Caricom and the continued Haiti fallout
Guyana and the wider world
Dr. Clive Thomas
Stabroek News
March 21, 2004
The fallout from Haiti continues to dog Caricom leaders. Jamaica, whose proximity to Haiti makes it a likely haven for refugees, has been a traditional friend of Aristide, as well as being the current chair of the highest deliberative body of Caricom - the Heads of Government Conference. Because of these circumstances it has found itself on the frontline, as it were, ever since the start of the crisis leading up to Aristide's ouster and during its aftermath. Two actions of Caricom in particular have kept it on centre stage. One is the call for an official international inquiry into Aristide's ouster, based no doubt on the widespread scepticism of people in the region about claims that he left 'voluntarily.' This call puts Caricom in direct conflict with the US version of events. The other is Jamaica's present hosting of the deposed Haitian President, on a supposedly 'personal and family' visit to Jamaica, despite voiced objections by the US government and the interim Haitian President, Latortue.
If one considers the humiliations Aristide was forced to suffer in the Central African Republic it lends support to the view that he did not go there voluntarily. From all indications, his physical situation was that of a virtual prisoner, not a former head of state. Thus, he had restricted hours of access to electricity and to exercise outside of the apartment he occupied. His phone calls were also restricted to 15 minutes per day. Indeed both the phone and the electricity were controlled from outside the apartment, from where they were turned off and on as his hosts deemed fit. One wonders how Third World leaders could be so indecent to each other. I am certain they would treat no former First World head of state this way. Jamaica in hosting Aristide is therefore ensuring no more than the basic dignity, decency and respect, which one should give to any 'former' head of state not charged with any crimes.
The AI dossier
In considering how to respond to the Haitian crisis readers should not lose sight of certain essential truths revealed in a recent Amnesty International (AI) publication. If we go back to Aristide's restoration to power in 1994, we find that there followed one of the most promising developments in Haiti's efforts to pursue a democratic and constitutional path and to transform its political culture. A series of trials were held against senior members of the Haitian armed forces (FADH) and the paramilitary front (FRAPH) for murder and violence committed by them against the Haitian people. These trials sought to achieve three things. One was to bring justice to the victims and their families and friends, and indeed to all of Haiti. In Haiti, achieving justice against those who hold power has been a rare achievement. The second aim was to sow the seeds for 'the rule of law' to grow on Haitian soil. In a country where arbitrariness and authoritarianism have been the norms of political behaviour, this represented a giant step forward. And, the third aim was to situate human rights at the centre of whatever the Haitian authorities sought to do to improve the quality of life and the standard of living of the people. Many developing countries aspire to a 'human rights' and 'people-centred' process of development, and Haiti sought to join this group.
Among those charged and who faced trial were 1) Louis Jodel Chamblain deputy-leader of FRAPH. He was convicted and sentenced to separate life sentences for the Raboteau massacre and the extrajudicial execution of Antoine Izmery 2) Hebert Valmond, the head of military intelligence, who was similarly convicted and sentenced to life for the Raboteau massacre 3) Jean-Claude Duperval, deputy commander-in-chief of the army, also convicted and sentenced to life 4) Carl Dorelien, army colonel, convicted and sentenced to life for the Raboteau massacre, and 5) Prosper Avril, General and leader of the 1988 coup d`etat. He has also been indicted in the 1990 Piatre massacre.
AI has identified all these persons, whom it has deemed as "perpetrators of past abuses," as part of the leadership of the rebel forces that pushed for the ouster of Aristide. These details provided should remove any lingering doubt that might remain as to what it would mean for the future of Haiti and Caricom if thugs and convicted murderers such as these gained control of governmental power in Haiti.
It is for this reason I fear that the opportunistic manoeuvre to oust Aristide as a condition for sending in a force to hold the peace will backfire, if the long-term goal is indeed to put Haiti on a sustainable democratic and constitutional path. Behind the facade of the interim President, Latortue, there are now two effective power bases in Haiti, apart from the peacekeepers. One is represented by the rebel forces and their criminal leadership. And, the other is constituted of Aristide's die-hard supporters, so-often referred to in the media as "slum-dwellers." For certain, the power and influence of the Aristide group will fade, as the whole orientation of the 'peace mission' enterprise is to make effective, complete and total, the removal of Aristide's influence and authority in Haitian society. Although the 'big powers' behind the manoeuvre are no doubt uncomfortable with their implicit, but still observable, alliance with the criminal-led rebel forces, the reality is that there is no other local power base with which they can work. Latortue is a selected, not an elected President, and consequently he has no legitimate power base to offer as an alternative to the existing rebel group.
If, as these powers have done after other previous 'rescue missions' in the hemisphere, they tire of 'maintaining the peace' and find reason to end their mission and depart, they will leave in their wake the criminal elites I described earlier. Sadly, much of this looming disaster stems from the decision of whatever genuine political opposition exists in Haiti who insisted on Aristide's ouster in the face of the rebel advance as a condition for a political settlement. With his ouster will follow the inevitable decimation of his party and its power base. The rebel forces will then have no more use for this opposition, as many of the opposition will find out at the cost of their lives.