Re-orientation
Editorial
Stabroek News
April 30, 2004
On Wednesday we reported that meetings between Caricom and US administration officials in St Vincent yesterday, and in the Bahamas on Monday, had been called off. The critical cancellation was the last-mentioned one, because it arose from a disagreement between the community and US officials regarding Haiti's attendance at the meeting. The US had been pressuring Caribbean governments to invite Haiti following the decision of the Caricom Intersessional held in St Kitts recently, that it would postpone a decision on Haiti's participation in its councils until the heads of government summit in July.
It so happens that Caricom has made a few mistakes in relation to Haiti: it should not have brought that country into Caricom; it probably should not have got involved in the negotiations between Mr Aristide's government and the Haitian opposition, but having done so, it clearly made a misjudgment about the political situation; and it should not have called for an investigation into how Mr Aristide left the country. It might be added that Jamaica for its part, should not have offered the ex-President sanctuary for so long - if at all - giving him a unique opportunity to interfere in Haiti's politics and further complicate the situation.
The nations of the community have so far declined to acknowledge - understandably so, considering how long their representatives spent negotiating with him - that former President Aristide could not be part of the solution in Haiti, because he was part of the problem and was contributing to the cycle of violence. At the time they were engaged in mediation efforts between his government and the amorphous opposition, they clearly underestimated the bitterness which had been generated by the events on and after December 17, 2001, when following an abortive attack by a small group on his palace, his supporters, armed by his administration, took revenge on the opposition.
The widespread beatings, arson and killings, including the burning to death of the opposition leader in Gonaives by Amiot Metayer and his thugs who were at that time Aristide men, made compromise between the two sides very difficult.
President Aristide did make concessions, but they were concessions which were too little and too late, when circumstances had already changed. The fundamental governmental reforms which the OAS required in its Resolution 822 passed in 2002, were never carried out. Among other things, these included the disarming of the armed gangs, the ending of judicial impunity, and the reform of the police leadership which was perceived as being an extension of Aristide's Lavalas Family party. It is true that in June 2003 a new police chief - Jean Robert Faveur - who was acceptable to everybody was appointed. He lasted all of two weeks, resigning because of the Haitian government's efforts to undermine the autonomy of his office.
On top of all this there was the corruption - of officialdom in general and of the police in particular - much of which was associated with the drugs trade. It is estimated that fifteen per cent of Colombian drugs destined for the United States was transshipped through Haiti. And those close to Mr Aristide were involved, including his security chief, Oriel Jean, arrested in Canada last month. It has not been revealed yet whether the former President was in any way directly implicated, although allegations to that effect have been circulating, which he has strongly denied. What can be said is that Haiti was coming close to the definition of a narco-state, with all that that implies.
Part of the hostility to the US intervention in Haiti this time around, harboured by the otherwise relatively well-informed peoples of Caricom, is that they really did not know about what was happening there, especially from 2000 onwards. They may not even have been aware, for example, that there was a problem with Haiti's first round elections that year. The results of these were blatantly manipulated in favour of the Lavalas Family party, as a consequence of which international observers refused to monitor both the second round and the presidential elections. No one really has any idea, therefore, what the size of Mr Aristide's majority was in the latter poll, because although the government claimed a 60.5 per cent voter turn-out, unofficial international estimates put it at somewhere between 10 and 40 per cent, depending on the organization. Caricom's own representative gave an estimate of no more than 20 per cent.
While Caricom governments are certainly aware of the flawed Haitian elections, since their own monitors in the first round of the legislative poll compiled a report, their electorates regard Mr Aristide's democratic credentials as unsullied; for them he is still the eloquent, courageous priest who spoke on behalf of Haiti's impoverished, brutalized masses, and who faced down 'Baby Doc' Duvalier's Tonton Macoutes. Time and power have corrupted Mr Aristide, but very little of that transformation has been given coverage in the regional media, whose interest in Haiti's deterioration has been spasmodic, rather than sustained.
It is perhaps a moot point as to whether if there had been more consistent coverage and more trenchant editorializing in the anglophone media, the Caricom leaders would have been quite so uncritical in their support of the former president at the time of his departure.
As for the Americans, despite their unwillingness to act to disarm the various groups so far, there are signs that this time around they are taking a longer view than they have done in the past. US Ambassador to Haiti, Mr James Foley, was reported by the Associated Press as telling Haitian business leaders earlier this week, that there were massive challenges, including in the areas of drug-trafficking and the deep divide between rich and poor. He was reported, for example, as urging Haiti's 'lighter-skinned elite' to abandon the class system and relinquish outdated business methods, which not only were conducive to corruption, but also meant that 'the darker-skinned majority' were kept in a state of 'near serfdom.'
In relation to the drugs trade, he warned that with the departure of a government which had had "intimate relations" with the traffickers, attempts would be made to reconstitute the networks, including infiltrating the police force. The Associated Press commented that this appeared to be a reference to rebel leader Guy Philippe's attempts to have 1,500 former soldiers inducted into the Haitian police force. Unnamed US officials, the agency continued, had already said that Mr Philippe 'facilitated' trafficking during the period when he was a police chief in north Haiti.
In addition, a bi-partisan delegation of members of the US House of Representatives visited Haiti last Friday, its leader, Representative Gregory Weeks telling the media, "America must break with the ways in which it has related to Haiti in the past... We must strive to be an honest broker and not a power broker." He also said that the members of Congress were concerned about the persecution of members of the Lavalas Family party, and that what was needed was "inclusive political democracy."
If the noises coming from the US in relation to Haiti are a little more hopeful than they were in the past, the same cannot be said of American dealings with Caricom. While it is true, as stated above, that the community leadership made a political misjudgement in relation to Haiti, that does not justify the bullying tactics being employed against Caribbean governments now. In fact, it is positively the worst thing which the Bush administration could do.
Caricom needs space and time in which to reorient its position - something which cannot be done immediately without an enormous loss of face. Left to their own devices, and given time, they might quietly forget the demand for an investigation surrounding the circumstances of Mr Aristide's departure, and might be prepared to re-engage with Haiti at some level after the Brazilians take over leadership of the UN contingent there in July. They are far more likely to stick their heels in, however, if the US continues with its current crude pressure tactics.
Since the Caricom leadership has expended so much energy over the years on Haiti - whether or not their commitment there was ill-advised in the first place - it would be a pity to waste all the experience acquired. Provided the Americans give Caricom space to make their own decisions in July, the community leaders could make a shift in orientation, which would allow for some level of interaction with the so far singularly unimpressive Prime Minister Latortue. What could be made clear to him is that Haiti's presence in the councils of the regional body would be contingent on whether his interim administration met some of the fundamental standards required by the democracies of the region.
If he undertook to commit to certain principles, the way would be opened for Caricom to re-formulate its Haitian policy, and if conditions were right, perhaps even to make its own active contribution in terms of sending police, etc, to that nation.
If the public statements of American officials are to be taken seriously, then an insistence by Caricom that Haiti's interim administration meet certain minimum standards of governance would not be out of consonance with US aims.