In last week's article I started to explore the darker side of the crisis and vulnerability, which seems to constantly envelop the Caribbean region. That exploration was deliberately counterpoised to the previous articles exploring the brighter side of the Carib-bean's future, specifically as exemplified in the bold aim of Trinidad and Tobago's Vision 2020 to transform that country into a modern developed economy by 2020. A number of persistent external and internal problems were referred to in last week's article, which concluded with my promise to begin addressing three of these problems that had taken on great urgency and each of which, I indicated, if not properly handled, has the potential to undermine the very foundations of Caribbean integration. The three problems identified were the situation in Haiti, the border controversy involving Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). In what follows these will be addressed in that order.
Before proceeding to this task, however, I should re-mind readers about my oft- expressed concern about timing. The rapidly transforming global trade and financial environment, as reflected in the arrangements of the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement, and the FTAA, leaves a very narrow window of opportunity for CARICOM to forge a unity among itself, in pursuit of a common regional inspired agenda. Recall that on paper, the FTAA is due to come on stream in January 2005, while the second phase of negotiations for an EU-CARICOM, Economic Partnership Agree-ment, which was scheduled to commence last September, is also scheduled for completion by December 2007. When these are in place the remaining scope for autonomous or independent regional policy choices will be virtually non-existent.
The Haitian experiment
Turning to Haiti, certain aspects of CARICOM's experiment in broadening its framework and allowing that country membership immediately strike one's attention. First, there is no doubt that the sentiment of Caribbean oneness must have played the decisive role in bringing Haiti into the CARICOM fold.
Added to this, was a profound appreciation of the glorious origins of that Republic, widely shared in the region. In 1997 Haiti became a provisional member of CARICOM and was formally and fully admitted in 2002. To the observant it was evident at the outset that this admission, if it were to be meaningful and not simply token, would constitute a far-reaching transformation of CARICOM, at all levels of its operations. Second, in light of the tumultuous nature of Haiti's history, its international significance far exceeds that of any other CARICOM country. This simple fact means that events in Haiti could potentially be played out on an international scale, with very little reference to the wishes and expectations of CARICOM. Third, despite its moderate success on a comparative global scale, CARICOM itself is so small and vulnerable that the economic, social and political reality of Haiti would always carry the potential for its problems to overwhelm the capacity of the grouping.
The basic features of Haiti's economy demonstrate the validity of this observation. To begin with, when Haiti became a member of CARICOM it added more than 8 million persons to a regional grouping whose population was then only about 6.5 million persons. Haiti's population has also been growing above the regional average (at about 1.3 per cent per annum) between 1975 and 2001, and it has been projected to reach 11 million persons by 2015. The value of its GDP is about US$3.7 billion, yielding therefore a per capita GDP of about US$460. This is by far the lowest in the region and in fact is about three per cent of the highest (Bahamas)! Further, for the long period 1975-2000 the annual growth rate of Haiti's economy has been negative (minus 2%). This has also been the case over the past decade, (1990-2002), when the growth rate was minus 2.5 per cent. This means that Haiti is not only poor, but has been in fact getting poorer.
Haiti is also a far less open economy than the rest of CARICOM.
Its exports represent only 13% of GDP and in many CARICOM countries this is usually as high as 80-90 per cent. The value of Haiti's imports represents about one-third of the value of its GDP. Thus we find, the value of total agricultural exports from Haiti was only about US$20 million in recent years or less than 2 per cent of the value of total agricultural exports from all of CARICOM. It, however, imports about US$360 million worth of agriculture imports, which represents about one-sixth the total value of all of CARICOM's agricultural imports.
The results of this situation are clearly revealed in the United Nations Human Development Index. Haiti is the only CARICOM country classed at a "low level of human development." Its country ranking was as low as 150 out of 175 ranked countries. By comparison four CARICOM countries were reported at a "high level of human development," and all the remainder except for Haiti, at "a medium level of human development."
Haiti and CARICOM: Economic
disproportions
The economic disproportions between Haiti and the rest of CARICOM are therefore quite obvious. Consequently it was always on the cards that this circumstance alone could create special problems for the integration movement, particularly as CARICOM lacks the resources to lift the 'Haitian boat' to the general level of the remainder of the region. This means that external non-regional support would for a long time to come be the determining factor in how Haiti performed. Unfortun-ately, for political and other reasons, over US$500 million worth of foreign assistance committed to the Haitian people in the 1990s was suspended during Aristide rule. This no doubt helped to precipitate the crisis that led eventually to his downfall, and with it the continuing threat to democracy and constitutionality in Guyana.
The political issues
The political situation in Haiti is by far the most immediate crisis, centering as it does on regime change. Even though I am willing to concede that Aristide contributed much to his ouster and the demise of his presidency (and along with it any immediate hopes for putting Haiti soon on a democratic and constitutional path), the legitimate opposition's rejection of a political solution just prior to this event could well turn out to be a blunder of historic proportions for the whole CAICOM region.
Next week I shall explain why I believe this to be the case, as we continue this discussion on crisis and vulnerability in the Caribbean.
Darker side
In last week's article I started to explore the darker side of the crisis and vulnerability, which seems to constantly envelop the Caribbean region. That exploration was deliberately counterpoised to the previous articles exploring the brighter side of the Carib-bean's future, specifically as exemplified in the bold aim of Trinidad and Tobago's Vision 2020 to transform that country into a modern developed economy by 2020. A number of persistent external and internal problems were referred to in last week's article, which concluded with my promise to begin addressing three of these problems that had taken on great urgency and each of which, I indicated, if not properly handled, has the potential to undermine the very foundations of Caribbean integration. The three problems identified were the situation in Haiti, the border controversy involving Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). In what follows these will be addressed in that order.
Before proceeding to this task, however, I should re-mind readers about my oft- expressed concern about timing. The rapidly transforming global trade and financial environment, as reflected in the arrangements of the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement, and the FTAA, leaves a very narrow window of opportunity for CARICOM to forge a unity among itself, in pursuit of a common regional inspired agenda. Recall that on paper, the FTAA is due to come on stream in January 2005, while the second phase of negotiations for an EU-CARICOM, Economic Partnership Agree-ment, which was scheduled to commence last September, is also scheduled for completion by December 2007. When these are in place the remaining scope for autonomous or independent regional policy choices will be virtually non-existent.
The Haitian experiment
Turning to Haiti, certain aspects of CARICOM's experiment in broadening its framework and allowing that country membership immediately strike one's attention. First, there is no doubt that the sentiment of Caribbean oneness must have played the decisive role in bringing Haiti into the CARICOM fold.
Added to this, was a profound appreciation of the glorious origins of that Republic, widely shared in the region. In 1997 Haiti became a provisional member of CARICOM and was formally and fully admitted in 2002. To the observant it was evident at the outset that this admission, if it were to be meaningful and not simply token, would constitute a far-reaching transformation of CARICOM, at all levels of its operations. Second, in light of the tumultuous nature of Haiti's history, its international significance far exceeds that of any other CARICOM country. This simple fact means that events in Haiti could potentially be played out on an international scale, with very little reference to the wishes and expectations of CARICOM. Third, despite its moderate success on a comparative global scale, CARICOM itself is so small and vulnerable that the economic, social and political reality of Haiti would always carry the potential for its problems to overwhelm the capacity of the grouping.
The basic features of Haiti's economy demonstrate the validity of this observation. To begin with, when Haiti became a member of CARICOM it added more than 8 million persons to a regional grouping whose population was then only about 6.5 million persons. Haiti's population has also been growing above the regional average (at about 1.3 per cent per annum) between 1975 and 2001, and it has been projected to reach 11 million persons by 2015. The value of its GDP is about US$3.7 billion, yielding therefore a per capita GDP of about US$460. This is by far the lowest in the region and in fact is about three per cent of the highest (Bahamas)! Further, for the long period 1975-2000 the annual growth rate of Haiti's economy has been negative (minus 2%). This has also been the case over the past decade, (1990-2002), when the growth rate was minus 2.5 per cent. This means that Haiti is not only poor, but has been in fact getting poorer.
Haiti is also a far less open economy than the rest of CARICOM.
Its exports represent only 13% of GDP and in many CARICOM countries this is usually as high as 80-90 per cent. The value of Haiti's imports represents about one-third of the value of its GDP. Thus we find, the value of total agricultural exports from Haiti was only about US$20 million in recent years or less than 2 per cent of the value of total agricultural exports from all of CARICOM. It, however, imports about US$360 million worth of agriculture imports, which represents about one-sixth the total value of all of CARICOM's agricultural imports.
The results of this situation are clearly revealed in the United Nations Human Development Index. Haiti is the only CARICOM country classed at a "low level of human development." Its country ranking was as low as 150 out of 175 ranked countries. By comparison four CARICOM countries were reported at a "high level of human development," and all the remainder except for Haiti, at "a medium level of human development."
Haiti and CARICOM: Economic disproportions
The economic disproportions between Haiti and the rest of CARICOM are therefore quite obvious. Consequently it was always on the cards that this circumstance alone could create special problems for the integration movement, particularly as CARICOM lacks the resources to lift the 'Haitian boat' to the general level of the remainder of the region. This means that external non-regional support would for a long time to come be the determining factor in how Haiti performed. Unfortun-ately, for political and other reasons, over US$500 million worth of foreign assistance committed to the Haitian people in the 1990s was suspended during Aristide rule. This no doubt helped to precipitate the crisis that led eventually to his downfall, and with it the continuing threat to democracy and constitutionality in Guyana.
The political issues
The political situation in Haiti is by far the most immediate crisis, centering as it does on regime change. Even though I am willing to concede that Aristide contributed much to his ouster and the demise of his presidency (and along with it any immediate hopes for putting Haiti soon on a democratic and constitutional path), the legitimate opposition's rejection of a political solution just prior to this event could well turn out to be a blunder of historic proportions for the whole CAICOM region.
Next week I shall explain why I believe this to be the case, as we continue this discussion on crisis and vulnerability in the Caribbean.