Largely for political reasons, Guyana has not progressed over the last five decades. Indeed, it is indisputable that, compared to its Caricom partners, except Haiti, Guyana has regressed. Politics, firstly in its geopolitical and now its ethnic forms, has largely been responsible for this underdevelopment. Since the fall of communism and the re-introduction of freer and fairer elections in 1992, ethnic problems, rooted in ethnic insecurities, have been at the base of the country's social instability. At this stage it makes no sense casting blame. What is necessary are governance arrangements that will give hope to all groups. All or none will be secured and prosperous.
However, there are real and substantial fears that a power-sharing regime might turn out to be worse than what now exists. These concerns have to be confronted and solutions found that could provide some degree of comfort to those who hold these concerns.
The various power-sharing proposals that have been put forward raise four major issues of concern. The first of these is the fear that power-sharing would institutionalise racial voting by encouraging parties to act to maintain their ethnic support. However, the present constitution, by permitting the party with the greatest block of votes to always claim the presidency, has already institutionalised racism. One solution could be that as in Brazil and France, the president should be elected by 51% of the votes cast. This will encourage the greater compromise Guyanese politics badly needs.
The second issue of concern is the fear that the Opposition will be dangerously weak in any power-sharing arrangements. This is a real problem but could be mitigated if Guyana adopts the North American system of an Executive President with a Cabinet whose members do not sit in the National Assembly. Cabinet members would then need to defend their programmes before parliamentary committees at public hearings or in private if the subject being considered warrants it.
With such an arrangement parliamentarians of both the governing and opposition parties need feel no allegiance to executive action and thus are free to attack the government on any issue. This would make for a clearer separation of powers and much like as obtains in the USA, it would allow the National Assembly to develop as an institution that is substantially independent of the executive.
The third issue of concern is that the power-sharing administration would be prone to gridlock. The power-sharing arrangement adopted could allow for the Leader of the Opposition to nominate 1/3 of the Cabinet for a period of ten (10) years after which this arrangement is reviewed. It would also provide that on any issue on which the entire 1/3 of opposition nominated ministers disagree they could then request that the issue be referred for debate in the National Assembly where it would just require a simple majority to be passed. The debate in parliament would alert the public to an issue and should be sufficient pressure for the government to ensure that its actions can withstand the glare of public scrutiny. However to avoid gridlock, there would be a restriction on the use of this mechanism of referring issues to the National Assembly being used once a month. There would also be a requirement that all governmental institutions should reflect the gender and ethnic composition of the country. These power-sharing arrangements seek to force compromise and so avoid gridlock at both the legislative and executive levels and the opposition would have some real executive power and all ethnic groups would be fairly treated.
The fourth concern is that it is usually argued that the power-sharing arrangement requires a high degree of trust. This is most questionable for it is precisely the absence of trust between the main protagonists that usually leads to the demands for power -sharing. Almost every example of power-sharing would attest to this fact. Notwithstanding, the present arrangement does not require any significant level of trust between government and opposition: outside of what is proper for a national opposition. The opposition will owe little allegiance to the government and within constitutional bounds, the government could do as it sees fit.Â
Gridlock is almost impossible and the parliamentary opposition will not be part of the government and as such owes it no allegiance. These arrangements simply seek to build legitimacy by providing an acceptable national political framework that is fair to all.
Though widely agreed it needs restating that there should be greater regional and local autonomy in policy formulation, taxation and spending. This will permit local groups and other interests to have a real say in some relatively small but sometimes important issues.
These are the broad outlines of a power-sharing arrangement, the details of which will have to be established. However, it offers some real power-sharing; avoids gridlock and contains the possibility of developing real opposition in a truly politically differentiated polity.
Given the nature of our situation, with proper mobilisation on the part of those out of government, it will be extremely difficult for any one party to continually win the presidency without truly looking to the welfare of all the people and making important compromises.
The opposition, knowing that it has a chance to take government and that, with or without government, its constituency is well located in the power-sharing arrangement to take better care of its interest, will act more responsibly.