The ongoing debate on more inclusive forms of governance Current Affairs August 2004
Stabroek News
August 18, 2004

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Introduction

In a statement to the media at Le Meridien Pegasus before his departure on Friday former US President Jimmy Carter said that one of the key provisions of the National Development Strategy (NDS) is the establishment of "a participatory democracy, within which opposition parties would share fully in shaping policies of the nation." Also he said that there were promises of constitutional reform to facilitate the emergence of a participatory democracy.

Carter noted however, that instead of achieving the crucial goal of inclusive and shared governance, the country remains divided as a result of the winner-take-all concept that continues to polarize many aspects of the country's life.

He disclosed that in his discussions with President Jagdeo and Corbin he had shared his thoughts on the steps that should be taken to ensure political harmony, peace and stability. One of the steps, he suggested, is the creation of an independent political forum "to lead a structured national discussion on a vision of governance of the country to promote reconciliation and the NDS." He said that even if the other measures were not pursued and there was a good faith effort to create the forum the Carter Center would support those efforts.

He also told reporters that the issue should be discussed by the President and Corbin, the National Assembly and the parliamentary committee on constitutional reform and that both the PNC's paper on Shared Governance and that of the PPP on Inclusive Governance should be on the table.
Donald Ramotar General Secretary of the PPP

As part of its continuing efforts to assist the Guyanese people in making informed decisions, Current Affairs sets out below the paper on Shared Governance issued by the PNCR in December 2002. This paper, the PNCR said, was intended to stimulate discussion on shared/inclusive governance and was not cast in stone.

The PPP's reaction was that the recent constitutional amendments should be given a chance to work and it put forward a number of proposals in a paper presented by President Jagdeo at State House in February 2003.

The PNC's proposal for power-sharing

I. BACKGROUND

1. In recent months there has been much discussion on the issue of shared governance. The public debate has been given considerable impetus as a result of the Leader's Address to the party's congress. The statement that "adjusted governance is an idea whose time has come" has made it necessary for the party to develop firm positions on the principles of the new governance arrangements.

II. PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING SHARED GOVERNANCE

2. The new system of governance must facilitate national development, the enrichment of the nation and the involvement and security of all Guyanese by instituting appropriate provisions to address the political, economic and social concerns and aspirations of all groups.

3. All significant political groups of society must be represented in the national executive decision-making process. Proportional representation (as determined by periodic national election) should be used to fix each party's level of involvement in the national government.

4. Measures must be put in place to enable appropriate representation of special groups (e.g., women, Amerindians, youth) in the national decision-making process.

5. Predetermined structures and procedures must be enshrined in the constitution or in any multiparty agreement to facilitate decision-making by consensus and to resolve disputes in the national executive.

6. The larger the margin of victory of the winning party, the fewer should be the inhibitions to the exercise of its powers in the multi-party executive.

7. The executive and legislative decision-making processes must be designed to discourage foot-dragging and undue delays by setting decision deadlines beyond which special mechanisms would be triggered.

8. The parliamentary committee on constitution reform must keep the new political arrangement under constant review through its own research and analysis, and by encouraging and examining submissions from the public.

9. The inclusionary democracy approach should infuse all aspects of national decision-making that have to do with resource allocation (tender boards, state boards, land selection committees, etc).

10. The new government must be subject to independent, powerful and effective mechanisms of oversight and scrutiny.

11. The new system of governance must mandate the participation of the public and civic society in national decision-making.

12. The new system must expressly provide mechanisms for the economic empowerment of the disadvantaged.

13. There must be broad agreement on a national developmental programme.

III. FACILITATIVE CONDITIONS FOR SHARED GOVERNANCE IN GUYANA

14. Several conditions promote the potential for success of multiparty governance in Guyana:

* The ability of the major parties to sit and discuss rationally (the Constitutional review process),

* the presence of strong partiocracy (the situation when parties can control or manage the actions of their supporters, thereby maximising the chances that agreements struck among party leaders will be respected by most party members). This factor is advanced as one of the main reasons for the success of Belgian's power-sharing government,

* the interests of international stakeholders (financial institutions) in preventing failure,

* convergence of ideologies among the main parties (a point in case: both major parties have publicly endorsed free enterprise).

IV. NON-EXECUTIVE HEAD OF STATE

15. We recommend the establishment of a non-executive President as Head of State. The presidency will constitute a moral, symbolic and, in a few cases, statutory authority standing over and above the dynamics of party politics. The nature and extent of the statutory authority is to be agreed on.

16. Specific functions will include:

* Assenting to bills,

* Acting as Commander-in-chief of the arm forces (see para. 54),

* Acting as a mediator in unresolved political disputes (see para. 36-37),

* Appointing presidential commissions of inquiry into suspected government misconduct.

17. Appointment. The president will be appointed for a seven-year renewable term on a multi-party vote in parliament. A seven-year term ensures the presidency straddles the holding of national elections and reduces the pressure on the officeholder to pander to the parties in hopes of re-appointment.

18. Removal. During his/her term of office, the president could be removed only on specified grounds by a weighted parliamentary vote.

V. EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES IN THE MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT

19. The make-or-break point in shared-governance arrangements is the decision-making process in the multiparty executive. Based on research of coalition (power-sharing) governments of several countries (New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Iceland, Bel-gium, and Ireland), the committee considers the following ideas best suited to Guyana's conditions.

20. Adopting the practice of most coalition governments, the partners in the government must first work out and sign a Coalition Agreement. The agreement must encompass:

* a policy platform (based on the national development programme and a merger of ideas from party manifestoes),

* portfolio allocation and party responsibilities, and

* the decision-making structures and procedures within the executive.

21. The agreement must be publicised, as the public then can monitor the process and assess the compliance of coalition partners with the spirit and provisions of the agreement and the constitution.

22. The primary objective of the coalition decision-making process must be to facilitate consensus and to avoid surprises (significant unannounced unilateral action) by setting up rigid mechanisms for communication, consultation and dispute resolution within the executive itself.

23. Decision-making in the governing executive will be a mixture of collective responsibility (where consensus has been reached) and single-party responsibility (where no consensus has been reached or where unilateral actions are allowed).

Council of Ministers (Cabinet)

24. The Council of Ministers will be the highest executive decision-making body. It will comprise all ministers of government, parliamentary secretaries and (probably) government advisors. The Council is the point through which all cabinet matters must be channeled for discussion and approval. These matters are:

* all policy issues,

* proposals that will affect government's financial position or commitments,

* matters concerning the machinery of government,

* decisions and actions, allowed under the statutory powers granted to Ministers, that would affect the collective interest of government,

* proposals involving new legislation or regulations,

* government responses to select committee recommendations,

* controversial matters,

* all but the most minor public appointments,

* the release of important government documents, papers and reports,

* matters affecting the interests of a number of ministries.

25. The Council will be chaired by the Prime Minister and will meet at stipulated times. A quorum will be two-thirds of the members of each of the major parties.

26. Decisions will be by consensus, failing which the matter is sent for resolution to the Standing Coalition Management Committee.

Standing Coalition

Management Committee

27. The Coalition Management Committee comprises the leaders (and possibly also senior party members) of the political parties in the Council. It is therefore a forum of summiteers (similar to the current inter-party dialogue), with two important roles: overall management of the coalition arrangement and to serve as the highest forum for dispute resolution.

28. The management committee will meet as often as necessary, and could be summoned at the request of any party leader in the coalition. The Prime Minister will chair meetings. To form a quorum, all the major parties must be represented.

Ministerial Working Groups

29. The main arenas for consultation, coordination and negotiation among parties will be the standing Ministerial Working Groups. These are sub-committees of the Council of Ministers, comprising, at minimum, key ministers from the coalition groups, selected MPs, civil service heads and government advisors. Mandates of sub-committees should be broad enough to facilitate coordination among related government ministries. Suggested fields include foreign affairs, economic policy, and social policy.

30. From the experience of other countries, working groups are most effective as informal decision-making forums (referred to in Finland as "government evening classes"). Their fundamental objective is to process issues so that they need only be formally dealt with at full meetings of the Council of Ministers.

31. All initiatives (whether bills, policies, etc) from the various Ministries therefore must be first sent to the relevant subcommittee, as the first point of inter-party discussion and bargaining, before being forwarded to the Council of Ministers.

32. Notwithstanding, the Council may delegate authority to a subcommittee to make final decisions.

Procedures for Unresolved Issues

33. Preparations have to be made for those occasions when internal mechanisms for achieving consensus fail. These so-called "agree to disagree" situations, hopefully, should be rare, but have to be managed to avoid destabilising the coalition.

34. The basic requirement is for unresolved issues to be in relation to different party positions, and not in relation to difference in opinions of individual Ministers. In fact, dissociation of individual Ministers from Council decisions outside the agreed coalition processes should be discouraged.

35. Unresolved issues are treated differently depending in which of the two categories they fall:

* those a coalition party identifies as inimical to race relations in the country, and

* those that are identified as issues of "party distinction".

Matters harmful to race relations

36. Any initiative put forward by a party in the coalition that any of its major partners declares to be potentially harmful to race relations can pass only on a vote of a majority of members of each party in the Council or in the parliament (in Belgium, a party can exercise a suspensive veto to temporary stop the measure). If all attempts at internal dispute resolution fail, the matter is sent to the State President for a judgement. However, he/she must first seek advice, and any guidelines for correction, from the Ethnic Relations Commission, which must hold a public hearing on the matter.

37. If the Head of State, acting in accordance with the ERC, rules that the measure is indeed harmful to race relations, the coalition partner must withdraw and amend the measure along the proposed guidelines before resubmitting it to the Ministerial working group. If the Head of State rules that the measure is not harmful to race relations, the matter could be implemented and is considered a collective decision of the Council.

Matters of "Party Distinction"

38. Unresolved matters identified by a coalition partner, other than the proposing party, as an issue that fundamentally separates the parties are sent to the parliament. There, the appropriate parliamentary sectoral committee must discuss the matter in a public session, before submitting its recommendations to the full House. Parties are allowed in speech and in vote to differentiate on the issue. The matter requires a simple majority to pass, and dissenting parties are no longer under any obligation of collective responsibility for that particular issue.

VI. ALLOCATION OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS

39. The number of portfolios each qualified party is entitled to will be determined by the election results. Parties have to garner above a minimum threshold of votes (5%) to qualify to join the governing coalition.

40. The Prime Ministership goes to the party that garnered the largest national support.

41. Distribution of portfolios will be as follows:

* The number of Ministries and their responsibilities would be fixed by Acts of Parliament.

* Stage 1: the parties attempt to decide on allocation through discussion within a specified timeframe (a week?).

* Stage 2: if no agreement is reached in the first stage, the selection process is done by an alternating pick system based on the principle of largest remainder, with the party with the largest number of votes in the polls being granted the first pick.

VII. PARLIAMENT IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

42. In the shared-governance constitution, the executive government will still be accountable to Parliament. However, because of the nature of the decision-making process within the executive (especially its consensus-driven relations), the dynamics of parliament inevitably will change.

43. The parliament will still be required to perform three functions:

* pass legislation and grant statutory powers,

* appropriate and empower government to use public funds, and

* srutinise and conduct inquiries into the policy, administration and expenditure of government.

44. In Guyana, the same parties that will dominate the government will also dominate the parliament. Given also the existence of strong party control over MPS (partiocracy), the parliament will likely endorse and support the joint decisions of the coalition government. This situation becomes acceptable, as these decisions would have already been processed by inter-party negotiations in the Council of Ministers and in Select Committee where MP's can make their imput. However, there should be provision for MP's (especially regional MP's) not involved in the NEC to dissent.

45. Nevertheless, the structure and functions of parliament should not in any way be weakened or diluted, as it is the only forum for citizens, interest groups, independent MPs, non-government parties and other stakeholders to influence the actions of government. Parliament is also the largest window through which the public can see into the operations of government. In view of this, the following features should supplement the recent constitutional amendments affecting parliament:

46. Law-making

All government bills, after their first reading, must be sent to the appropriate select committee for public "hearing of evidence" sessions. Allowances are made for exceptions if:

* the House adopts a motion of the subject Minister that the bill should not go to select committee because it is uncontroversial and no individual or group has formally indicated its intention to give evidence on the bill before the select committee.

* the House adopts a motion of the subject Minister that the bill should not go to select committee because it is urgent.

* the House adopts a motion of the subject Minister that the bill should not go to select committee because prior consultations were held with all interested groups and individuals in drafting the bill, and no other individual or group has formally indicated its intention to give evidence on the bill before the select committee.

47. Parliamentary debates

Provisions should be made in the Standing Orders for periodic General Debates in parliament during which MPs could speak on any issue of their own choice.

48. Public petitions

The practice of public petitions should be reactivated in Guyana politics. Citizens should be encouraged to submit petitions to parliament on matters affecting them. Select committees would be the forum for processing these petitions and will make recommendations to the full House.

49. Unresolved coalition matters

Matters of policy, which the coalition partners are unable to resolve within the Council of Ministers, should be channeled to select committees for public hearings. The committees would then be responsible to seek expert and other opinion on the issue, before making its recommendations to parliament. As discussed above, the matter could be passed by a majority vote of the full House, but would not obligate dissenting parties to shoulder any collective responsibility in that instance.

50. Select committees

As envisaged by the recent constitutional amendments, government accountability to the parliament would be mainly actualised through the select committees. In the new environment, it becomes critical that the chairmanship of these committees be opposite to the parties holding responsibility for the corresponding ministries.

VIII. REDEFINITION OF OPPOSITION POLITICS

51. Inevitably, the multiparty government system will redefine opposition politics in Guyana. The political parties, which traditionally would be identified as the opposition, will now be partners in the governing executive. The interparty political debate and discussion, therefore, would no longer be conducted in the public domain but behind the closed doors of the Council of Ministers. The committee recognises that this is an undesirable eventuality, and have proposed steps to, one, open the government decision-making process to public and civic society participation as well as scrutiny.

IX. MECHANISMS TO INCREASE PUBLIC AND CIVIC SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

52. To reduce the likelihood of the emergence of executive dictatorship in the new multiparty government, the committee recommends the following ideas:

* Select committee meetings should be in the form of public hearings, bar exceptional circumstances,

* Consultation with stipulated interest groups (regional MPs, trade unions, private sector, municipalities, etc) on major government policies and measures must be mandatory. j2

X. MEASURES TO INCREASE

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

53. As in any democracy, the government must be held accountable to the people. Given the fact that the traditional opposition parties will be in the coalition, the committee recommends the following special provisions to supplement those already enshrined in the constitution.

* Publication of the minutes of meetings of the full cabinet, bar sensitive issues of national security, foreign affairs and trade,

* Enactment of Freedom of Information legislation,

* Granting of powers to the president to commission inquiries into government misconduct, and

* More effective and robust government oversight authorities, such as the Auditor General and the constitution commissions, and the redefinition of the scope and powers of the Ombudsman.

XI CONTROL OF THE MILITARY FORCES

54. The proposed non-executive president will be the Commander-in-Chief of the military. He/she will, however, only act on the advice of the Defence Board, which must include in its composition the leaders of the main political parties in the government. XII. UNCHANGED PROVISIONSIN THE CONSTITUTION

55. The following constitutional provisions would remain essentially unchanged.

* Provisions for local government,

* Provisions for the establishment of all constitution commissions,

* Provisions governing individual rights and freedoms,

* Provisions for the independence of the Judiciary and the Auditor General.

XIII. REFERENDUM

56. After a period of ten years, a referendum will be held to determine whether the shared governance arrangement should be continued.

The PPP/C Government's response

Pioneering Constitutional Reform and Good Governance

The People's Progressive Party (PPP) was established in 1950 as a multi-ethnic organisation with the aim of winning independence and achieving social justice for all the people of British Guiana. The founders of the PPP were convinced of the need for such a Party to involve the broad masses for a successful challenge to colonialism and to improve the quality of life of the people. The PPP demanded constitutional reform with the objective of expanding rights and improving governance in all its aspects. The PPP was, therefore, a pioneer in the political campaign for good governance.

The first important victory of the PPP was constitutional reform allowing for universal adult suffrage for the people of British Guiana and a ministerial system of Government. After the first general elections held in 1953, which the PPP won by a landslide, the improved constitution was suspended and the colonial authorities persecuted the PPP leaders.

National unity forged by the PPP was shattered by an engineered division of the Party, which resulted in the formation of the People's National Congress (PNC).

Despite the division, in all subsequent free and fair elections, the PPP or the PPP/C won a percentage of votes far larger than the size of any single ethnic group.

The reason for this consistent success is that the PPP has unwaveringly promoted national unity even in the most difficult days of subversion. The late Leader of the PPP and President of Guyana, Dr. Cheddi Jagan reflects this position in the following statements:

"Regardless of race or ethnic origin, let us consolidate our forces, win new support and march forward to victory…Racism is the greatest curse of our land…anyone who spreads racial propaganda must be severely dealt with. Such a person is an enemy to himself and his country."

(Dr. Cheddi Jagan, 1965).

"Unity of the working class regardless of race is vital. If we are to go forward, the party must have the backing not of one race, but of all races. We must take the offensive. We must combat racism mercilessly and build a disciplined party…" (Dr. Cheddi Jagan, 1967)

The PPP won the 1957 elections after the colonial authorities reinstated constitutional rule. It again succeeded in securing constitutional reform in 1961 when it won elections for the second consecutive time after the suspension of the constitution. It assumed office under an advanced constitution which introduced "self government". The British Government gave the undertaking that independence would be negotiated before the next general elections due in 1965. However, the PPP Government was severely destabilised between 1962 and 1964. The Government was not allowed to serve out its term because of the imposition of early elections with a change in the electoral system from first-past-the-post to proportional representation in order to facilitate the removal of the PPP.

It was as a result of the rejection of efforts towards political unity, increasingly authoritarian rule and elections rigging from 1968 to 1990 that broad unity was sought by the PPP with other opposition forces. The unity which was generated aided the restoration of democracy in 1992 in which the Carter Centre led by Nobel Laureate and former US President Jimmy Carter and other international organisations, including the Commonwealth, played a major role. As a result, the PPP/Civic won the elections and assumed office.

The historical record is unchallengeable: Since the division in 1955, the PPP made continuous efforts to arrive at arrangements with the PNC to maintain and ensure the unity of the Guyanese people. These efforts were particularly intense during the periods 1961 to 1964, 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1985. The PNC rejected these efforts categorically describing them at one time as only "superficially attractive."

The struggle for good governance

During the years of authoritarian rule the PPP on its own or in unity with other opposition groups, parties and members of civil society, resisted all efforts to destroy democratic and constitutional rule in Guyana.

Among the issues which the PPP campaigned against were:

- Elections rigging between 1968 and 1990;

- Abolition of appeals to the Privy Council on constitutional matters.

- Politicisation of the Judiciary and Security Forces

- Political and ethnic discrimination

- Abolition of Press Freedom

- Subversion of independent institutions.

- Corruption and poor accountability.

- Party paramountcy over the institutions and organs of the State

- The 1978 rigged referendum and the 1980 imposed Constitution.

During this period the PPP continually sought unity and explored proposals to generate ethnic security and a restoration of

The commitment to democracy, constitutional reform and inclusive governance

As a result of the PPP's commitment to democracy it embraced constitutional reform and inclusive and participatory governance as part of its platform for the 1992 general and regional elections. This resulted in the formation of the PPP/Civic alliance to contest those elections.

Upon its accession to office in October 1992, the PPP/Civic Government inherited one of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries in the hemisphere with, inter alia:

- Over 90 percent of revenue being used to service external debt;

- Over 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line;

- Severe macro-economic imbalances including a fiscal deficit of 25 percent of GDP and a balance of payments deficit of 47 percent of GDP;

- High interest rates;

- Runaway inflation;

- Dilapidated physical and social infrastructure;

- Lack of public accountability; and

- Mass migration leading to a severe "brain drain"

Today, the debt servicing is less than 40 percent of revenue, the population below the poverty line has been reduced by half, the balance of payments and fiscal deficits are below 10 percent of GDP, interest rates have been cut in half and for the last eight years inflation is in single digits. The physical and social infrastructure has been significantly rehabilitated. In addition, the Government has made significant progress in advancing good governance and financial accountability through the introduction of the following measures:

- Return of and respect for democratic norms;

- Independent functioning of State institutions;

- Expansion of press freedom;

- Participation of the Opposition on state boards;

- Amendment of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly to allow for Standing Committees;

- Reintroduction of financial accountability especially through the submission of annual reports of the public accounts by the Auditor General;

- Reform of the tendering process;

- Appointment of the Integrity Commission;

- Introduction of legislation to prevent discrimination and marginalisation at the work place;

- Fair and transparent financial and resource allocation to regions, sectors and communities.

The PPP/C Government's attempts to establish a Race Relations Commission failed due to the lack of opposition support.

The achievements set out above are not exhaustive but a mere indication of the substantial work done by the PPP/C Government to restore good governance and participatory democracy to Guyana.

Constitutional reform commenced during the Cheddi Jagan Government by the appointment of a Select Committee on which the Opposition was represented. The Select Committee travelled to many parts of the country and compiled several volumes of evidence. However, it was unable to conclude its report and make its recommendations because Parliament was dissolved and elections called for December, 1997.

Constitutional Reform

and Inclusive Governance

In 1997, the PPP/C won the elections, which were certified as free and fair by international observers. Once again sustained destablisation activities created instability, threatened social peace and obstructed the functioning of government offices. In order to ensure that the situation did not spin out of control, the PPP/C agreed to major compromises in the Herdmanston Accord. The Government's term of office was reduced by two years, it agreed to an audit of the elections and undertook to continue the process of constitutional reform.

The Audit concluded that the elections were free and fair.

A Constitutional Reform Commission was established and the PPP/C agreed to substantial reforms that advance the process of inclusive governance.

The Constitution was amended to provide for:

(a) Reducing the powers of the President;

(b) An Opposition veto on the appointment of the Chancellor and Chief Justice;

(c) Expanding the functions of the Judicial Service Commission;

(d) Strengthening the financial independence of the Judiciary and

Auditor General;

(e) Institutionalising participation by social groups in the decision making process;

(f) Expanding human rights;

(g) Involving the National Assembly in the appointment of Service Commissions (Public, Police, Judicial and Teaching);

(h) Modifying the electoral system for national and local government elections;

(i) Establishing of five Standing Com-mittees to examine and review government policy in the social, economic, foreign policy and natural resources sectors;

(j) A Parliamentary Management Commit-tee;

(k) A Human Rights Commission;

(l) An Ethnic Relations Commission;

(m) A Procurement Commission;

(n) A Standing Committee on Constitut-ional Reform;

(o) A Commission to review the functioning and composition of the security forces; and

(p) Commissions on the Rights of the Child, Gender Rights and Indigenous Peoples.

These and other reforms make the Guyana Constitution the most advanced in terms of inclusiveness and Opposition involvement in governance in the Caribbean region and certainly one of the most advanced in the world.

The Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Procurement Commissions established in a bi-partisan way together can address allegations of police excesses, ethnic discrimination and corruption, which are some of the main unsubstantiated accusations which the Opposition has levelled against the Government. However, these and the other reforms now provided for by the Constitution to deal with these issues have not been given effect to because of the current boycott of Parliament by the Opposition.

In addition to the above, the constitutional standing committees of Parliament and the Parliamentary Management Committee have not been established nor have the commissions on social groups, which include commissions on Rights of the Child, Gender Rights and Indigenous People.

The PPP/C once again won the 2001 general elections under a modified electoral system. These elections were certified as free and fair by international observers, including the Carter Centre, the Commonwealth, the OAS, the European Union and CARICOM. Immediately after the conclusion of the elections, the PNCR opposition organized extensive protest demonstrations.

Consistent with the PPP and the Govern-ment's position on dialogue, as stated by President Bharrat Jagdeo below, an invitation was issued to the late Mr. Desmond Hoyte, then Leader of the PNC/R to dialogue.

"I extend a hand of friendship to those who are in opposition and invite them to sit with us and iron out differences so that we can have a common cause to serve - a cause in service to our people and nation". (President Jagdeo, August 11, 1999)

"It is critical that we engage one another in dialogue. We should always reach out and talk to each other. In this way, we would be fulfilling the mandate of all Guyanese as we share our differing views in the search for national consensus on the common objective of making this country a better place for all". (President Jagdeo, March 31, 2001)

Arising from the agreements, the following bi-partisan committees were established:

- Local government reform;

- Border and national security;

- Distribution of land and houselots;

- Resuscitation of the bauxite industry;

- Depressed communities' needs; and

- Radio monopoly and non-partisan boards

The achievements of

the dialogue included:

a) Depressed Communities Needs Committee: Four areas were identified by the Committee: Non Pariel/Enterprise, Buxton, De Kinderen and Meten-eer-Zorg. The Govern-ment had set aside $60M to do work in these areas. The agreed development work has been carried out in all of the four communities.

b) The Report of Border and National Security Committee: The committee met on a number of occasions and produced a report. President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte met with members of the committee and agreed that the report will be tabled in the National Assembly for the consideration of the Sectoral Commi-ttee on Foreign Affairs when it is formed.

c) National Policy on Distribution of Land and House lots: Both President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte rejected the report of the Committee on the distribution of land and house lots. It was agreed that the Government would table a white paper on land distribution and the criteria for selection by the end of February 2002. However Parliament did not meet until March 15th, 2002. The White Paper was tabled.

d) The Bauxite Industry Resuscitation Committee: On February 19, 2002, President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte met with the members of the Bauxite Resuscitation Committee. It was agreed that it would focus on the LINMINE privatisation issue. A negotiating team comprising representatives from the Government and the Opposition would be set up to engage OMAI/Cambior for the privatisation of LINMINE. On February 19th, 2002, Mr. Hoyte was asked to submit his representative, which he subsequently did. This has resulted in a MOU between the Government of Guyana and Omai/Cambior.

e) The Report of the Radio Monopoly and Non-partisan Media Boards: The report was presented to President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte. It was noted that no agreement was reached on the issue of the National Frequency Manage-ment Unit (NFMU) at the committee level. On February 18th, 2002, Mr. Hoyte suggested to President Jagdeo that the Government of Guyana proceed he proceeds with the drafting of necessary legislation pending agreement on the issue of the NFMU. By February 19th, 2002, President Jagdeo had informed Mr. Hoyte that the report was sent to the Attorney General Chambers so that the drafting process could start. It would be useful to note that on November 7th, 2001, President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte signed a Memorandum of Understand-ing, which cleared the way for the passage of the amendment to the Wireless Telegraphy Regulations (which was agreed to by the joint committee) and the establishment of an interim Advisory Committee on Broadcasting with respect to compliance by television stations licensees.

f) Local Government Reform Committee: The Joint Task force on Local Government Reform has made tremendous progress up to the time its mandate expired on May 18th, 2002. The Committee has made a request for an extension of the mandate by three months, so that it could wind up its work.

Other progress made

by the dialogue included:

1. PNC/R Membership on State Boards, Commission and Committees: Mr. Hoyte had raised the issue of PNC/R participation on boards. As a result, PNC/R nominees were named to serve on over 50 state boards, commissions and committees.

2. Creation of post of Head of the Public Service: President Jagdeo and Mr. Hoyte agreed "to create a position of a formal Head of the Public Service separate and distinct from the political post of Head of the Presidential Secretariat."

3. Parliamentary Management Committee and Sectoral Committees: At the February 18 and 19th, 2002 dialogue meetings, the President, once again, suggested to Mr. Hoyte that since their representatives (Messrs Persaud and Carberry) were unable to reach agreement on the issue, they should discuss this outstanding matter at their level. Mr. Hoyte, in response, suggested that the matter should be dealt with at a subsequent meeting.

On March 14, 2002, the PNCR surprisingly, put the dialogue on pause despite the above achievements alleging that agreements were not fulfilled.

Building Trust

Post-independence politics in Guyana has been characterized by a lack of trust between the two main political parties despite the determined efforts of the PPP and the PPP/C.

Recently, executive power sharing has been proposed as a solution to Guyana's problems. Quite apart from the negative consequences associated with executive power sharing such as the institutionalisation of ethnic rivalry and the absence of political opposition, no contrived system of governance will succeed in a situation where trust and good faith do not exist between the political parties.

The PPP/C believes that a conscious effort is required by the major political parties to build trust and establish confidence. Without such trust, suspicion will continue, motives will be questioned, policies will be judged on distorted criteria, resource allocation will always be followed by allegations of partisanship and agreements will be difficult to be arrived at. It is not even possible at this time to sign a crime communiqué as proposed by the Social Partners.

The PPP/C proposes the implementation of all the constitutional reforms as an immediate measure to building trust and to further enhance inclusive governance. In this regard, the parties will be required to collaborate on:

- the appointment of the Rights Commiss-ions;

- the appointment of the Parliamentary Management Committee;

- the appointment of the Service Commiss-ions; and

- the appointment of the Standing Commit-tees.

The establishment of these and other bodies provided for in the Constitution and their optional functioning will generate confidence and increasing co-operation and good-will.

The PPP/C will expand on these efforts by encouraging broader co-operation by all forces in the society involved in public affairs but particularly the political parties.

These collaborative efforts would include:

(a) establishing means and facilities to enhance the work of Members of Parliament and strengthening their ability to present their views in legislative matters and to represent their constituents.

(b) improving the discourse between Government and Opposition through the appointment of Shadow Cabinet Ministers who can represent their views on policy to the Government and be apprised of policy developments by the Government.

(c) improving ties between the political parties through discussions and debates which will also contribute to building confidence.

(d) devising additional ways and means of working closer together in a non-partisan way at the local government level where national political controversies generate less divisions and where development and implementation issues give rise to the possibility of greater co-operation in the short term.

These measures which are vital for our political development and the emergence of a new political culture characterized by greater trust, civility and commitment to the national interest.

The PPP/C is encouraged by recent pronouncements by the main opposition party which indicate a commitment for constructive engagement. We hope that these engagements will result in the acceptance of these and other proposals to solve national issues, to build trust and to improve relations between our political parties.

In an environment created by deepening trust and confidence, further arrangements for inclusive governance can result after consultation with our constituents and the electorate.