To return to Haiti. The immediate question - one which in the end may only be settled by historians - is whether Aristide was kidnapped, handcuffed and taken on to a plane or whether he left voluntarily. From the emerging facts, as distinct from statements, one might dismiss as untrue that Aristide was kidnapped in the precise meaning of that word. (The Oxford English dictionary defines kidnap as to carry off a person by illegal force). While there was no kidnapping in a technical sense there is evidence of threats and a level of coercion which have no place in the dealings between states except perhaps in the time of war. The facts appear to indicate that the departure of Aristide was the end game in a carefully conceived plan. Consider these developments.

On the Friday before the Sunday's dramatic events, one of the rebel leaders stated that responding to a US request he had decided to hold off his forces from an attack on the capital city, Port-au-Prince. Next came the Saturday night White House statement strongly calling for Aristide to go. Then came Sunday. US Congresswoman Maxine Waters who had been speaking on a daily basis to Aristide (and his wife) stated that an official of the US Embassy in Haiti had informed Aristide that the rebels were in the city and the US could not prevent him from being killed.

So Aristide boarded a plane already conveniently waiting at the airport which had been chartered by the US and was flown to the Central African Republic (CAR). It appears that the US with French assistance had chosen the place of exile. On Wednesday morning, 3rd March the BBC reported (6 am local time) that the CAR government had now revealed how Aristide arrived in Bangui (its capital city). He was only told where he was going 45 minutes before arrival. He disembarked accompanied by 60 marines. In the meantime, President Bush made a Sunday statement informing the nation that he is sending in forces into Haiti and in an uncharacteristic display of precision explains that the Haitian Constitution is alive and well as the next in line, the Chief Justice, had been sworn in as President. Within a few hours the marines who had clearly been on standby were in Haiti.

At first Bangui had indicated that Aristide would only be permitted a temporary stay but on Thursday 4th March the CAR government reversed its position and stated that he is welcome to stay there in exile, perhaps responding to pressure. (In terms of transport Bangui is comparatively isolated).

What was the US' motivation for military intervention in Haiti, one of the poorest countries. (No room there for Halliburton or Bechtel!). It may be it was to avoid the opprobrium which would follow from the turning back of hundreds of thousands of Haitian refugees. Maybe it was President Bush trying to enhance his image of a war President. More importantly it should be recalled that the Haitian intervention falls within the traditional pattern of US activity in the Caribbean. It is said that there have been more than a hundred interventions in the Caribbean region over the last century.

Whatever its motivation it will have fateful consequences for the regime's approach to security and diplomacy.

Caricom had been involved in a joint commission with the Organisation of American States (OAS) which for three years worked towards resolving the political conflict in Haiti. Accordingly the OAS was part of the diplomatic group (the OAS and Caricom) which over the last month had endeavoured to secure agreement between Aristide and the Opposition elements on the basis of a Caricom formula. It will be recalled that the Caricom formula to which Aristide had agreed involved the appointment of a new Prime Minister acceptable to the opposition and the appointment of a new government which would take the country into elections. It must therefore be remarked that at no stage did the OAS play, as far as is known, a visible role in resolving the current crisis. The OAS Democratic Charter to guard against coups and interruptions in the democratic process was not invoked either in letter or intent. The OAS Permanent Council did not meet.

Why this lack of OAS initiative in a major hemispheric crisis? It may be that this was another example of the OAS's observed behaviour in avoiding possible confrontations with the US. It has already been noted editorially on a previous occasion that the Latin States which dominate the OAS, even including powerful states such as Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil who maintain linkages with Cuba, have failed to raise the question of Cuba's continuing exclusion from the OAS. More recently at the Special Summit of the Americas in Mexico, Latin States who had expressed fundamental doubts about the efficiency of the Free Trade Area of the America (FTAA) acquiesced in a Final Communique which praised the progress in the FTAA negotiations, with only Venezuela dissenting.

More fundamental still to the OAS indifference or lukewarmness on the Haitian crisis may be the ambiguities (to put it delicately) with which certain Latin States view the black Caribbean whose leaders are the descendants of slaves and indentured workers.

The hesitation will be recalled with which many of the then members of the OAS had approached the question of membership in the OAS of the newly independent Caribbean states.

In this connection the Chilean contingent now in Haiti is perhaps not so much an indication of Chile's interest in the Caribbean as it is a function of Chile's close relationship with the US.

In short, there are situations in which the OAS cannot be regarded as a reliable ally of Caricom.

The Caricom diplomacy towards the crisis for its part was tentative and lacking in penetration. It was left essentially to two Foreign Ministers, Knight of Jamaica and Mitchell of the Bahamas albeit highly competent and articulate. Unaccountably there was no emergency meeting of COFCOR, the Council for Foreign and Community Relations. One wonders what magnitude of crisis could conceivably trigger a meeting of the Foreign Ministers! It has already been noted editorially that the early sidelining of Caricom was due to the failure to create a diplomatic balance to the enormous power of the US, Canada and France. A meeting of Caricom Foreign Ministers could have created an instrument for forging such a balance by inviting into consultation certain larger states, Brazil and Venezuela and perhaps other members of the Rio Group of Latin American Foreign Ministers in which Caricom has observer status. Important consideration should also have been given to inviting Cuba into consultation.

But so much by way of "post mortem." What next? The way forward is murky. The Caricom Emergency Summit meeting in Jamaica last week has wisely called for an investigation, perhaps by the UN, into the circumstances of Aristide's departure. Such an investigation besides helping to establish the facts could serve two purposes. First, within limits it can serve as a deterrent to similar interventions elsewhere in the region. Second it could provide the moral clarity which would enable Caricom to act in the Haitian situation without compromising its integrity. In this connection as foreshadowed editorially, the Summit decided not to participate in the multinational force for the time being.

But it will be no easy matter in which to mount any investigation. The US and President Bush himself are in a sense being put in the dock in an election year!

The Emergency Summit also decided that until Haiti returns to democracy it should be excluded from the Councils of Caricom. But clearly channels of communication must be maintained. There is no sense in which Haiti can be taken off the Caricom agenda.

The Haiti probelmatique will not be resolved by the marines and other forces going in and exiting in three months or even over a longer period. The failure of the earlier US intervention which restored Aristide to power to promote reconstruction, points, as UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan has asserted, to the need for a very long haul for the international community. (The reconstruction of post-war Europe and Japan took decades.)

The Haitian quagmire will overtake and consume any leader however carefully chosen, and irrespective of his democratic credentials, unless there are supportive institutions and a society which attaches importance to human rights and related values. It is a task for slow and patient building from which Caricom cannot stand aside. The wise Caricom decision to call for an investigation and to withhold participation in the multinational force must be seen for what it is, no more than a holding position.

The urgent challenge to Caricom diplomacy is how to maintain a vanguard role in the task of Haiti's reconstruction. This may mean an early return to the UN Security Council. There is need for much hard thinking; alas in a region characterised by its high intellectuality, regional leaders with few exceptions shy away from new ideas.