order throughout Guyana, for the efficient administration and government of the force, and for the proper expenditure of all public moneys appropriated for the service thereof."

The report says that this means that the commissioner has a statutory power of internal control and command, as well as a statutory responsibility to the minister. The minister, meanwhile, has the power to issue general orders and directions but because his office is outside the structure of the force, these can only be given to the commissioner, who has the administrative responsibility.

While unlike the commissioner, the minister is given a statutory power without a statutory responsibility, the report points out that he does have an executive responsibility to the National Assembly.

This executive responsibility, the report says, limits the minister's power to general orders and directions of an executive nature which does not encroach on the internal power of the commissioner to command and superintend the GPF. In fact, the words "subject to" in Section Seven shouldn't be interpreted to mean "any overriding power in the minister to command and superintend the GPF.

"The minister's executive power... is for the purpose of enabling him to establish and define the parameters within which the power of... the commissioner is to be exercised.

It enables the minister to establish executive objectives by which the commissioner must be guided... but does not extend to ordering or directing him how the GPF is to be commanded or superintended," the report states.

Accordingly, the minister could give general orders as to what functional operations should be carried out but cannot direct how such functional operations should be carried out.

But Beirne was critical of the discourse on the issue. She said there was an unquestioned acceptance that the police should be subordinate to a political appointee, and little or no interest in exploring models from elsewhere. She said the law itself was never questioned. "It would be fair to say, that I found little sympathy within the commission to exploring best practices elsewhere, despite this being an explicit part of our terms of reference."

In addition to Section Seven, Beirne said she raised reservations about other parts of the Police Act where there were extensive references to ministerial involvement in policing questions. Under the Act, the military duties of the police are carried out "under the authority of the minister". It is the minister who can "cause to be issued arms and ammunition to the force and for any member thereof to use the same". The force "shall consist of a commissioner and such number of deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners ...and band apprentices as the minister may from time to time direct. The commissioner may from time to time with the approval of the minister make regulations with regard to all or any of the following matters," which precedes what she called "a comprehensive list."

While she does agree that the police must be subject to the executive branch of government via a minister, Beirne holds specific reservations.

"The question is merely how close is that relationship, and what checks and balances exist to ensure that the head of the police is not overly subject to partisan political control."

The Northern Ireland Police Act states:

"The police shall be under the direction and control of the chief constable. In discharging his functions, the chief constable shall have regard to (a) the policing plan and (b) any Code of Practice under Section 27 (this latter can be issued by the secretary of state)".

Beirne explains that the Northern Ireland model ensures that the secretary of state (equivalent of the minister in Guyana) receives and approves estimates for receipts and payments for policing submitted by a Policing Board, determines and revises long-term objectives for policing, and issues and revises codes of practice about the work of the Policing Board and certain aspects of the work of the chief constable.

And while in other areas, the secretary of state is an "appeal" mechanism, the key policy oversight is passed to the Policing Board (a mix of political and civilian appointees), which sets the objectives for policing in Northern Ireland for the chief constable. The chief constable retains a clear direction and control function.

Beirne concedes that this is some way from the power of "general orders and direction" being subject to a political appointee.