Management and resolution of territorial conflicts: the case of Venezuela Part 1
By Cedric L. Joseph
Stabroek News
April 4, 2004
We publish below the first part of an edited version of a paper delivered on Thursday, March 4, 2004
It would appear that, whatever date was scheduled, it was highly probable that this conference on "Governance, Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution" would be convened amidst or alongside some conflict, so much has conflict been with us. Today the drama of brinkmanship continues unrelentingly. We could not invite so many esteemed persons here without offering you some graphic evidence of conflict to get your teeth into. Indeed, you may have already concluded that, like the hapless people of ancient Crete, we have made much more history then we can consume.
This paper will examine the management of the Venezuelan conflict by the United Kingdom, the colonial power, and what it bequeathed to the independent state of Guyana and how the state dealt with its inheritance. Responding to Venezuela, a calculated policy of appeasement, the United Kingdom, aided and endorsed by the United States, left Guyana with a major foreign policy responsibility. From the available evidence there should have been no conflict whatsoever for Guyana.
It is recalled that on October 3, 1899, the arbitral tribunal meeting in Paris, after the most exhaustive hearing, had determined unanimously the boundary with Venezuela as a full, perfect and final settlement. That boundary was subsequently demarcated on the ground and accepted by Venezuela and the international community for over sixty decades.
In February, 1944, Severo Mallet-Prevost, a distinguished international jurist and the junior council in the Venezuelan team at Paris, having been decorated with the Order of the Liberator by the Venezuelan government, compiled a memorandum alleging that the award was the result of a deal between the Russian President of the Tribunal, Frederic de Martens, and the British judges. Pursuant to instructions left by Mallet-Prevost, the memorandum was published posthumously. Vene-zuela would use this allegation, rejected by the United Kingdom, to reopen the matter.
It is known also that Dr Cheddi Jagan was elected to office in April 1953 and after a period of 133 days the colonial authorities suspended his government. He was returned to office in August 1961 amidst a volatile situation at home; in the region where Dr Fidel Castro's revolution was under way; and perceptions in the United States and Venezuela about the establishment of a communist state in strategically located British Guiana. All this within the context of the Cold War.
The administration of John F Kennedy, as recorded in 1962, would devote more man-hours per capita to British Guiana than to any other problem. As early as April 1961, Kennedy would raise with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan the issue of Dr Jagan returning to power. The administration was transfixed by its assessment that the politics of British Guiana was dominated by the "Communist-led People's Progressive Party of Cheddi Jagan." Accordingly, Kennedy sought to encourage Macmillan to mount an operation to prevent Dr Jagan from achieving office in August 1961. The British, however, were reluctant to undertake any venture of the kind as they believed Dr Jagan to be "salvageable."
When Kennedy met Macmillan on June 30, 1963, he restated the existing sentiments of his administration that if the United King-dom were to leave British Guiana at that time, it would become a communist state and that "the thing to do was to look for ways to drag the thing out."
In November 1961, during the XVI session of the United Nations General Assembly, Dr Jagan addressed the United Nations Fourth Committee, then dealing with Trustee-ship and Depen-dent Territories, about the difficulty he was experiencing in getting the United King-dom to set a date for independence. Taking advantage of this development, after the recess in February 1962, Venezuela also addressed the Fourth Committee and introduced the matter of the frontier, repeating the allegation that as a result of a deal the border had been arbitrarily established, called for negotiation and reserved its position on the border.
The United Kingdom replied that the matter had been settled by the arbitral tribunal and, in accordance with the treaty of arbitration, was a full, perfect and final settlement. The session ended, and there the matter would have stood with, at worst, a reservation.
During the intervening period to the next session of the UN General Assembly, President Romulo Betancourt would initiate the strongest demarche with the United Kingdom intimating his seriousness, if not agitation, over the claim. This would take place, notwithstanding some British palliatives including a state visit by HRH, Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh.
At the next session (XV11) of the General Assembly, on August 20, 1962, Venezuela requested the inclusion of an item on the border in the agenda. Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, instructed Sir Patrick Dean, the Permanent Represen-tative, not to oppose inscription of the item as the matter was deemed a legitimate one for consideration by the UN and, significantly, to avoid making things difficult for President Betancourt.
When the item came up for debate, as Sir Patrick conceded at the time in his report, the Soviets and their allies were somewhat abashed when the United Kingdom did not press the issue to a vote and permitted the item to be inscribed in the agenda.
It was known then that the United Kingdom also had the support of the Afro-Asian bloc, friendly to Dr Jagan, and a number of Latin American states that were chary of any UN discussion of borders. This was the first concession to Venezuela.
The item was assigned to the Special Political Committee. There it was learnt that Venezuela intended to table a draft resolution calling on the parties to negotiate. The United Kingdom would now use every diplomatic pressure to block tabling of a resolution. A number of Latin American countries advised Venezuela that they could not support a resolution and urged Venezuela to end the debate without one. They included Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru.
In the estimation of the United Kingdom, the United States was in a difficult position. While it could not support Venezuela, the United States was concerned about the effects of any rebuff for Betancourt who had taken a strong position in Latin America against Dr Castro. In fact, perhaps unknown to the United Kingdom, the State Department had instructed its Permanent Representative to vote against any resolution. Accordingly, Venezuela, appreciating that its proposed draft was unacceptable, withdrew the draft resolution.
All was not lost for Venezuela. The United Kingdom was equally concerned about any embarrassment for Betancourt. The Foreign Office had determined that Venezuela should be rewarded for agreeing not to table a draft resolution and had instructed the Permanent Mission that, only when it was assured that Venezuela would not table a resolution, to offer to discuss arrangements for a tripartite study of the documents. That became the acclaimed caveat announced by Colin Crowe, the Deputy Permanent Representative on November 12, 1962, that the offer in no way constituted an offer to engage in substantive talks about the revision of the frontier. This was the second concession.
In the words of Sir Patrick Dean, the Venezuelans were "heartily relieved and genuinely grateful that an offer had been made which allowed them to extricate themselves from a position which had become increasingly embarrassing. Later, in August 1965 the Counsellor in the British Embassy in Caracas, Robert Edmonds, would confide to his American counterpart, Francis Herron, that the British decision to agree to discuss the dispute had been motivated by a desire to help Betancourt through a difficult year.
The Latin American delegations were also greatly relieved at the outcome not having to choose between the merits of the case and Latin American solidarity. Later, Betancourt, personally, would thank US Ambassador C Allan Stewart, saying that he was "well satisfied" with the decision at the United Nations and the role of the United States in the debate.
Dr Jagan, who was in London, saw the draft statement on the offer on the previous day and accepted it. However, protesting to Governor Sir Ralph Grey on related matters in August 1963, Dr Jagan would describe the offer as "the first concession." It was really the second.
The authorities in both London and Washington were actively engaged in a friendly competition for Betancourt's hand. The United Kingdom was keen on saving Betancourt from the difficult position he had created for Venezuela at the UN. In both capitals there was some anxiety that Betancourt would not survive his term of office. Consequently, they both felt obliged to do everything possible to avoid causing embarrassment and to bolster the regime in its struggle against, as described, subversive elements. In August 1961, Betancourt had completed the first two and a half years of his five-year term as a constitutional president; this was a record in Venezuela. He had already survived three attempted assassinations, two military insurrections during May-June 1962. He was attacked from the left and the right and at the beginning of 1962 his party Accion Democratica split into two factions.
The United Kingdom was also particularly concerned about its investments, notably Shell Co, the largest investment in Latin America, and the increasing opportunity for the export of capital goods during the forthcoming four-year plan, 1963-1966. A major project to be undertaken was the Guri hydro-electric dam. The Kennedy administration also described Betancourt as their best and most influential supporter in Latin America. He was the bulwark in the Alliance for Progress programme in the struggle against the spread of communism and the attraction of the Castro revolution. Indeed, Betancourt was the first Latin American head to receive Kennedy for a state visit in December, 1961.
The Kennedy administration received many appeals from Venezuela for support of its territorial claim. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, offered several briefings about developments without specifically requesting, though expecting, that the United States would use its authority to blunt Venezuelan action. The United States, however, maintained a position of, as described, evenhandedness with both parties and declined to intervene in the dispute between friends hoping that the issue would be settled amicably.
In the event, the interests of the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela would be satisfied, while the interests of British Guiana were compromised and a valuable niche was offered to Venezuela to exploit at an appropriate time. Venezuela did not take much time to do so.
Within a short time, Venezuela was able to upgrade the meeting of officials assigned to study the documents to a full-scale meeting of ministers. As early as February 1963, the British Ambassador, Sir Douglas Busk, was urging the Foreign office to convene a top-level meeting, which would include Dr Jagan. This was not only an unusual proposal for the Colonial Office, but it also surprised the Foreign Office which instructed the ambassador that a ministerial meeting could not be considered until after the examination of the documents. Even this was unacceptable to the Colonial Office which maintained that the matter was fully, finally and perfectly settled and that there should be no discussion.
It happened, however, that the British embassy in Caracas carelessly transmitted the impression to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that the study by officials constituted one stage to be followed by a second stage at ministerial level. The Foreign Office tried to back away from this error by denying that any such statement was made. The Venezuelans pressed by refusing at the first meeting of the officials on March 18, 1963 to continue with the examination unless a prior assurance was given that a high-level meeting would follow.
Home, cornered, offered to meet his Venezuelan counterpart at the UN soon after the opening of the General Assembly. Venezuela countered with a proposal for a meeting either in London or Caracas. Home then conceded a meeting after the General Assembly in London in November 1963. Reacting early to any allegation that the meeting would deal with substantive issues, the Foreign Office sought to mask the development by describing the meeting as intending to review the results of the experts' work.
When Dr Jagan learnt about the scheduled ministerial meeting, he forwarded two strong representations to Governor Grey about the unilateral decision of the United Kingdom Government to convene the meeting and the erosion of the position taken at the UN. Both Grey and the Colonial Office were unhappy with the development: the latter recording its dismay that the Foreign Office had exceeded the understandings reached at the UN. This was the third retreat, no longer a concession.
In fact, Edmonds, the Counsellor in the British Embassy in Caracas in the conversation referred to earlier with his US counterpart, was reported as stating that the decision to meet the Venezuelan Foreign Minister "might have been a tactical mistake." He was to the point.
Thus, the two ministerial meetings. That of November 5-7, 1963, with Foreign Secretary RA Butler in the Chair, discussed the completed study of the documents and, owing to the disagreements with the reports, called for further study of the documents. Although both governor Grey and Dr Jagan were in London at the time only Grey was invited to participate. For Venezuela, this was a major advance in the process of negotiation.
That of December 9-10, 1965, convened during another session of independence talks at which the date of independence was set, broke down amidst a Venezuelan call for the establishment of a Mixed Commission to solve the territorial claims and for the session of sovereignty over an undetermined portion of the colony. It was this meeting that would be continued at Geneva. And it was the product of misjudgment, miscalculation and some appeasement as much as it confirmed the reopening process of the conflict.
It was also significant that the item dealing with the results of the work of the examination of the documents by the experts was excluded from further consideration as neither side was prepared to accept the other's report. The concession extended at the United Nations was now being abandoned, but not before giving life to a spurious claim.
To turn back briefly. Beginning in February 1965, and coinciding with the new administration of LFS Burnham, Venezuela initiated a series of forceful actions that startled the State Department. This included the launching of a new official map showing all the territory west of the Essequibo as zona en reclamacion, disputed zone, public warnings to oil companies seeking concessions in or off the Essequibo, and statements indicating that Venezuela would regard acceptance of any concession as an "unfriendly act."
Some political statements also stimulated attention within the State Department. Prominent was the exhortation by Dr Alirio Ugarte Pelago, leader of the Democratic Republican party, that Congress was obliged to affirm the will of Venezuela to conserve all that belonged to it and should exercise full sovereignty over the territory that had been discussed for more than over a century.
Then on July 30, the new Foreign Minister, Dr Ignacio Iribarren Borges, formerly the Ambassador in Britain, received Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum at his home for lunch. In the discussion Iribarren offered that a solution to the dispute was possible since the area claimed was "almost completely unpopulated" and that the Government of British Guiana ought to be able to count on friendly relations with Venezuela and, accordingly, should accept the necessity of yielding on the border issue to obtain Venezuelan friendship and economic aid.
On the same day, July 30, Rear Admiral Luis Humberto Croce Orozos, chief of the Venezuelan Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised the border question with an American military officer in "the most belligerent terms." Having been appointed as Ambassador to France, he said that he would like to remain at home and defend his country's honour. He noted that Venezuela was planning to distribute 30,000 pamphlets in various languages around the world and would take its case to the International Court.
Secretary Dean Rusk, alarmed by the developments, in July asked Ambassador Bernbaum for an analysis of the situation and specifically whether Venezuela was fearful that the Burnham government would not be able to assure internal stability. He also wanted to know whether pursuit of the claim against a friendly country was a genuine issue or was meant to divert domestic attention.
Ambassador Bernbaum did his best to explain that the developments were not threatening and that there was no likelihood of war. They were not motivated by the fear of Burnham being unstable, he went on, but were based upon the firm conviction that Venezuela was robbed at the 1899 tribunal and would continue to pursue the matter at the United Nations.
By September, the Legal Adviser in the State Department, just as anxious, found it imperative to record his concern that Venezuela was committing its prestige more publicly and more emotionally on the issue and strongly supporting a position it would be unable to sustain. And what was particularly distasteful to him was that it was occurring on the eve of independence. How prescient was his analysis!
The Legal Adviser further noted that available evidence showed that Venezuela's "legal case was almost non-existent and totally unpersuasive." He questioned the "hands-off" policy and advised that the administration should approach Venezuela and make clear that it saw little merit in the Venezuelan contention. Venezuela, he submitted, would interpret United States silence as constituting agreement that its case was meritorious and implying that the United States would not support British Guiana.
Yet when Rusk received Foreign Minister Iribarren in New York on October 1965, during the UN General Assembly, reacting to a call for United States support, he expressed the hope that Venezuela would pursue the mater bilaterally with the United Kingdom and not seek to involve the United States which had more than enough problems.
Thus, the meeting at Geneva was convened from a position of deadlock on the eve of British Guiana's independence. Venezuela had been encouraged beyond reason and some face-saving formula was required to prevent the meeting ending in disaster and to enable Venezuela to return home happy. Where British Guiana was concerned, the United Kingdom had announced its withdrawal and was anxious to avoid accusations that it had abandoned a troublesome colony. Leaving the territorial claim unattended would create serious problems for the newly independent state and would affect its relations with Venezuela. So all this needed a graceful ending even if it were necessary to resort to some ambiguity.
The main British proposal to freeze the claims for a number of years, in accordance with the recent Treaty of Antarctic, December 1959, which involved two Latin American states, Argentina and Chile, was unacceptable to Venezuela.
Understanding that Venezuela was not averse to a reference to the International Court of Justice, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart proposed to Burnham that the claims should be referred to the International Court. This, notwithstanding that during 1962/3, when the International Court had first surfaced in Foreign Office consideration upon hearing that Venezuela might make a proposal, the law officers had ruled against any submission, which among other things, could be considered as a full reopening of the matter.
Burnham, partly unsure about the extent of the terms of reference that would define a submission to the court, and party uncertain about the resources, legal and otherwise that might be available to the young state to pursue its case, declined. Burnham's main objective was to prevent any loss of territory and any formula that would lead to the substantive discussion of the matter.
In the end, the Geneva Agreement had something for everyone. Stewart felt that the agreement had not prejudiced the position of either side. The United Kingdom and British Guiana continued to regard the 1899 award as valid and Venezuela as null and void. British Guiana accepted the establishment of a Mixed Commission to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy arising from the Venezuelan contention that the arbitral award was null and void. The United Kingdom and British Guiana did not see this task as constituting any admission that the 1899 award was invalid or that a legitimate territorial dispute existed. Venezuela also accepted the Mixed Commission but had a different view of its task that would eventually doom it to failure. British Guiana did not see the Mixed Commission as leading to any substantive talks. Further, there was no cession of territory and there was no obligation at Geneva to submit the matter to the International Court. That reference remains on the table.
Venezuela was happy that there was a formula to continue the talks in the Mixed Commission that it had initially proposed. At issue, however, was what would succeed the Mixed Commission. This led to a delicate stage of the meeting when it was on the verge of a breakdown. However, a British suggestion, recapturing an earlier Venezuelan observation led to the agreement to include Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations about the choice of the peaceful means of settlement.
Predictably, the Geneva settlement entered into the domestic political controversy. There was no PPP participation at Geneva and Dr Jagan denounced the agreement for upgrading a spurious a claim to the level of a controversy and for reopening the matter. In reality, the Geneva Agreement ended that phase of the reopening commencing from February 1962 against which Dr Jagan had complained about the erosion of the position taken at the United Nations to which he had agreed. Geneva ended that erosion.
Post Geneva was a critical period for the newly independent state. Still reeling from domestic conflict, the years 1966-70 were difficult. There occurred the Venezuelan occupation of the Guyana part of Ankoko in October, 1966; the Leoni decree of July 1968 purporting to annex the waters off the Essequibo Coast; statements in the international press by Venezuela objecting to any concession granted in the Essequibo region; the failure of the Mixed Commission and Suriname's occupation and subsequent from the New River triangle, during August 1968.
An assertive foreign policy responded to the challenge. The completion of the Protocol of Port of Spain of June 1970 with Venezuela froze the territorial problem for twelve years and opened a breathing space that led to a bold demonstration of preventive diplomacy to protect and maintain the territorial integrity. That diplomacy was based on renewing or constructing close bilateral ties with immediate neighbours like the Caricom states at the centre; with Brazil, Colombia and including Suriname and Venezuela; the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and at the United Nations. High-level visits, commencing with Burnham's visit to Venezuela in January 1965, sought to give a personal and friendly touch to the bilateral relationship. Even the accomplishment of that extraordinary diplomatic offensive has been criticized at home as an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems.
On June 18, 1982, the Protocol of Port of Spain expired, Venezuela having refused the option of renewal. Another tense period followed in the relationship. Earlier, in June 1981, Venezuela had blocked financing by the World Bank of the Upper Mazaruni hydro-electric power scheme. Then in March 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands and incited those advocates in Venezuela of the acquisition of territory by force to turn their attention to Guyana.
Pursuant to the Geneva Agreement, the search for a means of settlement was set in motion. It took the rest of the decade and another phase of the consummate diplomacy led by Foreign Minister Rashleigh Jackson and encompassing the United Nations, Latin America and Caricom states to negotiate a new understanding. Venezuela desired direct negotiations on the controversy, but Guyana preferred judicial settlement before the International Court.
Eventually, in 1990, the parties agreed to the United Nations Good Officer process, which would eventually become the means of settlement. Alister McIntyre was the first United Nations Good Officer. He has been succeeded by Oliver Jackman. The United Nations process is still in force.
Suriname
The assertion of the Venezuelan claim has revealed coincidences with action emanating from Suriname and leaves no doubt about a collaborative operation to maintain pressure on Guyana.
The frontier with Suriname has never been definitively established and the present frontier is based on long usage, prescription and tacit agreement by both sides. The negotiations of a draft treaty during the 1930s by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands took account of the understanding between the two parties commencing from the first agreement between the two Dutch Governors in 1799 and including the agreement establishing the tri-junction point of the boundary between British Guiana, Brazil and Suriname in February 1937.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the final draft treaty of November 1939 described the boundary as being formed by a line on the left bank of the Corentyne from the sea southwards to a point near its source and that the river named by Schomburgk as the Kutari (Cutari) should be considered the upper reaches of the Corentyne with the boundary following the left bank of the principal course of the river. That was the position when the war in Europe intervened and interrupted the negotiations.
The New River triangle, that is west of the Kutari, had been recognized as the territory of British Guiana under whose jurisdiction it has remained. As stated earlier, Suriname chose the moment of the reopening of the controversy with Venezuela to announce an official claim to the New River triangle.
After the war, negotiations were reopened on the basis of the November, 1939 text. The United Kingdom sought to have a new provision included to take advantage of the developments I the delimitation of the Continental Shelf.
Those negotiations have continued through the period of independence up to the present time without reaching agreement. Differing interpretations about the line of equidistance in the Continental shelf have left a triangular area in the maritime zone in dispute off the mouth of the Corentyne. The possibility of reserves of oil in the area has also exacerbated the search for a solution. Today, with renewed interest in new sources of petroleum products, sensible and practical politics should prescribe some modus vivendi for the two neighbours.
A resolution of the border controversies should be mindful of the following factors:
First, since the controversies have coexisted with the domestic conflict, and have resulted at times in public differences over tactics, it would seem that the first requirement for the management of approaches to resolution would be to facilitate some degree of national consensus and collaboration across political lines.
A related and equally critical need is for a continuing programme to foster and inform public awareness.
Second, ideally, the resolution of both territorial conflicts is paramount.
Practically, in view of the incidence of collaboration between the two claimants, Guyana should seek to prevent or to contain simultaneous escalation by treating with each in accordance with the priority required at any given time.
Third, the diplomacy/negotiating style should be informed by the nature of the historical management. For example, in the case of Venezuela, there has been a formal agreement and an arbitral award of 1899 that has been accepted in international law and an internationally recognized boundary. Notwithstanding, permissive Cold War interests have been allowed to breach the fundamental basis of an international accord. Guyana should now repair that breach by renewing the international support and sympathy it had received in the past. It should now direct to the United Nations, and to the international community at large, a vigorous appeal identifying the flawed approaches of the past and their consequences and urging no less than a re-endorsement of the internationally recognized boundary.
In the case of Suriname the situation is different. There has been no formal agreement on the border. There have been a series of understandings which have been accepted by the parties and the draft agreement that was on the verge of being signed. However, the prevailing acrimony in the wake of the CGX issue of June 2000 has not only affected negotiations but holds within sights the likelihood of another small scale military/marine encounter.
Meanwhile, Suriname's membership of Caricom has led to competition for support from Guyana's premier solidarity base. Therefore, a nuanced approach that is guarded in public statements and diplomacy eschewing strident and recriminatory language while leaving no doubt about the capacity for self defence of Guyana's sovereignty is required.
With specific reference to Venezuela, the ebb and flow of the relationship may have deterred continuing aggression. Yet, after one hundred and four years of an international agreement the territorial claim to a huge portion of territory remains, Guyanese Ankoko is occupied and investment in the Essequibo is harassed and frustrated.
The essential objective for Guyana is to reaffirm and secure the validity of the arbitral award of 1899. Venezuela, on the other hand, seeks some tangible concession to satisfy the national expectations it was permitted to foment with a claim about a deal which it has never established beyond doubt. The United Kingdom, essentially, must bear the major responsibility for the articulation of the claim. The United States, to a lesser extent, by a mixture of inaction and unqualified support, encouraged Venezuela to persist with a claim it knew would threaten the territorial integrity of Guyana.
These simultaneous approaches are recommended:
First, in view of the involvement of the United Kingdom and the United States in both the arbitral award and in the reopening of the controversy, Guyana's diplomacy should be directed towards securing from the United Kingdom and the United States an assurance/statement that they regard the boundary established by the arbitral award to be permanent.
Second, the United Nations Good Officer Process remains valuable. It functions through quiet diplomacy and has been in existence since 1990. It needs to be invigorated before it runs the risk of expiring permanently. The process should now venture beyond the useful internal exchanges and should pursue bold initiatives for resolution. There have been two UN Good Officers, both from the Commonwealth Caribbean, and Guyana should begin to charter the next assertive stage before the office of the current Good Officer expires.
Third, Guyana should contest more purposely Venezuela's exercise of the veto against investment in or off the Essequibo in breach of Article V of the Geneva Agreement. There have been its objections to World Bank financing of the Upper Mazaruni Hydro-electric project in 1981 and more recently the Beal Aerospace project which also had domestic problems. There were also numerous protests against oil exploration off the Essequibo coast commencing since 1963.
(Continued from last week)
Within a short time, Venezuela was able to upgrade the meeting of officials as-signed to study the documents to a full-scale meeting of ministers. As early as February 1963, the British Ambassador, Sir Douglas Busk, was urging the Foreign office to convene a top-level meeting, which would include Dr Jagan. This was not only an unusual proposal for the Colonial Office, but it also surprised the Foreign Office which instructed the ambassador that a ministerial meeting could not be considered until after the examination of the documents. Even this was unacceptable to the Colonial Office which maintained that the matter was fully, finally and perfectly settled and that there should be no discussion.
It happened, however, that the British embassy in Caracas carelessly transmitted the impression to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that the study by officials constituted one stage to be followed by a second stage at ministerial level. The Foreign Office tried to back away from this error by denying that any such statement was made. The Venezuelans pressed by refusing at the first meeting of the officials on March 18, 1963 to continue with the examination unless a prior assurance was given that a high-level meeting would follow.
Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, cornered, offered to meet his Venezuelan counterpart at the UN soon after the opening of the General Assembly. Venezuela countered with a proposal for a meeting either in London or Caracas. Home then conceded a meeting after the General Assembly in London in November 1963. Reacting early to any allegation that the meeting would deal with substantive issues, the Foreign Office sought to mask the development by describing the meeting as intending to review the results of the experts' work.
When Dr Jagan learnt about the scheduled ministerial meeting, he forwarded two strong representations to Governor Grey about the unilateral decision of the United Kingdom Government to convene the meeting and the erosion of the position taken at the UN. Both Grey and the Colonial Office were unhappy with the development: the latter recording its dismay that the Foreign Office had exceeded the understandings reached at the UN. This was the third retreat, no longer a concession.
In fact, Edmonds, the Counsellor in the British Embassy in Caracas in the conversation referred to earlier with his US counterpart, was reported as stating that the decision to meet the Venezuelan Foreign Minister "might have been a tactical mistake." He was to the point.
Thus, the two ministerial meetings. That of November 5-7, 1963, with Foreign Secretary RA Butler in the Chair, discussed the completed study of the documents and, owing to the disagreements with the reports, called for further study of the documents. Although both Governor Grey and Dr Jagan were in London at the time only Grey was invited to participate. For Venezuela, this was a major advance in the process of negotiation.
That of December 9-10, 1965, convened during another session of independence talks at which the date of independence was set, broke down amidst a Venezuelan call for the establishment of a Mixed Commission to solve the territorial claims and for the session of sovereignty over an undetermined portion of the colony. It was this meeting that would be continued at Geneva. And it was the product of misjudgment, miscalculation and some appeasement as much as it confirmed the reopening process of the conflict.
It was also significant that the item dealing with the results of the work of the examination of the documents by the experts was excluded from further consideration as neither side was prepared to accept the other's report. The concession extended at the United Nations was now being abandoned, but not before giving life to a spurious claim.
To turn back briefly. Beginning in February 1965, and coinciding with the new administration of LFS Burnham, Venezuela initiated a series of forceful actions that startled the State Department. This included the launching of a new official map showing all the territory west of the Essequibo as zona en reclamacion, disputed zone, public warnings to oil companies seeking concessions in or off the Essequibo, and statements indicating that Venezuela would regard acceptance of any concession as an "unfriendly act."
Some political statements also stimulated attention within the State Department. Prominent was the exhortation by Dr Alirio Ugarte Pelago, leader of the Democratic Republican party, that Congress was obliged to affirm the will of Venezuela to conserve all that belonged to it and should exercise full sovereignty over the territory that had been discussed for more than over a century.
Then on July 30, the new Foreign Minister, Dr Ignacio Iribarren Borges, formerly the Ambassador in Britain, received Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum at his home for lunch. In the discussion Iribarren offered that a solution to the dispute was possible since the area claimed was "almost completely unpopulated" and that the Government of British Guiana ought to be able to count on friendly relations with Venezuela and, accordingly, should accept the necessity of yielding on the border issue to obtain Venezuelan friendship and economic aid.
On the same day, July 30, Rear Admiral Luis Humberto Croce Orozos, chief of the Venezuelan Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised the border question with an American military officer in "the most belligerent terms." Having been appointed as Ambassador to France, he said that he would like to remain at home and defend his country's honour. He noted that Venezuela was planning to distribute 30,000 pamphlets in various languages around the world and would take its case to the International Court.
Secretary Dean Rusk, alarmed by the developments, in July asked Ambassador Bernbaum for an analysis of the situation and specifically whether Venezuela was fearful that the Burnham government would not be able to assure internal stability. He also wanted to know whether pursuit of the claim against a friendly country was a genuine issue or was meant to divert domestic attention.
Ambassador Bernbaum did his best to explain that the developments were not threatening and that there was no likelihood of war. They were not motivated by the fear of Burnham being unstable, he went on, but were based upon the firm conviction that Venezuela was robbed at the 1899 tribunal and would continue to pursue the matter at the United Nations.
By September, the Legal Adviser in the State Department, just as anxious, found it imperative to record his concern that Venezuela was committing its prestige more publicly and more emotionally on the issue and strongly supporting a position it would be unable to sustain. And what was particularly distasteful to him was that it was occurring on the eve of independence. How prescient was his analysis!
The Legal Adviser further noted that available evidence showed that Venezuela's "legal case was almost non-existent and totally unpersuasive." He questioned the "hands-off" policy and advised that the administration should approach Venezuela and make clear that it saw little merit in the Venezuelan contention. Venezuela, he submitted, would interpret United States silence as constituting agreement that its case was meritorious and implying that the United States would not support British Guiana.
Yet when Rusk received Foreign Minister Iribarren in New York on October 1965, during the UN General Assembly, reacting to a call for United States support, he expressed the hope that Venezuela would pursue the matter bilaterally with the United Kingdom and not seek to involve the United States which had more than enough problems.
Thus, the meeting at Geneva was convened from a position of deadlock on the eve of British Guiana's independence. Venezuela had been encouraged beyond reason and some face-saving formula was required to prevent the meeting ending in disaster and to enable Venezuela to return home happy. Where British Guiana was concerned, the United Kingdom had announced its withdrawal and was anxious to avoid accusations that it had abandoned a troublesome colony. Leaving the territorial claim unattended would create serious problems for the newly independent state and would affect its relations with Venezuela. So all this needed a graceful ending even if it were necessary to resort to some ambiguity.
The main British proposal to freeze the claims for a number of years, in accordance with the recent Treaty of Antarctic, December 1959, which involved two Latin American states, Argentina and Chile, was unacceptable to Venezuela.
Understanding that Venezuela was not averse to a reference to the International Court of Justice, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart proposed to Burnham that the claims should be referred to the International Court. This, notwithstanding that during 1962/3, when the International Court had first surfaced in Foreign Office consideration upon hearing that Venezuela might make a proposal, the law officers had ruled against any submission, which among other things, could be considered as a full reopening of the matter.
Burnham, partly unsure about the extent of the terms of reference that would define a submission to the court, and party uncertain about the resources, legal and otherwise that might be available to the young state to pursue its case, declined. Burnham's main objective was to prevent any loss of territory and any formula that would lead to the substantive discussion of the matter.
In the end, the Geneva Agreement had something for everyone. Stewart felt that the agreement had not prejudiced the position of either side. The United Kingdom and British Guiana continued to regard the 1899 award as valid and Venezuela as null and void. British Guiana accepted the establishment of a Mixed Commission to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy arising from the Venezuelan contention that the arbitral award was null and void. The United Kingdom and British Guiana did not see this task as constituting any admission that the 1899 award was invalid or that a legitimate territorial dispute existed. Venezuela also accepted the Mixed Commission but had a different view of its task that would eventually doom it to failure. British Guiana did not see the Mixed Commission as leading to any substantive talks. Further, there was no cession of territory and there was no obligation at Geneva to submit the matter to the International Court. That reference remains on the table.
Venezuela was happy that there was a formula to continue the talks in the Mixed Commission that it had initially proposed. At issue, however, was what would succeed the Mixed Commission. This led to a delicate stage of the meeting when it was on the verge of a breakdown. However, a British suggestion, recapturing an earlier Venezuelan observation led to the agreement to include Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations about the choice of the peaceful means of settlement.
Predictably, the Geneva settlement entered into the domestic political controversy. There was no PPP participation at Geneva and Dr Jagan denounced the agreement for upgrading a spurious a claim to the level of a controversy and for reopening the matter. In reality, the Geneva Agreement ended that phase of the reopening commencing from February 1962 against which Dr Jagan had complained about the erosion of the position taken at the United Nations to which he had agreed. Geneva ended that erosion.
Post Geneva was a critical period for the newly independent state. Still reeling from domestic conflict, the years 1966-70 were difficult. There occurred the Venezuelan occupation of the Guyana part of Ankoko in October, 1966; the Leoni decree of July 1968 purporting to annex the waters off the Essequibo Coast; statements in the international press by Venezuela objecting to any concession granted in the Essequibo region; the failure of the Mixed Commission and Suriname's occupation and subsequent eviction from the New River triangle, during 1969.
An assertive foreign policy responded to the challenge. The completion of the Protocol of Port of Spain of June 1970 with Venezuela froze the territorial problem for twelve years and opened a breathing space that led to a bold demonstration of preventive diplomacy to protect and maintain the territorial integrity. That diplomacy was based on renewing or constructing close bilateral ties with immediate neighbours like the Caricom states at the centre; with Brazil, Colombia and including Suriname and Venezuela; the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and at the United Nations. High-level visits, commencing with Burnham's visit to Venezuela in January 1965, sought to give a personal and friendly touch to the bilateral relationship. Even the accomplishment of that extraordinary diplomatic offensive has been criticized at home as an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems.
On June 18, 1982, the Protocol of Port of Spain expired, Venezuela having refused the option of renewal. Another tense period followed in the relationship. Earlier, in June 1981, Venezuela had blocked financing by the World Bank of the Upper Mazaruni hydro-electric power scheme. Then in March 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands and incited those advocates in Venezuela of the acquisition of territory by force to turn their attention to Guyana.
Pursuant to the Geneva Agreement, the search for a means of settlement was set in motion. It took the rest of the decade and another phase of the consummate diplomacy led by Foreign Minister Rashleigh Jackson and encompassing the United Nations, Latin America and Caricom states to negotiate a new understanding. Venezuela desired direct negotiations on the controversy, but Guyana preferred judicial settlement before the International Court.
Eventually, in 1990, the parties agreed to the United Nations Good Officer process, which would eventually become the means of settlement. Alister McIntyre was the first United Nations Good Officer. He has been succeeded by Oliver Jackman. The United Nations process is still in force.
Suriname
The assertion of the Venezuelan claim has revealed coincidences with action emanating from Suriname and leaves no doubt about a collaborative operation to maintain pressure on Guyana.
The frontier with Suriname has never been definitively established and the present frontier is based on long usage, prescription and tacit agreement by both sides. The negotiations of a draft treaty during the 1930s by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands took account of the understanding between the two parties commencing from the first agreement between the two Dutch Governors in 1799 and including the agreement establishing the tri-junction point of the boundary between British Guiana, Brazil and Suriname in February 1937.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the final draft treaty of November 1939 described the boundary as being formed by a line on the left bank of the Corentyne from the sea southwards to a point near its source and that the river named by Schomburgk as the Kutari (Cutari) should be considered the upper reaches of the Corentyne with the boundary following the left bank of the principal course of the river. That was the position when the war in Europe intervened and interrupted the negotiations.
The New River triangle, that is west of the Kutari, had been recognized as the territory of British Guiana under whose jurisdiction it has remained. As stated earlier, Suriname chose the moment of the reopening of the controversy with Venezuela to announce an official claim to the New River triangle.
After the war, negotiations were reopened on the basis of the November, 1939 text. The United Kingdom sought to have a new provision included to take advantage of the developments I the delimitation of the Continental Shelf.
Those negotiations have continued through the period of independence up to the present time without reaching agreement. Differing interpretations about the line of equidistance in the Continental shelf have left a triangular area in the maritime zone in dispute off the mouth of the Corentyne. The possibility of reserves of oil in the area has also exacerbated the search for a solution. Today, with renewed interest in new sources of petroleum products, sensible and practical politics should prescribe some modus vivendi for the two neighbours.
A resolution of the border controversies should be mindful of the following factors:
First, since the controversies have coexisted with the domestic conflict, and have resulted at times in public differences over tactics, it would seem that the first requirement for the management of approaches to resolution would be to facilitate some degree of national consensus and collaboration across political lines.
A related and equally critical need is for a continuing programme to foster and inform public awareness.
Second, ideally, the resolution of both territorial conflicts is paramount.
Practically, in view of the incidence of collaboration between the two claimants, Guyana should seek to prevent or to contain simultaneous escalation by treating with each in accordance with the priority required at any given time.
Third, the diplomacy/negotiating style should be informed by the nature of the historical management. For example, in the case of Venezuela, there has been a formal agreement and an arbitral award of 1899 that has been accepted in international law and an internationally recognized boundary. Notwithstanding, permissive Cold War interests have been allowed to breach the fundamental basis of an international accord. Guyana should now repair that breach by renewing the international support and sympathy it had received in the past. It should now direct to the United Nations, and to the international community at large, a vigorous appeal identifying the flawed approaches of the past and their consequences and urging no less than a re-endorsement of the internationally recognized boundary.
In the case of Suriname the situation is different. There has been no formal agreement on the border. There have been a series of understandings which have been accepted by the parties and the draft agreement that was on the verge of being signed. However, the prevailing acrimony in the wake of the CGX issue of June 2000 has not only affected negotiations but holds within sights the likelihood of another small scale military/marine encounter.
Meanwhile, Suriname's membership of Caricom has led to competition for support from Guyana's premier solidarity base. Therefore, a nuanced approach that is guarded in public statements and diplomacy eschewing strident and recriminatory language while leaving no doubt about the capacity for self defence of Guyana's sovereignty is required.
With specific reference to Venezuela, the ebb and flow of the relationship may have deterred continuing aggression. Yet, after one hundred and four years of an international agreement the territorial claim to a huge portion of territory remains, Guyanese Ankoko is occupied and investment in the Essequibo is harassed and frustrated.
The essential objective for Guyana is to reaffirm and secure the validity of the arbitral award of 1899. Venezuela, on the other hand, seeks some tangible concession to satisfy the national expectations it was permitted to foment with a claim about a deal which it has never established beyond doubt. The United Kingdom, essentially, must bear the major responsibility for the articulation of the claim. The United States, to a lesser extent, by a mixture of inaction and unqualified support, encouraged Venezuela to persist with a claim it knew would threaten the territorial integrity of Guyana.
These simultaneous approaches are recommended:
First, in view of the involvement of the United Kingdom and the United States in both the arbitral award and in the reopening of the controversy, Guyana's diplomacy should be directed towards securing from the United Kingdom and the United States an assurance/statement that they regard the boundary established by the arbitral award to be permanent.
Second, the United Nations Good Officer Process remains valuable. It functions through quiet diplomacy and has been in existence since 1990. It needs to be invigorated before it runs the risk of expiring permanently. The process should now venture beyond the useful internal exchanges and should pursue bold initiatives for resolution. There have been two UN Good Officers, both from the Commonwealth Caribbean, and Guyana should begin to charter the next assertive stage before the office of the current Good Officer expires.
Third, Guyana should contest more purposely Venezuela's exercise of the veto against investment in or off the Essequibo in breach of Article V of the Geneva Agreement. There have been its objections to World Bank financing of the Upper Mazaruni Hydro-electric project in 1981 and more recently the Beal Aerospace project which also had domestic problems. There were also numerous protests against oil exploration off the Essequibo coast commencing since 1963.