This week I move on to discuss the second of the three critical challenges facing Caricom, which I had identified as the flare-up of boundary 'disputes' among member countries. In the discussion it is not my concern to pronounce in any definitive way on the pros and cons of the different claims that member countries are making against each other. Indeed I have neither the historical nor legal expertise to add value to the on-going dialogue on these matters. What I propose to do instead is to consider these 'disputes' in the context of the strategic considerations that drive the regional integration process, and to evaluate how serious an impediment the present situation presents for the forward advance of the integration process.
Coordination of foreign policies and the border implications
In 1973 when the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) was established, one of the declared primary objectives of the union was the coordination of the foreign policies of member states. Although the establishment of Caricom occurred at a period of active Third World interventionism in international affairs, decolonisation and strong national liberation movements, I have always felt that the coordination of foreign policies originally embraced the strategic aim of securing full Caricom support for those member states that already faced persistent boundary difficulties with their neighbours. At the time, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (in relation to Venezuela) seemed the obvious states to be helped by this agreement.
From this vantage point, the entry of Suriname into Caricom would have radically altered this original strategic aim. It was surprising therefore that in the discussion prior to Suriname's entry into Caricom this consideration did not surface as a major topic in the regional media. One sign of the change this has brought is that ever since Suriname's entry into Caricom, that organisation has been unable to display a map of member countries, which includes Guyana and Suriname because of the border considerations between the two countries. Readers may be surprised to learn that what usually happens is that a vague line tapering off to the south-east represents the south-eastern outer-limit of Caricom. In this context the recent flare-up of the maritime boundary dispute between Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago has further undermined the strategic aim of securing full member support for those members who face non-member territorial claims because, as we shall see, of the central role of Venezuela in the recent dispute.
The Caribbean Sea: Common heritage or bone of contention
The famous Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 had called for the creation of a Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME). The stated objective is to create a single, unified market place out of the several segmented national markets for goods, services, productive factors, and assets of member states. Behind this vision I believe lies the strategic idea of the eventual 'pooling' of the region's resources. If this is true, then among these resources the Caribbean Sea surely stands out as perhaps the region's prime asset. It is ironic, therefore, that this asset has now become a source of profound conflict embroiling Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. At a certain level this is not as surprising as it seems, since historically the 'sudden' appearance of a potential for immense natural wealth has generated disputes among the countries neighbouring it. Nonetheless, it is a sad reflection of the inherently brittle state of our developed sense of Caribbean oneness that this could still happen the way it has. It shows how much distance we still have to cover.
As a layman, it seems from all appearances that the dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and by extension Guyana, has its proximate origins in the Delimitation Treaty signed between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela in 1990, only one year after the Grand Anse Declaration! The treaty sought to determine the boundary line that stretches over the area of the Gulf of Paria, the Caribbean Sea, and into the Atlantic Ocean between the two countries. Based on the agreed boundary line the two states have agreed to the exclusive exploitation of seabed and subsoil petroleum fields and other mineral deposits. Barbados claims that this treaty purports to capture for Trinidad and Tobago a large part of its territory as well as that of Guyana.
Several difficulties have arisen in relation to this treaty, and I shall highlight a few in order to indicate how grave these are. One difficulty is that Venezuela is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while Trinidad and Tobago is a party to the UNCLOS. The international legal obligations of the two parties in maritime boundary disputes therefore differ. A second difficulty is that the Delimitation Treaty between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago cannot legally draw territorial boundaries, as this would seem to violate UNCLOS. Thirdly, Trinidad and Tobago has stated that, it will not repudiate the Delimitation Treaty and indeed, it further contends that under international law it cannot in good faith now make any such repudiation.
What has surfaced from the exchanges between the two countries is that Trinidad and Tobago objects to Barbados' insistence that, in the maritime boundary negotiations between them, they should start with a median or equally distanced line between the two states. The principal grounds of this objection seem to be that Trinidad and Tobago is an archipelago or group of closely spaced islands and, in accordance with UNCLOS its maritime boundaries have to be settled with this in mind. In other words, Trinidad and Tobago should be classed as an archipelagic state so that the 12-mile territorial zone has to be drawn from the outermost limits of the group of states that make up the archipelago. Trinidad and Tobago claims its archipelago baseline stretches from Little Tobago to East Rock (off Trinidad's east coast). Based on this it has constructed its own 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Barbados does not accept this.
Readers should note that there is no prescribed method in international law for establishing maritime boundaries. Appealing as it sounds, the median or equally distanced line does not have a legal standing. In truth it is left to the parties of the proposed agreement to determine their own modalities for arriving at a settlement.
Although it is not my intention to pursue the details of the dispute in any depth, I have indicated enough to convey to readers how contentious these issues are. In particular I wish to draw to your attention their complexity and therefore the likelihood that these will remain for a long period with us, festering unhealthy attitudes within the integration movement.
Hostile actions and angry exchanges pose a real and immediate threat to the forward advance of the CARICOM integration movement. Last week I started to trace some of the ramifications for CARICOM of the maritime boundary dispute that has erupted between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and which has been extended to involve Guyana. This dispute was almost immediately followed by a similar public maritime boundary dispute between Guyana and Suriname. This has also been taken to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). I had also pointed out last week that, at the heart of the Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago dispute is the Delimitation Treaty between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, which Barbados claims (and now Guyana) appropriates a large chunk of their territory. To this I might add the recent Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago regarding their mutual exploitation of cross-border natural gas reserves. Some have also speculated that Venezuela's claim to Bird Island may also be an issue.
These disputes are now not simply regional in scope, but have become international because of two considerations. One is of course the consideration that Venezuela's relations with some CARICOM member states are central to the disputes. And, the other is that parties to the disputes have already invoked the legal jurisdiction of the United Nations.
The reality and
the rhetoric
I have argued that, ultimately, these conflicts over maritime boundaries reveal how shallow is the rhetoric that portrays the Caribbean Sea as a 'common resource' of the region. And, for that matter, how far we may have retreated from CARICOM's aim to pursue a harmonized foreign policy, as surely, the minimum objective of a harmonized regional foreign policy must be in taking steps to preserve the sanctity of borders of member states in a hostile international environment.
In its dispute with Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados has invoked the claim that the Caribbean Sea is a "common resource" of the entire region. In reply, the Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Affairs Minister asserted to the contrary. As he bluntly put it: "Let me state categorically that the Treaty of Chaguaramas [which created CARICOM], which the government of Trinidad and Tobago will continue to honour, confers no such right. There is under the treaty no right of access to the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) of member states of the Community! In other words, there exists no CARICOM commons by virtue of which member states are entitled to automatic access to the living resources of the EEZs of other member states."
I have quoted the Foreign Affairs Minister at some length in order to make readers aware of how outright and emphatic has been this rejection of the notion of the Caribbean Sea as a common resource of Caribbean countries. In strict law the Minister is correct. The Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established CARICOM, does not pretend to make this claim. National sovereignty is the legal basis of the treaty. The concept of a Caribbean commons has been, at best, an aspiration of all Caribbean citizens. In practice therefore, this rejection reveals how much further CARICOM has to travel, if it is to embrace such a notion.
Sabre-rattling
This matter should, of course, not be viewed one-sidedly. It is tempting to do this, particularly since the area claimed by Barbados as reflecting the historic fishing rights of its fisherfolk, may well be the location of some of the gargantuan natural gas reserves, which have already been found in Trinidad and Tobago's EEZ. Some persons portray this newly found wealth as making Trinidad and Tobago 'greedy.' The truth of the matter, however, is that Trinidad and Tobago has similarly tried unsuccessfully for many years to secure fishing rights in Guyana and Suriname's EEZs. Indeed, its fishermen have been arrested on several occasions for fishing in Guyana's EEZ.
The manner in which the dispute has been handled has not only created waves, but marks an unacceptable deterioration of fraternal relations, which can only bode danger for us all. Thus Barbados has not only invoked the binding dispute settlement procedure under Article 286 and Annex VII of UNCLOS, but Trinidad and Tobago has claimed that it received no prior word or suggestion of this action from Barbados, even though meetings to resolve the issue were taking place between the two member states at the time. These meetings were at the Prime Ministerial level! Clearly, this could only have happened if at least one side felt that the breakdown of relations between the two states was catastrophic.
If there is any doubt about the accuracy of this observation readers should ponder the telling remarks of the Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Minister: "I must tell you, it is not normal to conduct diplomatic relations in this way, not even among States that are hostile to each other." He went on to claim that this action might indicate "a lack of good faith, as well as being inconsistent with the spirit of the Caribbean Community that we are in the process of fashioning." The matter, of course, did not stop there.
During the exchanges between the two states, Barbados had indicated that it would impose economic sanctions on its trade with Trinidad and Tobago. To this the Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Minister replied to say that the imposition of punitive measures that injured its economy "would be viewed as a hostile act, and we will respond accordingly." For friendly states, this is indeed a lot of sabre-rattling.
I have dealt at some length with the exchanges between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, because the bitterness revealed in these underscores my main point, which is that the maritime boundary issues that have arisen constitute a potentially serious threat to the progress of the regional integration movement. At best it might stall collective regional action until these issues are ironed out.
At worst, it could lead to deadlock. Either outcome would be grave, as with the rapidly approaching Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the on-going negotiations with the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement, time is certainly not on the region's side.